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Indo-Bengal
POLITICAL AND MILITARY

and the
EVENTS

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IN BRITISH INDIA,

FROM THE YEARS 1756 TO 1849.

19549

BY

MAJOR WILLIAM HOUGH,

LATE A DEPUTY JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, BENGAL ARMY;

AUTHOR OF SEVERAL WORKS ON MILITARY LAW, ON "THE
EXPEDITION TO CABOOL UNDER LORD KEANE;" AND
THE "RETREAT OF THE CABOOL FORCE,
IN 1842;" ETC., ETC.

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
VOL. I.

LONDON:

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
DEDICATION.

*To the OFFICERS OF HER MAJESTY'S ARMY AND NAVY, and
of the HONOURABLE EAST INDIA COMPANY'S CIVIL,
MILITARY, and NAVAL SERVICES.*

The Author served forty years in India, and as the officers of Her Majesty's and of the East India Company's services are both equally included in the operations during the several wars in India, he is of opinion that the above dedication is appropriate to the occasion. He has written without any party views. His object has been to endeavour to produce a work that may be useful to those entering the service; who may not have the means of referring to the numerous works and authorities quoted in these volumes.

LONDON, ORIENTAL CLUB,

12th November 1852





INTRODUCTION.

It is presumed that the subject of Indian affairs must be interesting to all those now in the service of the East India Company; to those who have retired from it; and likewise to persons who may hereafter enter the military profession in India. To the relations and friends of all the above classes, even, the present publication may not be without its value.

The earlier period of the East India Company's connexion with India, when only possessed of factories, and in the character of "merchants trading to the East Indies," was important chiefly in a mercantile and commercial point of view; deprived of the trade of India (1813), and of the trade to China (1833), they assumed a new character—that of sovereigns.

The battle of Plassey gave us a "*locus standi*"

in Bengal, in 1757, and the grant of the Dewanee 1765, yielding £2,000,000 a year, gave the first considerable revenue. We found a Mohammedan power paramount. The battle of Plassey enabled us to appoint a new nawab in place of Suraj-ud Dowlah, who had captured Calcutta from us, in 1756. We were opposed by the vizier of Oude, and even by the fugitive Emperor of Delhi—whose position was caused by the decadence of the Imperial Government, and the breaking up of the empire into pieces, each governed by an independent prince. We defeated both Ahmed Shah of Cabool, who had before invaded Hindostan, and left it, replacing the lawful sovereign on his throne. The battle of Panniput in 1761, fought between Ahmed Shah and the Mahrattahs, decided the fate of the latter,—the Mohammedans, however, never formed a stable government,—and the nominal emperor (Shah Allum), who had not ascended his throne, placed himself under our protection, and resided at Allahabad. In 1771, the Mahrattahs made a great effort to become paramount in power, by placing the emperor on his throne at Delhi—de-

signing to govern in his name. The Mahrattahs originally resided in the south of India—this movement brought them to the north. The only rising Mohammedan power was that of Hyder Ali, of Mysore. The Mahrattahs were recovering their power; the English stood in their way to the realisation of a Mahrattah empire; and the native powers, both Hindoo and Mohammedan, conceived the idea of adopting the military discipline of Europeans. At times the nizam was supported by the French: next he placed himself under the protection of the English.

Our policy of endeavouring to gain a formidable ally among the Mahrattahs, and thus to protect our provinces in Bengal and in the Carnatic, induced us to support the claim of Rugonath Rao to the office of peishwa. This involved us in a Mahrattah war which ended in 1782. Hyder Ali of Mysore, attacked us at Madras in 1780, and continued his war till his death (1782), when his son, Tippoo Sultan, continued the war till 1784; when, deprived of his French officers by the peace of 1783, his means of aggression were lessened, by the want of support.

For many years there had been no legitimate head of the Mahrattah or of the Mohammedans. The raja of Satara was a prisoner—the emperor was likewise a prisoner at Delhi; till we released him, in 1803, by the victory gained near that city. The peishwa's power had become weak, and Holkar and Sindia, both, desired to hold the paramount authority at Poona. The peishwa fled; we restored him to his throne. This displeased the Mahrattah chiefs, who considered the management of his affairs to be a Mahrattah (*family*) arrangement. This led to the Mahrattah war of 1803-4. In 1816, we made a new treaty with the peishwa. This caused the Mahrattah war of 1817-18. The difference between the Mahrattahs and the Mohammedans, was this: the former had no *external* relations—the latter had several powers to appeal to.

In 1789, Tippoo Sultan attacked our ally of Travancore; we supported the raja; defeated Tippoo and took half his dominions. Zemaun Shah of Cabool, desired to invade India. Tippoo applied to the Mohammedan powers of Constantinople, Cabool, Persia, and even to the native

princes of India; and addressed Napoleon and the French Directory, to aid him in the re-establishment of the Mohammedan power in India. This led to the second war with Tippoo—to the capture of Seringapatam, and his death in 1799. There was a great difference in the wars between the Mahrattahs and the Mohammedans; in the latter case, they expected to be aided by the French; and thus the war became more complicated—hence we sent an expedition to Egypt; another to the Isle of France; and a third to Java.

When, in the early wars in India, the English had to contend against large bodies of cavalry and horsemen, we never could bring them to action; our infantry and guns made too slow movements; it only remained to capture their forts. When the French and foreign officers induced the native princes to give an European discipline to their infantry, then battles were fought upon a large scale. The result often astonished the victors; but numbers failed against the smaller British force.

The selection of the operations given in this

work, has not been made by the author with reference to any partiular Presidency. He has endeavoured to show that the Mahrattahs have been our great antagonists. The Marquis Wellesley, the most talented Governor-general we ever had in India, desired to keep the Mahrattahs to the south of India. In 1803, we found M. Perron, with a large disciplined army, and with a powerful artillery, in the service of Sindia, paramount in authority in our present upper provinces, in the north of India.

The danger to India is not, in the present day, *external*, but *internal*; and, so long as we promote the well-being of the nations of British India, preserve their social and religious institutions, and do not interfere with their laws of inheritanee and adoption, which are part and pareel of their religion, we shall have nothing to fear internally. Education is the stepping-stone to all knowledge.

W. HOUGH, MAJOR.

LONDON, ORIENTAL CLUB,
12th November, 1852.

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¹ As they had done formerly to Egypt (1810), and the Isle of France (1810).

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POLITICAL
AND
MILITARY EVENTS IN INDIA.
1756—1849.

CHAPTER I.

It has been often remarked that the affairs of India do not interest the public in general. In the House of Commons, on the discussion regarding the renewal of the East India Company's Charter, in 1833,¹ the Right Hon. Mr. B. Macauley said "A broken head in Cold-bath Fields excites more attention and greater interest in this house, than three pitched battles in Hindostan." (Several honourable members, hear! hear!) Mr. Macauley,—“I am not in the slightest degree exaggerating. This is no figure of speech, it is a real

¹ Mirror of Parliament, vol. xxiv. p. 2916.

fact.” On a former night in discussing this bill,—
“There were fewer members in the house than generally attend the discussion of a Turnpike Act or a Road Bill.”

Since the passing of the last bill (28th August, 1833), there have been a great many committees' reports in different years,¹ and in 1848, there were no less than eight reports made by parliamentary committees on the products of India, of sugar, coffee, cotton, &c., so that much evidence has been taken, and it may be safely asserted that since the year 1829, there has been as much evidence collected on East India affairs, as was submitted to the houses of parliament in the whole period before the above year. Now, as the merchants of Liverpool and Manchester are very much interested in the trade to India, we may expect that blue books will not be scarce during the sessions intervening between the present time and the 30th of April, 1854.

The united companies became the present East India Company in 1708,² so that it began its

¹ 1834, 1835, 1836, 1838, 1839, 1840, 1841, 1844, 1848, 1849, 1850, 1851.

² Mill, vol. iii. p. 1. The original company was formed in the time of Queen Elizabeth.—Vol. i. p. 21, and a charter granted in A.D. 1600.

career under the auspicious reign of one queen (Anne) and it will, as is usual, petition the parliament in the reign of our gracious queen (Victoria) for a renewal of its lease; for Sir J. C. Hobhouse (now Lord Broughton) repudiated in 1851, the idea of the charter being renewed.

At very early periods the Company were indebted to the exertions of gentlemen of the medical profession. Orme states,¹ "the trade of this country (Bengal) was opened to the English by means of a surgeon named Boughton, who in 1636 was sent from Surat to Agra, to attend a favourite daughter of the emperor Shah Jehan, whom he cured, and the emperor, besides other favours, granted him a patent to trade free of customs throughout his dominions, with which Boughton proceeded to Bengal, intending to purchase goods in this province, and to carry them by sea to Surat."

His patent would probably have been little regarded, if the nabob of the province had not wanted his assistance to cure one of his favourite women, whom he likewise recovered; on which the nabob prevailed on him to remain in his service, giving him an ample stipend, and confirming the privilege of trade which he had ob-

¹ Vol. ii. p. 8.

tained at Agra, with a promise to extend it to all others of the English nation who should come to Bengal. Boughton wrote an account of his influence to the English governor at Surat, by whose advice the Company in 1640 sent two ships from England to Bengal, the agents of which being introduced to the nabob by Boughton, were received with courtesy, and assisted in their mercantile transactions; and the advantages gained by this trial, gave encouragement to prosecute the trade.

The second instance occurred in the last century. The emperor of Delhi, Furruk Shir, was ill. An embassy had been sent from Calcutta to Delhi,¹ consisting of John Surman and Edward Stephenson, two of the ablest factors of the Company, accompanied by an American named Serhaud. "The Moghul, despairing of the skill of his own empirics, was advised by Caundorah (his favourite) to employ the surgeon of the English embassy, named Hamilton, by whom he was in a few weeks perfectly cured; and, in gratitude for this service, promised to grant the ambassadors any indulgences which might be consistent with the dignity of his government. Soon after his recovery succeeded the festival of his mar-

¹ Vol. ii. p. 20. It reached Delhi on 8th July, 1715.

riage with the daughter of Jassing (Jy Sing), the principal rajah of the Rajpoot nation, which interrupted all other business, and obliged the ambassadors to wait six months before they could gain permission to present their petition."

It was presented in January 1716, but it seems nothing could be done till the vizier had been bribed. "Soon after, thirty-four patents, including the different subjects of the petition, were issued in the Moghul's name, and signed with his seal." The emperor was assassinated in 1719.

It was, therefore, gratifying to read of the installation of Sir James Thompson, now surgeon-general of Bengal, on the 23rd May, 1851, at the Government House, Calcutta, with due honour, on his appointment to be a Knight Commander of the (Military) Most Honourable Order of the Bath.¹ The Court of Directors made a move in the right direction, by recommending to the proper authorities, the conferring such a distinction on one of their servants,—a member of a profession to which the Company were so much indebted in its early days. It is said that the Missionary Society three or four years ago, sent a surgeon to Damascus, where he is doing much good. So much for the medical profession.

¹ Englishman, Calcutta, 24th May, 1851.

Passing over many transactions which occurred between the years 1708 and 1746, we come to an event of great importance; this was the capture of Madras by the French in that year:¹ Madras was then the principal settlement of the Company. It was restored at the peace in 1749. In June, 1756, the nawab of Bengal, Suraj-u-Dowlah, instigated by the Dutch and French, attacked and took Calcutta.² A force was sent from Madras, under Colonel Clive and Admiral Watson, which retook Calcutta on the 2nd of January, 1757. It was next resolved to attack the nawab, but as Chandernagore, belonging to the French, was situated between Calcutta and Moorshedabad, it was resolved to attack it first, as otherwise we should have an enemy in our rear. The French in Bengal had a force of three hundred Europeans, and a train of artillery, which, if added to the army of the nawab, would have rendered him a more powerful enemy; this force was commanded by M. Law. The nabob sent orders to the English to desist from the attack on Chandernagore, and even put part of his army in motion to prevent it. The place was reduced by the fire from Admiral Watson's ships, on the 23rd March, 1757.

¹ Mill. vol. iii. p. 53.

² Vol. iii. pp. 163, 174.

Clive had been desired by the Madras authorities to send the troops which had been employed in the above operations, back to Madras, for the governor was apprehensive of being attacked by the French. War between England and France was officially known to the admiral in the first week in March, 1757.¹ It was known that M. Bussy had marched on the 10th of May, and was five marches beyond Cuttack on his road towards Calcutta. It had been resolved to attack the nawab, and place Meer Jaffier on the musnud at Moorshedabad. It was necessary to detain the troops sent from Madras, as, without those, no operations could be undertaken against Suraj-u-Dowlah. As the case stood, it was to be feared that M. Bussy's force would join the nawab in another attack on Calcutta.² "Pressingly invited to come into this province" by the nawab, "we discovered that he was designing our ruin, by a conjunction with the French." Meer Jaffier having promised to aid us in our enterprise, but little opposition was to be expected against our troops. While we placed a friend on the musnud, in the room of an enemy, who had de-

¹ Malcolm's *Life of Clive*, vol. i. p. 186.

² Vol. i. p. 263.

stroyed our factory and fort at Calcutta, our own security demanded that we should deprive the nawab of all power to inflict on us a second injury. M. Law had been recalled from Patna, which is about three hundred miles from Moorshedabad. M. Bussy's force consisted of seven hundred Europeans and five thousand sepoy. M. Law's force was about two hundred¹ men. Malcolm says, "The dangers at Bengal, had Clive abandoned the scene, were immediate; and even if we suppose that Calcutta had not been retaken by the resentful Suraj-u-Dowlah, aided by the party of French² who still remained, it was certain that all those impressions and advantages which had been gained by the combined efforts of Admiral Watson and Clive, would have been lost, and future armaments required to restore the English in Bengal to that power from which they had fallen, and which was henceforth indispensable to their existence; for from the

¹ Malcolm's *Life of Clive*, vol. i. p. 287.

² Supposing Bussy neither came to Bengal, as was expected, nor sent any reinforcements to his countrymen, the strength of the party under Law, was above two hundred men, and a large proportion of officers. Clive's whole strength of Europeans in September, (the earliest time at which the season permitted his sailing to Madras) was only 500."

moment they had been compelled to undertake offensive operations against the native sovereign of the country, their reverting to their former condition of merchants was impossible." They would have had the French and Dutch to contend against, joined by the native powers, and must have even lost their trade.

On the 19th June, 1757, Clive¹ wrote to the secret committee in Calcutta, expressing his great anxiety at the little intelligence he received from Meer Jaffier, whom it was intended to place on the musnud. Clive wished to prevail on him to march out and join him at Plassey, the place of rendezvous. Meer Jaffier did not do more than write, that he would be found on the left of the nawab's army at the head of the horse, and indicating that there his flag would be seen. He had bought over most of the commanders of the horse. It seems that Meer Jaffier, by not joining Clive as proposed, gave the nawab confidence to try a battle; otherwise Suraj-u-Dowlah would, probably, have fortified himself at the city of Moorshedabad. A few day's delay might have been of consequence; the nawab fled during the battle. "Suraj-u-Dowlah was not discovered

¹ Malcolm, vol. i. p. 257.

till some days after his flight. However, he was at last taken¹ in the neighbourhood of Rajah-Mahul,² and brought to Moorshedabad on the 2nd instant (July), late at night." "Monsieur Law and his party came as far as Rajahmahul to Suraju-Dowlah's assistance, and were within three hours' march of him when he was taken. As soon as they heard of his misfortunes, they returned by forced marches." It is obvious that M. Law's party would have been of great service, had the nawab intended to hold out at his capital. Besides, as the season was so far advanced, every day's delay was of great consequence. It rained heavily on the 19th June.

On the 21st June, Clive³ called a council of war, and proposed the question, "Whether in our present situation, without assistance, and on our own bottom, it would be prudent to attack the nabob; or whether we should wait till joined by some country power?"

The votes were as follows, (from the Clive MSS.):—

¹ Malcolm, vol. i. p. 270.

² Seventy miles N.N.W. from Moorshedabad.

³ Malcolm, vol. i. p. 258.

NEGATIVE.	FOR IMMEDIATE ATTACK.
Robert Clive	Eyre Coote
James Kilpatrick	G. Alex. Grant
Archibald Grant	G. Muir
George Fredk. Goupp	Charles Palmer
Andrew Armstrong	Robert Campbell
Thomas Rumbold	Peter Carstairs
Christian Firkan	W. Jennings
John Cornelle	
H. Popham	

Clive, however, almost immediately afterwards "satisfied himself, that there was no other road to safety and honour, but by moving forward; and without consulting any individual,¹ much less the council of war he had so unwisely assembled, on the very evening of the day on which the council had been held, changing his purpose, he determined to march against the enemy, and accordingly gave orders for his army to cross the river the following morning." It is stated, that "before he carried this resolution into effect, he had received a letter from Meer

¹ Major Coote in the House of Commons said that "Clive spoke to him first, unasked, of the army marching."—*Parl. Reports*, vol. iii. p. 153.

Jaffier, which, though it in some degree removed the doubts he had before entertained of the sincerity of that leader, confirmed him in his opinion, that the success of the enterprise must wholly depend upon the advance of the British troops."

One circumstance to be remembered, is that Clive was driven to hostile proceedings against the nawab. Thus we find,¹ "Calcutta, which offered no resistance, was taken possession of on the 2nd January, 1757." Then² he writes on the 1st February, 1757, "We are encamped with our little army; and the nabob is at the head of 40,000 men to give us battle." Next,³ "The hopes indulged of an amicable disposition on the part of Suraj-u-Dowlah were soon dispelled by the military movements of that prince." On the 22nd February, he wrote to the secret committee, and reported the result of his attack to surprise the nawab's camp. Clive had 1,350 Europeans, and 800 sepoys; the nabob above 40,000 men. In a sharp action with part of that army during a fog, he lost two guns, one hundred and twenty Europeans, and one hundred sepoys. Preparations were making for another attack; but Suraj-

¹ Malcolm, vol. i. p. 155. ² Malcolm, vol. i. p. 171.

³ Malcolm, vol. i p. 173.

n-Dowlah made overtures for peace ! a treaty was concluded on the 9th February.

"The attack of Chandernagore¹ had been strongly recommended to Clive's attention (A. D. 1757) by the government of Madras ; and it was evident that, while the French left so strong a force at that settlement, the safety of Calcutta must be endangered whenever its garrison was weak, or the nabob of Bengal chose to contract an intimate alliance with our European enemy." M. Bussy had possession of the northern Circars. Malcolm says, " Whatever might be Bussy's intention, it was sufficiently obvious that he possessed the power of forming a junction² with the French force on the Ganges ; and it was equally obvious that such a junction would be ruinous to the English interests." The nawab had given his consent to our attacking Chandernagore, and then retracted it. Malcolm says, " The very ground which he urged, the expected advance through Cuttack of Bussy, was considered an additional reason for hastening the siege." The place was taken on the 23rd March, 1757.

¹ Malcolm, vol. i. p. 183.

² "The distance of the northern part of the country ceded to Bussy was not two hundred miles from Calcutta, through Cuttack."

M. Law¹ and his party had been sent away from Moorshedabad by the nawab, who "at first seemed not to oppose the surrender of this small party of the French to the English; he afterwards pretended to banish them from his dominions, and they marched from Moorshedabad for Patna, but in consequence of a note² from the nabob, M. Law remained at Rajmahal, the manager of which district had been directed to supply him with money, and to aid him in every way he could until Bussy's approach." The nabob by these acts, by his positive refusal to allow the English to proceed up the river, by his non-performance of some of the articles of the treaty, and by his advancing a part of his army to Plassey, had placed himself in a position hostile to the Company. But he artfully desired to throw the odium of renewed hostilities upon the English. He complained of the continuance in the field of the troops under Clive, and of the fleets lying off Chandernagore. If the British

¹ Malcolm, vol. i. p. 211.

² Translation of a note from Suraj-u-Dowlah to M. Law : "I send you ten thousand rupees for expenses. Remain quiet at Rajmahal, when M. Bahadre (Bussy) &c. comes on this side Cuttack, I will then send for you."—*Parl. Reports*, vol. iii. p. 221.

commanders would return to Calcutta, or leave the river, he would, he said, withdraw his advanced corps from Plassey, and remain on friendly terms, as he would then be convinced that the object of the English was commerce, not war. This was the purport of several communications ; but every day brought proof of their insincerity, and showed that the nabob's sole object was to lull them into a fatal security, till, from the departure of their force, and the arrival of his French allies, he could accomplish his design of extirpating them from his dominions."

"An intercepted letter from M. Law¹ to the chief of one of the lesser French factories, afforded of itself proof of this fact, had any been wanting; but the indiscretion of the nabob was too great to allow him to conceal his designs, and a number of the chief nobles and ministers of his government, who had long been discontented with his rule, perceiving what must early happen, sought the alliance of the English, concluding that they must desire the dethronement of a prince, whose

¹ Copy (Ext.) "Je viens de recevoir une lettre du nabob, par laquelle il m'ordonne de retourner à Muxadabad. Il vient, dit il, se joindre à nous pour tomber sur les Anglais," &c.

continuance in power was incompatible with their existence.”

Clive¹ marched with an army of about 3,000 men, and nine guns. Orme² states the nawab's army, to have been 50,000 foot, 18,000 horse, and fifty pieces of cannon. The greatest part of the foot were armed with matchlocks, the rest with various arms, pikes, swords, arrows, rockets. The cavalry, both men and horses, drawn from the northern regions, were much stouter than any which serve in the armies of Coromandel. The cannon were mostly of the largest calibres, twenty-four and thirty-two pounders, and these were mounted on the middle of a large stage, raised six feet from the ground, carrying, besides the cannon, all the ammunition belonging to it, and the gunners themselves who managed the cannon on the stage itself. There were also forty vagabond Frenchmen, under the command of one Sinfray; at a large tank, that nearest the grove,³ near which Clive drew up his troops in line. There is not much to be said about this battle, or rather cannonade, which lasted six

¹ Malcolm, vol. i. p. 256.

² Orme, vol. ii. p. 173.

³ Eight hundred yards long and three hundred broad.

hours. Clive¹ computed the enemy's loss at five hundred killed; the English loss at twenty-two killed and fifty wounded. In the action with part of the nawab's army (of 40,000 men) near Calcutta, on the 5th of February, 1757, Clive² had 1,350 Europeans and eight hundred sepoy, and lost one hundred and twenty Europeans and one hundred sepoy killed and wounded. Orme gives one hundred and twenty-one Europeans and fifty-three sepoy. This was in an attack during a fog. It is obvious that the little loss at Plassey was owing to the enemy's guns being fired from raised platforms: our loss was caused chiefly by the French guns. Meer Jaffier's horse and many of the nawab's troops were not engaged.

The council of war held on the 21st June, 1757, to decide as to the attack of the nawab. consisted of twenty officers according to Orme³, who says, "Contrary to the forms usually practised in councils of war, of taking the voice of the youngest officer first, and ascending from this to the opinion of the president, Colonel Clive gave his own opinion first."

¹ Malcolm, vol. i. p. 266.

² Malcolm, vol. i. p. 176.

³ Orme, vol. ii. p. 170.

The Cintra convention held in 1808, consisted¹ of seven general officers. They signed a report on 22nd of December, 1808, declaring that "no further military proceeding is necessary on the subject"—i. e. no general court martial was necessary. The commander-in-chief ordered a revision, when a question was proposed, "Do you, or do you not approve of the armistice, as concluded on the 22nd of August, 1808, in the relative situation of the two armies?"—six approved and one disapproved. Another question proposed was as to the convention, concluded on the 31st August, 1808. When four approved and three disapproved: those who differed from the majority gave their opinion in writing. On both occasions the *youngest* officer signed first. In the original report they signed according to seniority. (Judge Advocate-general's office, 27th December, 1808.) Clive gave his own vote first, and then descended to the lowest according to the succession of rank," according to Orme; but Malcolm gives the names of Majors Kilpatrick and Grant as voting next after Clive.

Clive had no cavalry, the enemy had eighteen thousand horse; the enemy's fifty pieces of (large)

¹ Hough's Military Law Authorities, 1839.

cannon were of little use. Indeed, guns raised on platforms six feet high, must necessarily have thrown the shot over the heads of our men. The four light guns under Sinfray, near the larger tank, that nearest the grove, and two larger pieces advanced on a line with this tank, close to the bank of the river, did all the execution from the redoubt, to which he retired. At this period of our military history in India, the natives had not become expert artillcrymen. We had no cavalry in our force for many years after this battle. The enemy abandoned their camp in the utmost confusion at five p. m. Orme says, "The cause of this sudden panic was the flight of the nabob, who hearing that Meer Jaffier remained inactive on the plain, and that the English were advancing to storm his camp, mounted a camel, and fled at the utmost pace of the animal, accompanied by about two thousand horsemen." The battle of the 23rd June, 1757, placed Meer Jaffier on the throne at Moorshedabad.

In the year 1758, the English were in full expectation that M. Lally, who had some time before arrived in India, would lay siege to Madras.¹ Colonel Forde was detached from Calcutta.

¹ Mill. vol. iii. p. 222.

He retook Vizagapatam,¹ and then Masulipatam ; when the French abandoned their design against Madras.² In 1759, the Dutch sent an expedition from Batavia. It appears that Meer Jaffier had instigated the French and Dutch to oppose us. They landed, and were attacked and defeated by Colonel Forde on the 25th of November at Bedarra, about four miles from Chinsura,³ with great loss, and the rest made prisoners.⁴

In April 1760, Colonel Coote⁵ took Cuddalore ; and on the 4th January, 1761, he obtained possession of Pondicherry, the French head quarters. From 1749 to 1761, we had recovered Madras (at the peace), and had taken Masulipatam, Cuddalore and Pondicherry ; thus holding these four places on the coast of Coromandel, between Cape Cormorin and Ganjam, the northern post of the French : and thus, as remarked by Mill, in the years 1756 to 1761, the French power, which

¹ Malcolm, vol. ii. p. 12.

² Mill, vol. iii. p. 230.

³ Malcolm, vol. ii. p. 87.

⁴ When Colonel Ford reported to Clive the arrival of the Dutch in the river, and wrote for orders, Clive was playing at cards, and wrote on the back of the nine of diamonds : " Fight them, and I will send you an order in council to-morrow."

⁵ Mill, vol. iii. p. 257. Peace in 1748.

had been superior to that of the English, had now become inferior to us in India.

The viceroyalty of Meer Jaffier came to a close in 1760. "From the administration of Jaffier, resigned as he was to a set of unworthy favourites,¹ old, indolent, voluptuous, estranged from the English, and without authority; no other consequences were to be expected than those which had already been experienced. From a strong sense of the incurable vices of Jaffier and his family Mr. Holwell, during the few months of his administration, had advised the council to abandon him; and, embracing the just cause of the emperor, to avail themselves of the high offers which that deserted monarch was ready to make." The son-in-law, Meer Casim, was made nawab by a treaty concluded on 17th September. Shah Jehan, the emperor of Delhi, was dethroned in 1760; he was succeeded in the title by his son Shah Allum II., who was roaming about the country, seeking the means of his restoration to the throne at Delhi. Ever since the death of Aurungzeb, in 1707, what with the invasion of Nadir Shah in 1739, and the appearance of Ahmed Shah Abdallee, from Cabool, when the insurrec-

¹ Mill, vol. iii. p. 306.

tion at Delhi took place in 1753, the empire was fast declining.

Ahmed Shah Abdallee had made his appearance a second time in Hindostan. The Mahrattahs had been incited by the vizier of Delhi (Umud-ul-Mulk) to invade the provinces of Oude and Rohileund. The vizier had, on hearing of the march of Ahmed Shah for the invasion of Hindostan,¹ ordered the murder of the Emperor Aulumgur, by whose death Shah Allum became emperor! On the 7th January, 1761, was fought the decisive battle at Panniput between Ahmed Shah, Abdallee, and the Mahrattahs, who were defeated. This broke the power of the Mahrattahs for several years, and caused them to form more separate parties, and withdrew them from the north to the south of India for a time.

The new emperor had made repeated excursions into the province of Behar, and had attacked Patna. To render the troops of the new nawab, Meer Casim, more efficient, the council of Calcutta induces him to dress and discipline his sepoys like those of the Company's service. Owing to the disturbed state of the country about Delhi, the capital of Hindostan,² the new

¹ Mill, vol. iii. p. 293. ² Agra was in the line of Akbar.

emperor was in hopes of getting possession of the provinces of Behar and Bengal by an inroad made by the Mahrattahs. Meer Casim, attended by a detachment under Major Yorke, defeated the troops opposed to them near Beerbhoom. The emperor had been acknowledged by Ahmed Shah Abdallee as sovereign of Hindostan, and Shah Allum, after having opposed us, entered into terms. This connection between the emperor and the English displeased Meer Casim.¹ He had views of independence and conquest, and at length took up arms against us. In 1761, Major Hector Munro² took Mahé, to the north of Calicut, from the French. It was restored at the peace in 1763. In April 1763, Meer Casim,³ being persuaded that the council of Calcutta had resolved to depose him, he applied for assistance to the emperor and the nawab of Oude. The council restored Meer Jaffier. Being defeated, Meer Casim fled, and sought the protection of the vizier of Oude, with whom a treaty had been made. He was received by the vizier and emperor (who was with Suja-ad-dowla) with distinction in 1764. The vizier himself desired the

¹ Mill, vol. iii. p. 314.

² Grant Duff, vol. ii. p. 400.

³ Mill, vol. iii. p. 339.

possession of the provinces of Behar, Bengal and Orissa.¹ He took the field, and was defeated at Patna on the 3rd May, 1764. The vizier was at last defeated by Major Munro (afterwards Sir Hector) at Buxar, on the 23rd October, 1764. His victory broke the forces of Suja-ad-dowla, and placed the emperor under the protection of the English. It was agreed that the English, by virtue of the imperial grant,² should obtain possession of Ghazecpoor, and the rest of the territory of Bulwant Sing, the Zemindar of Benares, and that the emperor should be established in possession of Allahabad.

Meer Jaffier died in January 1765. He was succeeded by Nujum-ud-dowla, the next surviving son of Jaffier, twenty years old. In the treaty with the new nawab,³ dated in February 1675, "it was resolved by the English to take the military defence of the country entirely into their own hands; and to allow the nabob to keep only so many troops as should be necessary for the parade of government, the distribution of justice, and the business of the collections."

¹ On the 11th February, 1764, a mutiny broke out among our troops, they expected a reward for their services against Meer Casim.

² Mill, vol. iii. p. 354.

³ Mill, vol. iii. p. 358.

The state of Bengal rendering it necessary to reappoint Clive (now a peer), and the votes in the Court of Directors not effecting the return (thirteen for, and eleven directors against, his return to India,) the court of proprietors caused his reappointment. Clive appointed president at Bengal, and commander-in-chief, reached Calcutta on the 3rd May, 1765. The new nawab of Bengal, in June 1765, resigned the whole of his revenues, and was allowed a pension. The nawab was obliged to obey the orders of the committee in Calcutta.

The vizier of Oude (Suja-ud-dowla) on the 3rd May, 1765, again¹ tried his strength against the English at Corah, near Allahabad, and was defeated. He at length threw himself on the generosity of the English. The emperor, it was settled, was to have an annual tribute from the three provinces of Behar, Bengal and Orissa, granted in the names of Meer Jaffier, Meer Casim and Nujum-ud-dowla, of twenty-six lakhs of rupees; but he was refused the jaghiers, or land, amounting to five and-a-half lakhs rupces. "On his part, was required² the imperial grant of the dewanee, or collection and receipt of the reve-

¹ Mill, vol. iii. p. 406.

² Vol. iii. p. 409.

nues in Bengal, Bahar and Orissa. The firman of the dewance, which marks one of the most conspicuous eras in the history of the Company, constituting them masters of so great an empire, in name and in responsibility, as well as in power, was dated the 12th day of August, 1765. Along with the dewance, was required of the emperor his imperial confirmation of all the territory which the Company possessed throughout the nominal extent of the Moghul empire. Amongst the confirmations, was not forgotten the jaghier of Lord Clive, a possession, the dispute about which that powerful servant had compromised before his departure from England, by yielding the reversion to the Company, after ten year's payment, if so long he should live." The dewance was reckoned by Clive¹ to be "little short of two hundred lakhs (about £2,000,000) to the Company, clear of all expenses in collections."

In consequence of an order issued,² that "on the 1st January, 1766, the double batta should cease, and that the officers in Bengal, with some exceptions in favour of the troops in the most distant and expensive stations, should be placed

¹ Malcolm, vol. ii. p. 376.

² Vol. ii. p. 420.

on the same footing with those of the coast of Coromandel (Madras army), that is, receive single batta when in the field; in garrison or cantonments, no batta at all, the troops mutinied.” Upon the conclusion of the war with Suja-ud-dowla, the troops were regimented, according to a plan proposed by Clive, and sanctioned by the Company before his departure from England; divided into three brigades, each consisting of one regiment of European infantry, one company of (European) artillery, six battalions of sepoys, and one troop of black cavalry; and were stationed, one brigade at Mongheer, three hundred miles from Calcutta; another at Bankipore, near Patna, one hundred miles beyond Mongheer; and the third at Allahabad,¹ two hundred miles beyond Patna, whither it had been sent as a security against the Mahrattahs, whom the emperor and vizier were far too reduced to be able to oppose.”

The directions of Clive² were immediately sent to the commanding officers, “to find, if possible,

¹ The communication being more distant, the officers there were less affected. The officers agreed to send in their resignations by a certain day, (1st May, 1766).

² Mill, vol. iii. p. 424.

the leaders in the conspiracy; to arrest those officers whose conduct appeared the most dangerous, and detain them prisoners; above all things, to secure the obedience of the sepoys and black (native) commanders, if the European troops should appear to be infected with disobedience to their officers. Letters were dispatched to the council at Calcutta, and the presidency at Fort St. George, to make the greatest exertions for a supply of officers; and Clive himself hastened towards Mongheer."

Malcolm says,¹ "It must, moreover, have been satisfactory to Lord Clive to know that this combination had not its source in any of those evil designs by which such mutinous proceedings are often marked. It originated in the too long continuance of a temporary grant, of an extra allowance to which young officers (and almost all concerned were such) soon adapted their expenditure; and when luxuries, recommended by the climate and character of the service, became necessities, they were not likely to recognise the justice of the distinction, which had been made by the directors, between the boon of a nabob (which the double allowance first was), and a direct pay-

¹ Malcolm, vol. iii. p. 78.

ment from the treasury of government, which it became after the Company had obtained the grant of the dewanee.¹ The opposition which the officers offered to the reduction of their allowances, was in some measure countenanced by the local government, which had evaded the execution of the orders issued by the directors for the abolition of double batta."

Lord Clive wrote to Calcutta to get any merchants' clerks, or persons out of the service, to take commissions. One old officer, when most of the officers had agreed to send in their resignations to the adjutant-general of the army, addressed the envelope in the usual manner, but the enclosure was addressed to himself, and was returned to him. Some officers were tried by courts-martial. Some were pardoned, and had their commissions restored; but these were young subalterns, supposed to be misled by their seniors; thus captains and older officers were not pardoned.

The advantage of possessing the northern cir-

¹ In the case of the Nawab of Oude, officers serving beyond the Caramniassa river, received double full batta from the nawab, but in 1802 when the nawab assigned territory to pay our troops, the double full batta ceased.

cars, and a line of coast which joined the English territories on the Carnatic to those of Bengal, suggested to Clive,¹ in 1765, the importance of obtaining it on permanent terms. A firman was accordingly received from the emperor, by which the northern circars were freed from their dependence upon the subahdar of the Deccan, and bestowed upon the English. The Mahrattahs held the province of Orissa, so that they were shut in to the south and north; and if they advanced to the north, they were in danger of losing Orissa. This was an advantage as regarded the protection of Calcutta,² the Orissa province intervening between the two.

In 1767, Hyder Ali (father of Tippoo Sultan) began to occupy the attention of the English.³ He had rendered himself entire master of the kingdom of Mysore. He was for many years the enemy of the Company, and his son continued to be such till the day of his death.

In 1772, Mr. Hastings⁴ was appointed first governor-general of India. Ever since the treaty made with the emperor, he had been living at

¹ Mill, vol. iii. p. 453.

² Bussy's force there in May, 1757, threatened Calcutta.

³ Mill, vol. iii. p. 456.

⁴ Vol. iii. p. 516.

Allahabad, in the enjoyment of the districts of Allahabad and Corah, under the protection of the English.¹ He determined, against the advice of the English, to march for Delhi to assume his throne. He left Allahabad in the month of May, 1771, at the head of an army of sixteen thousand men. He did not reach Delhi till the 25th December, 1771. He had placed himself under the protection of the Mahrattahs. They soon hurried him into the field, wishing to make conquests under the influence of his name. The country of the Rohillahs "was the object of cupidity to both; to the emperor, as an increase of his limited territory; to the Mahrattahs, as a field of plunder, if not a permanent possession." Their united power defeated the Rohillahs under Zebita Khan, who fled.

The English were bound by treaty to aid the the vizier of Oude in the defence of his own territories.² In September, 1773, at a meeting held at Benares between him and the governor-general, the vizier proposed that the English should assist to put him in possession of the Rohillah country, lying north of his dominions and east of the Ganges. This was acted upon

¹ Mill, vol. iii. p. 545.

² Vol. iii. p. 561. *

the next year. As the emperor had left the protection of the English it was decided,¹ and this upon the decision of the Court of Directors (Lr. Ct. Drs. 11th of November, 1768), that he forfeited Allahabad and Corah, as well as his tribute.

Now was to be decided the fate of the Rohillahs. First attacked by the emperor and the Mahrattahs, they were to be annihilated for the vizier. Colonel Champion, the commander-in-chief, with the 2nd brigade of infantry,² attacked the forty thousand Rohillahs under Hafiz Ruhmet, on the 23rd of April, 1774, near the Babul nulla, in Rohilcund. They were defeated, and the chief killed. Colonel Alexander Champion was so disgusted with the whole affair, that he resigned his command on the 29th December in the same year.

The important point as to the succession to the office of peshwah, was next agitated. In 1761, was fought the battle of Panniput. Bajee-rao, peshwah, left a son, whom his father called Ballajee Bajee-rao. The Bhow, killed at Panniput,

¹ Mill, vol. iii. p. 580.

² Six battalions of infantry, a company of artillery, and a troop of cavalry.

was his cousin, whose death, and the disgrace and danger of the Mahrattah state, was caused by grief.¹ Upon the death of Narrain Rao, his successor, who died at the age of eighteen years, Rugoba, his uncle, who had been regent (and caused his death²), was immediately acknowledged peishwa.

It appears³ that "in the end of September, 1761, Mahdoo Rao, the second son of the late peishwa (Ballajee Rao) then in his seventeenth year, proceeded to Satara, accompanied by his uncle, Rugonath Rao, and received investiture as peishwa, from the nominal raja (of Satara), who remained precisely in the same state of imprisonment under the obdurate Tara Bye,⁴ as before described, until her demise, which happened in the month of December following, at the great age of eighty-six. To the last moment of her existence, she maintained her inveteracy against Ballajee Rao and Sewdasheo Rao, declaring that she expired contented having lived to hear of their misfortunes and death. The raja's condition was after-

¹ Mill, vol. iii. p. 594.

² Vol. iii. p. 599 ; and Grant Duff, vol. ii. p. 250.

³ Grant Duff, vol. ii. p. 161.

⁴ Widow of Raja Ram, first regent, and afterwards peshwa. He died in 1700.—Duff, vol. i. p. 39.

wards so far improved, that he was brought down from the fort, and suffered to live a prisoner at large in the town of Satara. At a subsequent period he was permitted by Mahdoo Rao, to appoint agents for the management of his patell dues in several villages, and the collection of his other hereditary claims as deshmookh of Indepoor."

" Rugonath Rao, naturally fond of power, contemplated, with no small satisfaction, the prospect of gratifying his favourite inclination, during the minority of his nephew. When the preparations of Nizam Ally gave reason to expect a rupture with the Moghuls, he became desirous of putting an end to some existing disputes between the presidency of Bombay and Ramjee Punt, and Ramjee Punt the soobahdar of the Concan." Subsequently " Rugonath Rao, being ill-prepared to resist the expected invasion of the Moghuls, wished eventually to obtain from Bombay some European soldiers and guns, and prolonged the negociation for that purpose, by sending another wukeel to Bombay, on pretence of making some alterations in the agreement, but in reality to negotiate for military aid. The English East India Company, from the example of their great

commercial rivals the Dutch, had early been desirous of obtaining territory." " They had been extremely solicitous to obtain possession of the island of Salsette and the fort of Bassein, not only on account of the advantages expected from the revenue, but as advanced positions essentially necessary to the security of the island and harbour of Bombay. The overtures of Rugonath Rao, therefore, met with the readiest attention; but, although he offered to cede territory yielding revenue of 150,000 rupees at Jumboseer, and to make several other concessions, yet as the favourite island of Salsette was not of the number, the alliance was suspended."

" As the danger from the threatened invasion increased, the overtures were renewed; even Salsette was offered, and though not an accredited agent, the president and council were sanguine in their hope of accomplishing the object; especially, as by every succeeding day's account, the Mahrattahs, without aid from the English, were likely to be completely worsted. No period, indeed, for the last forty years had been more favourable for the restoration of the Moghul authority in the Deccan. The loss of the battle of Panniput was imputed by the Mahrattah silli-

dars¹ solely to the misconduct of the Bramins; the Bramins of the Desh, or country above the Ghauts, acknowledged the fact, but declared that it was to be ascribed entirely to the mismanagement of their brethren of the Concan."

The young peishwa had been (1762) out to the southern territory to collect the revenue. "Shortly after the return of Mahdoo Rao to Poona² disputes arose between him and his uncle, in consequence of Mahdoo Rao's desire to be admitted³ to a share in the administration. Rugonath Rao, as well as Sukaram Bappoo, and several other ministers were much offended at his presumption; conceiving that affairs could not be conducted without them, they threw up their situations, but Sukaram Bappoo, whose object was to keep well with both parties, resigned, as if a matter to which he was compelled, and always contrived, as far as he was himself concerned, to keep open the door of reconciliation. Mahdoo Rao, in the promptest manner, requested Trimback Rao Mama to act in the situation of dewan;" and it is worthy of remark, as extremely creditable to the selection of so young a man, that Ballajee Jenardin Bhanoo,

¹ Horsemen who provide a horse at their own expense.

² Duff vol. ii. p. 167. ³ Then eighteen years of age.

already mentioned, and afterwards well known as Nana Furnuwees, and Hurry Punt Phurkay, were at this period employed as personal Carkoons¹ by Mahdoo Rao."

At length Rugonath Rao² placed Mahdoo Rao in confinement, and appointed Sukaram one of his principal ministers, bestowing on him a jaghier of nine lakhs of rupees. Mahdoo Rao being now in the exercise of his office, hearing of a rebellion under his uncle Rugonath Rao, attacked and defeated him, and conveyed him a prisoner to Poona.³ Mahdoo Rao⁴ died on the 18th November, 1772. The confinement of Rugonath Rao had been relaxed prior to the death of Mahdoo Rao. "Rugonath Rao was sent for to Theur,⁵ a reconciliation took place, and Mahdoo Rao in presence of Sukaram Bappoo, recommended his brother, in an impressive manner, to the care and protection of his uncle (Rugonath Rao). Narrain Rao, the nephew,⁶ early in December repaired to Satara, where he was invested as peishwa by the raja. Sukaram Bappoo received the clothes of

¹ Clerks. ² Duff, vol. ii. p. 169. ³ Vol. ii. p. 200.

⁴ Vol. ii. p. 227. ⁵ Vol. ii. p. 242.

⁶ The youngest of the three sons of Ballajee Bajee Rao. Wiswas Rao, the eldest, fell at Panniput, (1761), the second just dead.

prime minister, and Nana Furnuwees was recognised in the hereditary situation of his family."

The new peishwa and Rugonath Rao continued for some time in apparent amity; but the mother of the one, the wife of the other, and the jealousy of the Bramin ministers, would probably have created discord between men of better temper and stronger judgment. Rugonath Rao, with the consent of all, except Sukaram Bappoo, who objected to the violence of the measure, was again made prisoner on the 11th of April, and confined in an apartment of the same palace in which Narrain Rao, when at Poona, usually resided. Nana Furnuwees stood high in the young peishwa's estimation, but Bujaba Poorundhuree and Hurry Punt Phurkay were his chief confidants. The principal state affairs continued ostensibly to be transacted by Sukaram Bappoo, but the favourites were inimical to his administration. Narrain Rao was particularly ambitious of military fame.¹

At length, says Duff,² "The attention of all

¹ Duff says, vol. ii. p. 228, of his brother and predecessor "Although the military talents of Mahdoo Rao were very considerable, his character as a sovereign is entitled to far higher praise."

² Vol. ii. p. 245.

India was arrested, and there was a momentary pause in the bustle of political affairs by reports, which proved correct, of the murder of Narrain Rao Peishwa on the 30th of August." (1773.)

"It appeared, that on the morning of that day, there had been considerable commotion amongst the regular infantry in the peishwa's service, and it increased so much towards noon, that after an interview with Rughoojec Angria, who had just arrived from Kolabah to pay his respects, Narrain Rao, before he went to dinner, told Hurry Punt Phurkay to take some precautions in case of disturbance, meaning, that he should secure the palace. Hurry Punt, however, thoughtlessly neglected these orders, and went to dine with a friend in the neighbourhood.¹ The peishwa, in the afternoon, had retired to repose in his private apartments, when he was awoken by a great tumult in the palace, caused by a large body of infantry, who, having continued their clamours for pay throughout the day, were at last, about two o'clock, led to the palace by Somer Sing and Mahummud Yeesoof, on pretence of demanding their arrears. Khurruck Sing, one of their num-

¹ Hurry Punt was "accused of being one of the partisans of Rugoba, which decidedly was not the case."

ber, who commanded at the palacc-guard, joined them ; but, instead of entering at the large gate on the north side, to which there was no impediment, they made their way by an unfinished door-way on the east side, which, together with the wall surrounding the palace, had been pulled down a short time before, to make an entrance distinct from that of the quarter inhabited by Rugonath Rao. Narrain Rao, on starting from sleep, neither resolved on concealment nor defence, but ran to his uncle's apartments, and being closely pursued by Somer Sing, he threw himself into his uncle's arms, and called on him to save him. Rugonath Rao did interfere, and begged of them to spare him. "I have not gone thus far to insure my own destruction ;" replied Somer Sing : "Let him go, or you shall die with him." Rugonath Rao disengaged himself, and got out upon the terrae ; Narrain Rao attempted to follow him, but Truleea Powar, one of the Mahrattah domestics of Rugonath Rao, who was armed, seized him by the legs and pulled him down, at which instant another domestic, named Chapajee Teleekur, in the service of Narrain Rao, entered the apartment, and, although unarmed, ran forward to his master, who clasped his arms about

his neck, when Somer Sing and Truleea Powar despatched them both with their swords. Whilst this was passing in the interior, the whole of the outer wall of the palace was secured by the conspirators; the people in the city heard of a tumult, armed men thronged in the streets, the shops were shut, and the inhabitants ran to and fro in consternation, asking what had happened. Sukaram Bappoo repaired to the kotwal's chow-kee, or office of the police magistrate, where word being brought to him that Rugonath Rao was not only alive, but had sent assurances to the people that all was quiet, and had even invited some of them to go inside; Sukaram directed Hurry Punt Phurkay to write a note to Rugonath Rao in his name, which Rugonath Rao answered in his own handwriting, informing him of the murder of his nephew by some of the gardees (regular infantry). Hurry Punt Phurkay then declared, that suspicions which he had entertained of Rugonath Rao, were confirmed, and alarmed for his personal safety, he instantly fled to Bara-muthee. Sukaram Bappoo tranquillised the minds of the people, by recommending them to go to their homes, and to remain quiet, when nothing should molest them. Bujaba Poorund-

huree and Mallojee Ghorcpuray, had an interview with Rugoba Rao that night, and Trimback Rao Mama repairing to the palace, bore off the body of the unfortunate peishwa, and performed the funeral obsequies."

"Visitors were admitted to the palace; Mr. Mostyn,¹ the English envoy, and the different wukeels, paid their respects, but Rugonath Rao remained in confinement, detained, as was pretended, by the conspirators, as a security for the payment of their arrears. Rugonath Rao was suspected, but there was no proof of his being the author of the outrage. It was well known that he had an affection for his nephew, and the ministers, considering the extreme jealousy with which many of them viewed each other, are entitled to some praise, for having adopted a resolution on the occasion equally sound and politic. They were generally of opinion, that whilst there remained a shadow of doubt, it was on every account advisable to support Rugoba's right to the succession; to this Ram Shastree, who was consulted, made no objections, but diligently instituted a search into the whole transaction. About six weeks after the event, having obtained proofs against Rugo-

¹ Sent by the Bombay Government.

nath Rao, the shastree waited upon him, and accused him of having given an authority to Somer Sing and Mohummud Yecsoof to commit the deed. Rugonath Rao is said to have acknowledged to Ram Shastree, that he had written an order to those men, authorizing them to seize, but that he never had given the order to kill him. This admission is generally supposed to have been literally true; for by the original paper, afterwards recovered by Ram Shastree, it was found that the word, *dhurawe*, to seize, was altered *marawe*, to kill. It is universally believed, that the alteration was made by the infamous Anundee Bye;¹ and although Rugonath Rao's own conduct, in subsequently withholding protection, even at the hazard of his life, sufficiently justifies the suspicion of his being fully aware of it, the moderate and general opinion in the Mahrattah country is that he did not intend to murder his nephew; that he was exasperated by his confinement, and excited by the desperate counsels of his wife, to whom is also attributed the activity of the domestic, 'Truleca Powar,'² who was set on by the vindictive malice of that bad woman."

¹ Wife of Rugonath Rao.

² He was executed for the murder of Narrain Rao, several years afterwards, by Nana Furnuwees.

The arrears of the troops were discharged, Rugonath Rao was released,¹ and proclaimed peishwa. Sukaram Bappoo was confirmed as Karhuree.² Narrain Rao was murdered in the eighteenth year of his age.

The principal persons of the Poona ministry at this time were³ Sukaram Bappoo, Trimback Rao Manna, the two Turnuwees's, Nann and Moraba, Bujaba Poorundhuree, Anund Rao Jewajee, and Hurry Punt Phurkay; all men raised by the present family of peishwas—totally distinct from the eight Purdhans of Sivajee and Shao. There was evidently to all but Rugoba and his immediate dependents, some scheme in agitation. Some supposed the ministers intended to release the raja (of Satara); others that a person assuming the name of Sewdashee Rao Bhow⁴ was to be set up as peishwa in the room of Rugonath Rao. The development, however, of their real plans soon put an end to surmises. It having been discovered, that Gunga Bye, the widow of Narrain Rao, was pregnant, it was resolved, on pretence of carrying her to a place of safety to convey her to the fort of Poorundhur.

¹ Duff, vol. ii. p. 250.

² Or Dewan.

³ Duff, vol. ii. p. 258.

⁴ Killed at Panniput.

But it is generally believed that the real motive was to disguise an intention they had formed, of eventually exchanging the infant of Gunga Bye, in case of its proving a female, by substituting a male child. For this purpose several Bramin women, in a state of pregnancy, are said to have been conveyed into the fort at the same time. Gunga Bye herself was carried off from Poona by Nana Furnuwees and Hurry Punt Phurkay, on the morning of the 30th January (1774), but the reason of her removal was publicly announced. Parwuttee Bye, the widow of Sewdasheo Rao, a lady very much respected, accompanied her. The ministers forming themselves into a sort of regency under Gunga Bye, began to govern the country in her name. All the adherents of Rugonath Rao were thrown into confinement. Negotiations were opened with Nizam Ally and Sabajee Bhonslay,¹ both of whom agreed to support the widow's pretensions. The birth of Mahdoo Rao Narrain, on the 18th April (1774), gave a finishing blow to his ever being recognised as peishwa.² Notwithstanding the suspicions created by the scheme which was

¹ Soon after had the dignity of Sena Sahib Soobeh conferred on him.

² Duff, vol. ii. p. 264.

adopted for eventually imposing upon the country, there is very little doubt but that the child was the son of the murdered Narrain Rao. Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees were deputed by Gunga Bye to receive the clothes of investiture for her son, which were sent from Satara by the raja.¹ The infant was formally installed as peishwa, when he was forty days old.

The ministers very soon became jealous of each other: Nana Furnuwees was too cautious to take the lead in an infant government; but, like the generality of men who have risen by revolution, and who seldom appear in the foreground, he supported Sukaram Bappoo as the person likely to have most weight and consideration with the public. This conduct in him proceeded as much from timidity as design. Sukaram was an old, cautious, time-serving courtier,² but he was a man of much more courage than Nana Furnuwees,³ and, in the humble and assiduous attention of his colleague and adherent, he did not foresee a

¹ One of the descendants of the founder of the Mahrattah empire: the peishwa was his prime minister.

² Mill, vol. iii. p. 598, says, "Sukaram Bappoo, who had been raised by Rugoba from a menial service in his household, to the office of dewan or financial minister of state.

³ Duff, vol. ii. 157, "amongst the first of the fugitives from the battle of Panniput.

future rival and a powerful foe. Duff adds "one circumstance, not generally known, which was used by Nana Furnuwees as an instrument of ambition, was the power he had acquired over the mind of the regent, Gunga Bye; for, although a profound secret at the time, the young widow was deeply enamoured of Nana Furnuwees, and was taught by him the best means of governing the old minister. Moraba, the cousin of Nana, who had been the ostensible prime minister of Mahdoo Rao, was dissatisfied on finding little deference paid to his counsel, and would readily have returned to Rugonath Rao, if he could have effected it with safety, and insured his future power. Such of the other ministers as would not submit to Sukaram and Nana were soon united in common discontent. The cabal, in short, divided into two parties, and their disagreement became generally known by the discovery of a correspondence on the part of Moraba Bujaba and Babajee Naik with the ex-peishwa." From intercepted letters, it appeared that these three had formed a plan for securing the persons of Sukaram Bappoo, Nana Furnuwees, Gunga Bye and her son, then residing in the village of Sassoor. Thus, it appeared that the Mahrattahs

were disputing who should be the head of their nation. The English had long taken a lead in the affairs of the Mohammedan : and why not play the best card in the Mahrattah game of policy !

The emperor, Shah Allum, had resided at Allahabad for several years under the protection of the English government. Nujub-ud-dowla, the Rohillah, left as imperial deputy at Delhi upon the departure of Shah Abdallee, had, by his wisdom and vigour, preserved order and tranquillity in that part of Hindostan. He died in 1770, when the ambition of Shah Allum stimulated him to the hazardous project of courting the Mahrattahs to assist him in returning to Delhi as emperor. We were assisting Rugonath Rao to return to the throne of Poona !

The emperor, in the beginning of the year 1771,¹ had sent his minister to Calcutta to obtain, " if not the assistance, at least the approbation of the English to his projected expedition, and was not restrained by their dissuasions." It seems that Tukajee Holkar, Madhajee Sindhia, and Kishn Visajee, officers of the peshwa (Mahdoo Rao), were in 1769 sent with an army of three hundred thousand horse into Hindostan,

¹ Mill, vol. iii. p. 546.

to recover the influence the Mahrattahs had lost by their defeat at Panniput (1761), and to exact revenge upon the Rohillahs for the aid they had given to the Abdali (king of Cabool). It was for the easier accomplishment of these objects that they (Mahrattahs) undertook to replace Shah Allum on the throne of Delhi.¹

By the exertions of the Moghul nobles, and the assistance of the vizier, the emperor was enabled, in 1771, to march from Allahabad at the head of an army of sixteen thousand men. The death of Nujub-ud-dowla was a great loss to the imperial cause. The emperor made his entry into Delhi on the 25th December, 1771. It was decided (11th November, 1768), that if the emperor threw himself "into the hands of the Mahrattahs, or any other power," the government would pay the tribute of twenty-six lakhs of rupees no more.² The Mahrattahs soon induced the emperor to take the field. "The country of the Rohillahs³ was the object of cupidity to both." "The united power of the emperor and Mahrattahs, Zebita Khan, though he

¹ Duff, vol. ii. p. 222.

² Mill, vol. iii. p. 580.

³ I believe to have been those Affghans left by, or who declined to return to Cabool with, Ahmed Shah. Mill, vol. iii. p. 549.

made a spirited defence, was unable to withstand. He was overcome in battle, and fled across the Ganges, in hopes to defend what territories he possessed on the opposite side." The Rohillaes were roused by the news of the attack upon Zebita Khan. "They proposed an union of councils and of arms with the subalidar of Oude, to whom the establishment of the Mahrattahs upon his frontier was, they knew, an object equally of danger and alarm." He was thrown into great consternation and embarrassment. Early in January, 1772, he pressed for an interview with the English general, Sir Robert Barker, who was then on his route to Allahabad, and met him on the 20th of the same month at Fyzabad. Sir R. Barker¹ strongly urged upon Suja-ud-dowla, the necessity of protecting the Rohillaes, "the weakness of whom became the strength of the Mahrattahs, and enabled them, if their departure were purchased, to return to the seizure of the country whenever they pleased." The vizier made a hard bargain with the Rohillaes, and they made a "promise to pay to the vizier forty lakhs of rupees, on condition that he should expel the Mahrattahs from the Rohillah terri-

¹ Mill, vol. iii. p. 554.

tories." The vizier made no effort to expel the Mahrattahs. The emperor, after his operations against the Rohillahs, returned to Delhi, and became an instrument in the hands of the Mahrattahs. They tried to extort from him the grant of the provinces of Corah and Allahabad.¹ They were destined for the vizier of Oude. We considered the emperor to have forfeited those provinces, as well as the share of the revenues of Bengal, Behar, and Orissa; probably it was, as one reason, judged that the enrichment of the emperor would be to aid our enemies (Mahrattahs), in fact, that the emperor was in their hands, and only a *nominal* sovereign.

The Mahrattahs now returned to the banks of the Ganges, which they prepared to cross. The vizier was thrown into a great alarm, and "wrote repeated letters to the Bengal government to send a military force to his protection." The Mahrattahs engaged not to commit any depredations on the Rohillahs, provided they would yield a "free passage through their dominions into the territory of the vizier."² The vizier was alarmed

¹ They were sold to the vizier, in 1773 for fifty lakhs of rupees. Mill, vol. iii. p. 568.

² Letter of Hafez Ruhmet himself.

at any such union of the Mahrattahs and Rohil-lahs. "The obligation under which the English were placed to aid the vizier in the defence of his own territory, and their opinion of the advantage of supporting him against the Mahrattahs, induced them to send Sir R. Baker, with a part of the army."¹ The Mahrattahs overran a great part of Rohilkund. In the month of May (1773), the "domestic affairs of the Mahrattahs recalled them wholly to their own country."

On the departure of the Mahrattahs, a meeting was concerted between the vizier and the governor-general. It took place at Benares, in September, 1773. In his report of the 4th October, 1773, to the council, he says, "The vizier was at first very desirous of the assistance of an English force to put him in possession of the Rohillah country, lying north of his dominions and east of the Gangcs. This has long been a favourite object of his wishes; and you will recollect that the first occasion of my last visit was furnished by a proposal of this kind." Hastings² wrote, "I found him still bent on the design of reducing

¹ Mill, vol. iii. p. 561.

² Appeal 3rd Dec. 1774, to the Court Directors. Mill, p. 563, *note*, 2.

the Rohillaes, *which I encouraged*, as I had done before, by dwelling on the advantages which he would derive from its success." "Money," adds Mill, "was the motive to this eager passion for the ruin of the Rohillaes." We had then a bond debt amounting to a hundred and twenty-five lakhs of rupees (£1,250,000), notwithstanding one of our three brigades was paid for by the vizier.

In Jan., 1774, the second of the three brigades of the Company's Bengal army, received orders to join the vizier,¹ and Colonel Champion, now commander-in-chief, "proceeded in the middle of February to assume the command. On the 24th February, the brigade arrived within the territory of the vizier; and on the 17th of April, the united forces entered the Rohillah dominions. On the 19th, Colonel Champion wrote to the presidency, that the Rohillah leader was inclined to come to an accommodation "with the vizier, but that the nabob claimed no less than *two crore* of rupees (£2,000,000). The Rohillaes, after this extravagant demand, prepared for action. Early on the morning of the 23rd, the English advanced to the attack. "Hafez," says the Eng-

¹ Mill, vol. iii. p. 572.

lish general, with a generous esteem, "and his army, consisting of about forty thousand men,¹ showed great bravery and resolution, annoying us with their artillery and rockets. They made repeated attempts to charge, but our guns, being so much better served than theirs, kept so constant and galling a fire, that they could not advance; and where they were closest was the greatest slaughter." They tried to turn both our flanks at the same time, and kept up a brisk fire on our centre. Above two thousand of them fell in the field, and many sirdars, and Hafez Ruhmet fell, bravely rallying his men. The vizier and his troops kept at a respectful distance from the scene of action. Colonel Champion, in his letter to Warren Hastings, 24th April, 1774, says, "*We had the honour of the day, and these banditti (vizier's) the profit.*" The colonel is stated to have remarked in a letter to a friend, that such an action was a disgrace to us upon our saint's day (*St. George's Day*). He was so disgusted, it is said, that he resigned at the end of the year.

¹ The English had about 5,000 men, all natives.

CHAPTER II.

RETURNING TO THE MAHRATTAHS AND RUGOBA.

The Court of Directors on the 1st of April, 1772, directed that a resident envoy should be appointed to the peishwa's (Mahdoo Rao) court ;¹ and Mr. Thomas Mostyn, of the Bombay civil service, was selected by the court for this important duty. The declared intention was for the purpose of acquiring, from time to time, "upon safe and honourable terms, such privileges and rights as might be beneficial to their commerce, and of security to their possessions, by maintaining a friendly intercourse with all the native powers, but carefully abstaining from active alliance with any. The resident was instructed² to communicate to Madras and Bengal direct, all intelligence he could procure, relative to the designs of the Mahrattahs of a nature likely to affect those presidencies ; but the principal objects of the mission were to obtain possession of

¹ Duff, vol. ii. p. 270.² As is usual.

the island of Salsette, the port of Bassein, and the small islands of Kenery, Hog island, Elephantia, and Caranja." Permission for the envoy to reside at Poona was granted by Mahdoo Rao, and Mr. Mostyn arrived there a few days prior to that peishwa's death; otherwise, it was Mr. Mostyn's opinion, the succeeding administration would not have allowed him to remain.

Rugoba had raised troops, but instead of marching boldly to Poona, the Mahrattah capital, he moved to the northward, as far as Malwa; there, after he had recruited his forces, he resolved to recross the Nerbuddah, and took up a position on the Taptee. He renewed his overtures to the English, through the civil governor of Surat. Rugoba's agent informed Mr. Gambier, that the ex-peishwa was desirous of entering on a treaty for the purpose of being furnished with a sufficient force "to carry him to Poona, and establish him in the government, for which he would defray the charges of the expedition, make very considerable grants to the Company, and enter into any terms of friendship and alliance the president and council at Bombay might choose." This acceptable proposal was received at Bombay on the 6th September, 1774, when

the president and council agreed to assist Rugoba with all the troops they could spare, which amounted to about two thousand five hundred men, "on the condition that he should advance fifteen or twenty lakhs of rupees; and on being established in the government at Poona, cede to the Honourable Company, in perpetuity, Salsette, the small islands contiguous to Bombay, and Bassein, with its dependencies. The Mahrattah share of revenue in Surat and Baroach was, if possible, to be obtained, and also protection from Mahrattah inroads into the Bengal provinces,¹ and the possessions of the nabob of the Carnatic."

Rugoba declined to give up Bassein and Salsette. He offered to cede districts and claims in Guzerat, and "to pay six lakhs of rupees in advance, one lakh and a-half monthly, for the expense of one thousand Europeans, two thousand sepoy, and fifteen guns."² The government agreed to part of these propositions;" "but at this stage of the negotiation, they were alarmed

¹ The Mahrattah ditch at Calcutta, made about thirty years before this period.

² A good notion as to the proportion of artillery required for bodies of disciplined troops, in battles against very superior numbers.

by the receipt of intelligence from the envoy at Goa, that the *Portuguese* government had sent a formidable armament from Europe, for the avowed purpose of recovering their lost possessions, including Salsette and Basscin." This alarmed even the Poona ministers, and they reinforced the garrison of Tannah with five hundred men."

The Bombay government resolved to anticipate the Portuguese,¹ and Brigadier-General Robert Gordon was employed in an expedition, consisting of six hundred and twenty Europeans, including artillery, one thousand sepoy, and two hundred gun Lascars, to take Tannah, and Commodore Watson commanded the naval part of the force. The expedition proceeded on the 12th Dec., 1774, and next day, a part of the Portuguese fleet anchored in the mouth of the harbour of Bombay, and formally protested against their proceedings. Finally, the place was taken, after a second assault. Another detachment, under Lieut.-Colonel Keating was sent to take possession of the fort of Versovah, on the northern extremity of Salsette. The island of Caranja was also occupied, and the whole of Salsette reduced before New Year's Day, 1775. The Court

¹ Duff, vol. ii. p. 277.

of Directors had, in a letter, dated 18th March, 1768, written to Bombay that they rather wished¹ "they could be obtained by purchase than war."

In the meantime, the negotiations with Rugoba were continued, but the ministers had secretly engaged Sindia and Holkar in their interests, and collected an army of about 30,000 men. Thus they were prepared for *peace* or for *war*. The Mahrattah navy in the ministerial interest, at the commencement of the war,² consisted of six ships, one of forty-six guns, one of thirty-eight, one of thirty-two, and two of twenty-six guns; and ten armed vessels, mounting each from two to nine guns, besides swivels. In an action with Commodore Moor, the forty-six gun vessel blew up, and the rest escaped. We read in Mill,³ that the Mahrattahs, as early as the time of Sivajee,⁴ had raised something of a fleet, to protect them against the enterprise of the Siddoes. There was an admiral, who quarrelled with the Mahrattah government, and revolted with the greater part of the fleet. He set the Mahrattah state at defiance, and made himself master of the coast to

¹ Mill, vol. iii. p. 603.

² Duff, vol. ii. p. 304.

³ Mill, vol. iii. p. 170.

⁴ He died 1682.

the extent of sixty leagues from Tannah to Rajapore. The Mahrattahs compounded with him by receiving a small annual tribute as a mark of subjection. This rebel was named Conajec Angria, a pirate by trade. The English and Mahrattahs had made several attempts to extirpate these corsairs without effect, till 1755, "when an English squadron under Commadore James, and a land army of Mahrattahs, attacked Severndroog, and took it, as well as the fort Bancooti. Towards the conclusion of 1755, Admiral Watson with his fleet, and Colonel Clive with his forces, arrived at Bombay. On the 11th February, 1756, the fleet, consisting of eight ships, besides a grab, and five bomb ketches, having on board eight hundred Europeans and one thousand sepoy, commanded by Colonel Clive, arrived at Gheriah; while a Mahrattah army approached on the other side. Angria, after a violent cannonade, surrendered himself into the hands of the Mahrattahs, and the fort was given up. Hyder Ali Khan was of opinion, that without a navy he could not do anything against the English; and both he and Tippoo built many ships. These pirates, not many years after, captured one of our vessels, and annoyed trading vessels.

In June 1775, on the side of Rugoba,¹ everything seemed favourable. The state of the young pcishwa's affairs wore an aspect proportionably unpromising. Then, later,² the cause of Rugoba was extremely unpopular.

By a treaty dated 6th March, 1775,³ at Surat, where Rugoba had fled to, he yielded up Salsette and Bassein, and the Mahrattah share of the revenue of Baroaeh. The council of Fort William at first disapproved of the measure. In 1776, the council of Bengal resolved "to support the cause of Rugoba with the utmost vigour, and with a general exertion of the whole power of the English arms in India." This seems to have arisen from their agent, Colonel Upton, having, on the 7th February, 1776, written that "the chiefs of this country (Poona) are quite at a loss which side to take, and are waiting to see what the English will do."

In 1774, a doubt arose in the council of Bombay as to the operation of the act of parliament of 1773,⁴ which rendered the presidencies of Madras and Bombay subordinate to Bengal; for Warren Hastings was, in 1772, appointed go-

¹ Duff, vol. ii. p. 305.

² Duff, vol. ii. p. 306.

³ Mill, vol. iii. p. 609.

⁴ Duff, vol. ii. p. 275.

vernor-general of India. But, as the arrival of the members appointed from Europe was not known, the Bombay government considered that there was no "Supreme parliamentary council" in India. Mr. Hastings had been¹ one of the first to recommend a controlling authority in India, and the additional members had not arrived at Calcutta. Colonel Upton had arrived at Poorundhur, near Poona, on the 28th December, 1775. In 1776, when Colonel Upton proposed the retention of Salsette, &c., the cession of Bassein, and the revenues of Baroach, the Maharrattah ministers affected to consider such an application as perfectly unauthorised. In fact, "they demanded the immediate surrender of the delinquent Rugoba, and the entire restoration of the territory occupied by the Bombay government since the commencement of the war." They seconded their arguments with threats, and mistook the mild remonstrances of the envoy for timidity. Colonel Upton² conceiving the nego-

¹ Mill, vol. iii. p. 515. General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis did not arrive in Calcutta till the 19th October, 1774. The Bombay discussion was on the 6th September, 1774.

² Mill, vol. iii. p. 320.

tiation at an end, expressed this opinion to the governor-general and council in a letter, dated 7th February, when they immediately determined to support the cause of Rugoba with the utmost vigour. They prepared troops for embarkation, ordered a large supply of treasure to be transmitted to Bombay, and directed troops to be sent from Madras. They wrote letters to Rugoba, to Nizam Ally, and Hyder; and endeavoured, in the same manner, to induce Moodajce Bhonslay, Mahadajce Sindia, and Tookajce Holkar to embrace their cause, or, at all events, to engage their neutrality."

This decision in his favour by the supreme government raised the spirits and expectations of Rugoba; but the ministers, almost immediately after they had carried their menaces to the highest pitch, acceded at once to the greater part of Colonel Upton's original demands; and before accounts had time to reach Calcutta, that the negotiation was broken off, the treaty of Poorundhur was settled. It was signed on the 1st March, 1776, and consisted of nineteen articles, but two of them were afterwards erased by mutual consent, and an additional clause signed. The treaty was made by Lieutenant-Colonel Upton, on the

part of the Company's government, and by Sukaram Bappoo and Nana Furnuwees, on that of the peishwa's; but the titles of Rao Pundit Purdhan are only mentioned in the treaty, the name of the peishwa having been omitted."

Duff states previously¹ "that Sukaram Bappoo was originally concerned in Rugoba's conspiracy against the liberty, though not the life, of Narrain Rao. After the murder, as it was deemed, by the ministers generally, a measure of prudence to affect a disbelief of Rugonath Rao's participation : of course Sukaram had stronger reasons than any of them for possessing that opinion." Mill states² that the treaty of Poorundhur "had left the minds of the governing party at Poona, and those of the Bombay residency, in a state of mutual jealousy and dissatisfaction. The occupation of Salsette, and the other concessions which had been extorted, but above all, the countenance and protection still afforded to Rugoba, rankled in the minds of the Poona ministry; while the Bombay rulers, condemned and frustrated by the supreme council, but encouraged by the approbation of the Court of Directors, stood upon the watch for any plausible opportunity of evading or infringing

¹ Duff, vol. iii. p. 314.

² Mill, vol. iv. p. 31.

the treaty. Colonel Upton, though he remained at Poona till the commencement of the year 1777, departed before any of the material stipulations had been carried into effect."

We have seen that Nana Furnuwees, one of the ministers who signed the treaty, is the person, of whom Duff says,¹ "the young widow (of the late peishwa Mahdoo Rao) was deeply enamoured of Nana Furnuwees, and was taught by him the best means of governing the old minister. Moraba, the cousin of Nana, who had been the ostensible prime minister of Mahdoo Rao, was dissatisfied on finding little deference paid to his counsel, and would readily have returned to Rugonath Rao, if he could have effected it with safety, and insured his future power. Such of the other ministers as would not submit to Sukaram and Nana, were soon united in common discontent. The cabal, in short, divided into two parties, and their disagreement became generally known by the discovery of a correspondence on the part of Moraba, Bujāba and Bubajee Naik, with the ex-peishwa. It appeared, from letters intercepted by Hurry Punt, that these three had formed a plan for securing the persons of Suka-

¹ Mill, vol. ii. p. 216.

ram Bappoo, Nana Furnuwees, Gunga Bye, and her son."

Now Duff next states ¹ A.D. 1778, that, "in the meantime dissensions among the parties at Poona continued to increase. Nana Furnuwees despised the abilities of his cousin (Moraba Furnuwees), but, with a Brahmin's caution, he was at more pains to conceal his contempt than his enmity. Moraba was supported by all the partisans of Rugoba, particularly Buchaba, Poorundhuree, Sukaram Hurry, Chintoo Mittul, and Wishnoo Nerhur. This faction gained Tookajee Holkar, whose defection, from the cause of the ministers became avowed, by his excusing himself when ordered to support Hurry Punt Phurkay in the Carnatic. The English envoy attributed the confidence he could perceive in Nana to an assurance of support from France. Immediately after the death of Gunga Bye, Sukaram Bappoo began to be jealous of his hitherto humble colleague, ² and now united, by cautiously and with no decision, in a plan for the restoration of Rugoba. Moraba ³ made the proposal to the Bombay government, and requested that the government would imme-

¹ Duff, vol. ii. p. 349.

² Nana Furnuwees.

³ Cousin of Nana Furnuwees.

diately bring Rugoba to Poona. Preparations were accordingly begun, and the president and council determined to afford their assistance without delay. Their resolve was approved of by the supreme government; and it was determined at Bengal, in consequence of the war in which they were about to engage on the west of India, as well as the apprehended schemes of the French, in the same quarter, to support the Bombay presidency with six battalions of sepoy, &c., from Bengal." The Bombay government agreed to aid the scheme of Moraba, with the promise that Sukaram Bappoo, the principal authority in signing the treaty of Poorundhur, should state in writing, "that the invitation was made at his desire. This decided declaration Sukaram, unfortunately for himself, refused, and the plan was, in consequence, suspended; but it was the deliberate opinion of the Bombay government that their own safety depended on their effecting a change in the Poona administration. The complex political machine which Nana¹ Farnuwees managed on this emergency with consummate artifice, was at first a little deranged by a pre-

¹ In which all branches of the Mahrattahs claimed to have a voice.

mature attempt to apprehend Moraba, who made his escape from Poona." "Nana, through Sukaram Bappoo, persuaded his cousin to return, and it was agreed that a new ministry should be formed, including Moraba and Bujaba Poorundhuree; but Bujaba was not so easily persuaded; and Sukaram Hurry nobly declared that nothing should ever induce him to abjure the cause of a generous master, who had been his protector from youth to manhood; that Rugonath Rao was a soldier, and Nana a cunning, cowardly courtier.¹ Moraba's party, by the aid of Holkar's troops, obtained the complete ascendancy; and Nana, who was obliged to retire to Poorundhur, pretended to acquiesce in the plan for conducting Rugoba to Poona, on condition of obtaining security for himself and property. The Bombay government again received notice to prepare; but the weak Moraba imagined that he had attained his object, and fancied himself at the head of the administration. Nana affected his usual deference for Sukaram's opinion, and was scrupulously respectful to his cousin. Consultations took place respecting the restoration of Rugonath Rao, and Moraba began to perceive the force of Nana's

¹ One of the first to fly from the battle of Panniput.

objections. He could not but recollect that when he was minister under Mahdoo Rao, the conduct of Rugonath Rao had invariably tended to dissension, loss, or dishonour. He, therefore, though still pretending to be desirous of re-installing Rugoba, began to evade the question, when pressed by his English friends.

A majority of the council in Bombay, seeing that their hopes from Moraba's party had vanished, soothing themselves with the hope of a continuance of peace with France, and with an idea of being able, through Moraba, to destroy the influence of the French, at Poona, came to a resolution on the 22nd April of countermanding Colonel Leslie's detachment; but on the 3rd May, they reversed this resolution, and directed Colonel Leslie to advance. Then came a second revolution at Poonah.

Saint Lubin's¹ dismissal from Poona had been promised. He had proposed to assist the Mah-rattahs with French troops. Duff says, Nana Furnuwees's jealousy of Europeans "would never have admitted a French force sufficiently strong even for the expulsion of the English from the small settlement of Bombay, unless he could have

¹ Duff, vol. ii. p. 352, French agent.

been certain of crushing them afterwards. Nana Furnuwees never entirely believed that St. Lubin could bring troops;" and that the impostor adopted the deception of writing to Goa and Damaun for permission to pass two French regiments through the Portuguese territories. His letters were intercepted by the English. Nana had reassumed his former power, occupied the principal passes in the country with his troops, and through Sindia's influence, and by a bribe of nine lakhs rupees, detached Holkar from the confederacy.

The rivalry between Sukaram Baboo¹ and Nana Furnuwees had produced a division in the council of Poona; a part of the ministers, with Sukaram Baboo at their head, had resolved to declare for Rugoba, and they had applied for the assistance of the English to place in his hands the powers of government. Originally the treaty (Poorundhur) had been signed by both Sukaram Baboo and Nana Furnuwees. Mr. Francis and Mr. Wheeler disapproved of the conduct of the Bombay government, which had resolved to co-operate with the ministers who were in favour of Rugoba. Mr. Hastings and Mr. Barwell were in

¹ Mill, vol. iv. p. 34.

favour¹ of supporting Rugoba, and finally determined that a force of six battalions of sepoys, one company of native artillery, and a corps of cavalry should be sent across the country *via* Calpee, through Bundelcund to Surat, to aid the Bombay army. Applications had been made to Sindia and Holkar for passports, to allow our troops to march unmolested through their country. This they granted, as their own troops being engaged in the direction of Poona, their territories would be less unprotected, and therefore wished the English should pass as friends.² "The ministers, however, observed to Mr. Mostyn, that as the detachment was sent on account of the French, by the dismissal of the envoy (St. Lubin), both their advance and their passports were no longer necessary; Nana at the same time sent secret orders to the Mahrattah officers, and to the rajas in Bundelcund to oppose Leslie's progress."

Leslie's detachment³ marched from Calpee in May 1778, and having advanced as far as Chat-terpoor, a principal city in Bundelcund, early in June, it halted till the middle of August. In fact, Colonel Leslie had improperly delayed his

¹ Hastings's casting vote decided the question.

² Duff, vol. ii. p. 357.

³ Mill, vol. iv. p. 44.

movements by making an attack on Mhow, six miles west of Chatterpoor. The president and council of Bombay, on the receipt of intelligence of a rupture with Nana, had earnestly exhorted Colonel Leslie to accelerate his motions. They renewed their solicitations on the 21st July, when they came to the resolution of supporting Rugoba. The supreme council wrote to the commanding officer on the 31st August, desiring him to explain his reasons for delay, and to pursue the march. He had marched in the middle of August, and was at Rajegur¹ on the 17th, where he still stayed. He died on the 3rd October, and was succeeded by Colonel Goddard, who, on the 22nd October, reported to the governor-general his progress towards the Nerbuddah, on the boundary of Berar. The detachment had been placed under the orders of the Bombay government. Now,² on the 7th December, 1778, when the governor-general heard of the second revolution at Poona, he proposed that Goddard should act under the orders of the supreme council. Goddard crossed the Nerbuddah on 1st December. The Bombay army was now on its march to Poona. It had embarked at Bombay

¹ In Bundelcund.

² Mill, vol. vi. p. 47.

for Panwell¹ on the 23rd November, 1778. The army was composed of five hundred and ninety-one Europeans, two thousand two hundred and seventy-eight native infantry, and five hundred gun lascars; the whole, officers included, amounted to three thousand nine hundred men. Mr. John Carnac,² one of the members of council, and declared successor of Governor Hornby, urged vigorous preparation, and a speedy departure of the troops. Mr. Draper dissented from Mr. Carnac, who strenuously supported the proposals of Governor Hornby. "It was the opinion of the majority, that no time should be lost; the French might probably arrive, an incident, the truth of which Mr. Draper admitted, and that too, he observed, 'with their garrison drained of troops, and Bombay at their mercy;' but his voice was overruled.'"

The whole force,³ accompanied by Rugoba, and Amrut Rao, his adopted son, ascended the Ghauts by the 23rd December, 1778. The dilatory preparations at Bombay afforded Nana Furnuwees

¹ Duff, vol. ii. p. 364.

² Formerly Brigadier-general Carnac in Bengal.

³ Duff, vol. ii. p. 366. A committee had been appointed, something like the Dutch field deputies in Marlborough's time.

and Mahadajec Sindia ample time to assemble the army. On the 9th January, 1779, the army reached Tullygaom, where the Mahrattahs made a show of resistance ; but when the line advanced, they retired. The village had been destroyed by order of Nana Furnuwees, and it was reported, orders had been given to burn Chinchore and Poona. "Instead of pushing forward eighteen miles, the distance between Tullygaom and the capital (Poona), the apparent determination of the enemy alarmed them. Rugoba urged, that no person of consequence would declare for him until some advantage had been obtained. Still the committee sank into despondency. Finally, they resolved to retreat. Rugonath Rao earnestly begged of them to defer their resolution ; "but the man who had led fifty thousand horse from the Nerbuddah to the Attock,¹ was equally odious to his countrymen, and despicable among his allies."

The army was divided into two brigades, besides six companies of grenadier sepoys, which were kept distinct as a reserve. The army was reduced to two thousand six hundred men. The Mahrattahs were about fifty thousand men. The

¹ Passage across the Indus towards Peshaweer.

two brigades were now united, having a strong advanced guard in front, with the six companies and two guns considerably in the rear; the heavy guns had been thrown into a large tank. Captain Hartley commanded the reserve. The Mah-rattahs surrounded the Bombay troops on the morning of the 12th January. The troops were formed into line, but the strength of the attack (as in warfare in the Deccan since the days of Shah Jehan) was made upon the rear. Hartley's sepoy's drove them back. After sunrise, the attack on the rear was renewed by the main body of the Mahrattah army, consisting of both cavalry and infantry. They also opened their guns on the line. Captain Hartley was not supported by Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn with the main body as requested, but by a detachment. The colonel had ordered Captain Hartley to retreat, but was prevailed on to allow the captain to hold his ground. On the 13th, the enemy opened their guns on the village, and a body of infantry advanced to attack it. They were repulsed, but the troops were supposed to be dispirited; doubts of being able to retreat began to be expressed. On the 13th, the total loss of fighting men in the preceding day, was found to

be three hundred and sixty-two, of whom fifty-six were killed, one hundred and fifty-one wounded, and one hundred and fifty-five were missing; many of the last supposed to have deserted. There were fifteen European officers among the above killed and wounded.

A further retreat was deemed impracticable by the committee,¹ and Mr. Farmer, secretary to the committee, was sent to negotiate with the Mahrattah ministers. They at first demanded the surrender of Rugonath Rao, which the committee would have complied with, "but they were saved from this disgrace by his having entered into a separate agreement with Mahadajee Sindia, to whom he afterwards gave himself up. Sindia was aiming at an ascendancy which Nana Furnuwees was studiously endeavouring to prevent; yet each was so necessary to the other in the Mahrattah empire,² that although their ultimate views were at variance, their present interests were in union. The ruling party, of which Nana and Sindia were now the real authorities, insisted on the committee's entering

¹ Mr. Carnac and Colonel Egerton.

² Nana to furnish advice—Sindia to furnish troops—the head of the one, and the arm of the other.

on a treaty for the surrender of the whole of the territory the Bombay government had acquired since the death of Mahdoo Rao Bullal, &c. There was a separate negotiation opened with Sindia by Mr. Holmes, which¹ “flattered him exceedingly, and accorded most fully with his plans of policy; but no ebullition of joy prevented his taking every advantage of the English, as far as was consistent with the control he now had, and was determined to preserve, over Nana Furnuwees. Mr. Holmes settled that everything was to be restored to the Mahrattahs as held in 1773. The committee were obliged, on the spot, to send an order countermanding the advance of the Bengal troops, and Sindia’s favour was purchased by a private promise to bestow on him the English share of Baroach, besides a sum of 41,000 rupees (£4,100) in presents to his servants. The committee were so completely humbled, that they viewed with gratitude the kindness of Sindia in suffering the army to depart;² they were obliged

¹ Duff, vol. ii. 377.

² It was said that the committee signed a paper in blank at the bottom allowing the Mahrattahs to write above their (committee’s) names what they liked. Again, it is said Sindia advised the Mahrattahs not to be too hard upon the English, as they might thereafter pay them off with interest.

to give two hostages, Mr. W. G. Farmer, and Lieutenant C. Stewart, as a security for the performance of their engagement; but their first act, on descending the Ghauts, was to suspend the countermand they had addressed to the officer commanding the Bengal detachment."

On the return of the troops to Bombay, Colonel Egerton and Lieutenant-Colonel Cockburn were suspended. The Court of Directors dismissed Mr. Carnae and Colonel Egerton from the Company's service, as also Lieut.-Colonel Cockburn. The gallant and judicious behaviour of Captain Hartley was universally acknowledged; but the governor in council, having raised him at once to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, although he might have merited the distinction, such promotion being unprecedented in the Company's service, was deemed so improper and injurious, that every officer, before senior to Lieut.-Colonel Hartley, represented the injustice and degradation to which he was personally subjected. Some time after, when an answer arrived from the Court of Directors, it proved a source of mortification to Hartley, as although he was not deprived of his rank, his further promotion and his pay as lieutenant-colonel in the Company's service were suspended

until the whole of those, formerly his seniors, should, in the usual routine, be promoted over him.”¹

In the case of Lieutenant Flint,² of the Madras army, for the defence of Arcot in January, 1781, “Sir Eyre Coote recommended the immediate promotion of Lieutenant Flint to the rank of captain, which was acceded to by his government; but this distinction was rendered nugatory by a subsequent determination of the Court of Directors, as an inconvenient deviation from the established routine of their service.”³ The depressing influence caused by a seniority promotion, as stated by Colonel Wilks, has for many years (1826) been overcome by the grant of brevets to Company’s officers for distinguished conduct in the field.

“Governor Hornby⁴ disavowed the validity of the disgraceful articles of the Wurgaom convention; for although Mr. Carnac had ostentatiously intimated to Nana Furnuwees, probably to en-

¹ Cadet, 1763.—Lieutenant-Colonel, 11th April, 1779. Removed to the king’s service, and died October, 1799.

² Wilks’ South of India, vol. ii. 293.

³ A captain 23rd November, 1782, (Cadet, 1769) retired 1st June, 1796, as lieutenant-colonel.

⁴ Duff, vol. ii. 381.

hance his own consequence, that he was entrusted with the Company's seal, and with full powers, he had no authority to conclude a treaty, nor could the Bombay government have delegated such a commission. Mr. Hornby determined, at all hazards, to resist the sessions made by the committee; but as every point was indispensably referred to Bengal, there appeared no necessity for publishing a defiance to the Mahrattahs. Every effort was made to recruit and improve their army. Mr. Hornby, on the 19th February, 1779, laid before his council an elaborate minute. He proposed to secure a peace, so as to exclude the French from the Mahrattah dominions, and to retain the territory then in possession of the English. He assumed that Sindia had indicated an aversion to the French, and a desire to form an alliance with the English, against Nana Furnuwees. In this supposition thus adopted, Mr. Hornby was not wholly wrong; for had Nana by any means (foreign or domestic) become too powerful, Mahadajee Sindia might have sought assistance from the English; but while Nana Furnuwees held the reins, principally by the support of Sindia's power, it was completely the interest of the latter to uphold Nana's administration."

To return to Colonel Goddard¹, his route lay by Mooltan, Khemlassa, Beilsah, Bhopaul, and Hoossingabad; at the last mentioned place he forded the Nerbuddah, on the 2nd December, 1778. The conduct of the nawab of Bhopaul was different from that of the Mahrattah officer at Sagur (Ballajee Punt). The former furnished the troops with supplies, (as certificates in possession of the nawab's family prove), and granted every assistance. The latter plundered our camp. After Colonel Goddard had crossed the Nerbuddah, he halted to the south bank of the river, to await some communications from Moodajee Bhonslay, particularly connected with his future operations. Duff says the views of the supreme government were, "an alliance with the ruler of Berar (Moodajee Bhonslay) against the Poona ministers, for the purpose of attaining permanent peace, and complete security to the Company's possessions, against the attempts of France, by establishing and upholding Moodajee Bhonslay as raja of all the Mahrattahs. Mr. Hastings, in this plan, was precisely adopting the scheme originally suggested by Wittul Sondoor, the

¹ Duff, vol. ii. 384.

minister of Nizam Ally.¹ He was not aware that Moodajee had no claim to the Mahrattah sovereignty. Mr. Elliot, who was to have carried this plan into execution, died on the 12th September, 1778, on his route towards Nagpoor, the capital of Moodajee Bhonslay. Colonel Goddard was directed to take charge of the secret instructions regarding this plan. He was removed from under the control of the Bombay government, and placed under the orders of the supreme council. Two additional battallions were ordered as reinforcements under Major Jacob Camac.

Moodajee, in the first instance, would have acceded to the governor-general's views, but before any explanation had taken place, he had received intelligence of the designs at Bombay in favour of Rugoba, and of the vigorous preparations of his own countrymen, at Poona;² both of which tended to deter him from entering on any immediate alliance. "Moodajee foresaw that opposition would be made to pretensions in his own person, but he knew there would be much less difficulty, and a powerful party

¹ Said to have been first suggested to Mr. Hastings by Beneeram, the Wukeel of Sabajee.

² Duff, vol. ii. 386.

against the Bramin administration, by his assuming the character of protector at Satara, (his authority in Berar was nothing more), and declaring that his sole design was *the restoration of the imprisoned raja's authority*." "Let," says Moodajee, in his own proposals to Mr. Hastings, "a lineal descendant of Maharaja Chutter Puttee Sivajee Bhonslay, continue on the *musnud* of the Satara raja; but, till the power and authority of the raje (sovereignty) is established, nothing is done." This was sound reasoning for the Mahrattah cause; not, to take steps to support the claims of the peishwa or prime *minister* of the descendant of Sivajee, the founder of the Mahrattahs, while the *head* of the Mahrattahs was imprisoned. Mr. Hastings, doubtless, thought that could he have succeeded in making Moodajee Bhonslay the head of the Mahrattahs, the English would have had a claim to their forbearance and would have secured a permanent peace. It may be asked when the government of Bengal declined to support the *right* of the Emperor of Delhi to his throne, why did they desire to support the *claim* of Rugonath Rao,¹ or of any other

¹ He was the uncle of the peshwa, and his (Rugonath's) son, Bajee Rao, who died not long since, became peishwa in 1795. Rugonath Rao died in 1784.

Mahrattah chief, to the supreme power at Poona? The answer is, that the Mahrattahs were the strongest. The Company's danger was to the west of India; strong measures were required. From the Bombay government,¹ urgent applications were received by Colonel Goddard, dated on the 6th and 19th December, 1778, to advance to support the Bombay army. Goddard, though no longer under the control of the presidency, considered the interest of his country at stake, and resolved to march to the west coast. He now acted on his own judgment. On the 26th January, he marched, and arrived at Burhanpoor² on the 30th of that month. On the 25th of February, 1779, he reached Surat, a distance of three hundred miles. Colonel Goddard himself repaired to Bombay.

Governor Hornby now saw that the scheme for a treaty with Moodajee Bhonslay, as proposed, could not be effected. On the 30th March, 1779, he submitted to council a plan for obtaining resources and for distressing their enemies, for Mahadajee Sindia had shown no favourable inten-

¹ Duff, vol. ii, 387.

² Mahrattah Country, 288 miles from Poona, and 340 from Bombay.

tions to the English, who were on the eve of becoming principals in a war, to maintain which, they had no funds. Mr. Hornby's plan, was to enter into a treaty with the Gaekwar family, on the terms solicited by Futih Sing in 1772 ;—reconciling the brothers, releasing them from tribute and dependence on the Poona state, and conquering the peishwa's share of Guzerat for the Company. But in all these schemes, they were subject to the control of the governor general and council.

The governor-general had appointed Colonel Goddard, with distinct powers, as their envoy and plenipotentiary at the court of Poona. The governor-general, on hearing of the disastrous news regarding the Bombay army, ordered a brigade to the banks of the Jumna, and Sir Eyre Coote, the commander-in-chief, proceeded to inspect the military resources on the north-west frontier, the quarter most likely to be invaded. Goddard was appointed a brigadier-general, and the Bengal government sent a recommendation to the Court of Directors for his appointment as commander-in-chief at Bombay. The Bombay government objected to his being appointed to the rank of general, or being separately appointed

to negotiate with the Poona state, except through their aet; or having any military force within the limits of their presidency, independent of their authority. Still, soothed by the consideration shown to them by Mr. Hastings, and the judicious conduct of General Goddard, they determined to exert themselves to forward the views of the supreme government.

In the end of May the supreme government, taking into consideration Mr. Hornby's minutes of February and March, decided against the British authority being engaged as a party between the brothers, Futih Sing and Govind Rao Gaekwar. The alliance was, therefore, to be formed with Futih Sing, the acknowledged head of the Baroda state, and no pledge given for reconciling their domestic differences." The governor-general¹ was inclined to concur in opinion with Mr. Hornby, that Sindia had some secret design of connecting himself with the English. General Goddard was instructed to treat separately with Sindia, if he found him disposed to espouse the interests of the Company; but the dependence of Nana Furnuwees on Mahadjee Sindia was at this time best secured by

¹ Duff, vol. ii. p 394.

war. Sindia had a high opinion of the English troops. Just after the convention at Wurgaoon, Sindia, in the presence of Mr. Farmer, Mr. Holmes, and Mr. Sibbald, loudly extolled the conduct of their rear guard (Captain Hartley), which he compared to a red wall; "and no sooner beat down, than it was instantly built up again," (each stepping where his comrade stood, the instant he fell). "I hope," said Mahadajee, whispering in Mr. Sibbald's ear, "to see these fine fellows co-operating with my own troops, bye and bye." But Sindia rather looked to obtaining the means of making conquests, in which he could not expect aid, such as would make him too powerful. He, not many years after, began to employ infantry disciplined by Europeans.¹

Hyder Ali,² prior to 1779, had become jealous of the English, and, but for the fears of a Mahrattah invasion, would, probably, at an earlier period, have gone to war with them, and declared himself an ally of the French. He had for some time encouraged a close intercourse with that nation, and was supplied with arms, warlike stores, and occasionally with men, from the island of

¹ Duff, vol. ii. p. 476.

² Vol. ii. p. 399.

Mauritius. The recapture of Pondicherry¹ on the 18th October, 1778, caused regret to Hyder; and when the governor of Madras intimated the intended reduction of the French settlement of Mahé, the port through which Hyder drew his supplies, he formally protested against the attack of a settlement which he considered under his protection. The fort fell in March 1779.

The fugitive Rugoba² was received by the English, and on the 12th of June, 1779, accompanied by his sons, Amrut Rao (adopted), and Bajee Rao, the latter a child of four years old, visited General Goddard in his camp. The general avoided entering on any terms of alliance with Rugoba, "it was considered very impolitic to attempt forcing a person into the Mahrattah government, to whom the whole nation had manifested indifference or aversion; and therefore, acting upon the terms of the Poorundhur treaty, if all accommodation were rejected, the English in support of their national honour, could do no less than engage in the war as principals. The negotiation between General Goddard and Nana

¹ Formerly taken in 1760,—restored at the peace in 1763.

² He had escaped from his guard,—said by the contrivance of Sindia.

Furnuwces continued for several months, but towards the end of the monsoon, Goddard communicated to the Bombay government some intelligence he had received of a general confederacy of the Mahrattahs, Hyder, and Nizam Ally, against the English, on whom it was said they meditated an attack, at all their presidencies." Goddard had before this sent to demand explicit answers from Nana Furnuwees, who declared that the surrender of Salsette and the person of Rugoba, were preliminaries to any treaty which the English might wish to conclude with the Mahrattah state.

Goddard¹ on this, embarked for Bombay, and consulted the government regarding the proposed alliance with Futih Sing (Gaekwar), and to urge the dispatch of troops. A detachment, under Colonel Hartley,² one hundred European artillery, two hundred European infantry, two battalions of native infantry, one of them a battalion of grenadier sepoy, volunteer drafts, principally those who had served before under Hartley, on the rear guard at Tullygaom, were speedily dispatched to

¹ Duff, vol. ii. p. 402.

² The Captain Hartley in January 1779, at the Bhore Ghaut attack.

Guzerat. A treacherous correspondence about this period, was intercepted by General Goddard, between the wukeels of Nana Furnuwees and the Dutch chief and direetor, at Surat, who had engaged in a plot for assisting the Mahrattahs to surprise Surat Castle. General Goddard marched 1st January, 1780, and crossed the Taptee. He concluded a treaty with Futih Sing, on the 26th January, 1780. On the 15th February, 1780, he took Ahmedabad. The capital of Guzerat was seareely reduced, when General Goddard heard of the approach of Mahadajee Sindia and Tookajee Holkar, with a body of fifteen thousand horse, to which were to be united seven thousand horse, then engaged in plundering the villages about Baroach.

The escape of Rugoba caused some coolness between Sindia and the minister for a time, but they were soon reconciled; and although Mahadajee did not wish to quit the capital at that time, yet as he had Nana under command by causing them to apprehend an alliance with the English, he at last consented to oppose Goddard in Guzerat. Rugonath Rao had been persuaded by General Goddard to remain in the city of Surat. Sindia and Holkar forded the Nerbuddah

on the 29th February, 1780, with above twenty thousand horse. Goddard advanced to attack them. They retired. "Sindia, so far from evincing hostile intentions, professed the greatest friendship for the English. The two hostages (Mr. Farmer and Lieutenant Stewart),¹ who were still in his camp, and whom he had treated with much hospitality, were restored to liberty, and joined General Goddard on the 9th March, 1780. Sindia's object was to waste the time in negotiation, and keep Goddard inactive during the fair season." General Goddard was sincere in assuring Sindia of his desire for peace, but he limited the negotiation to a certain time, and allowed Sindia three days from the time his wukeel quitted the British camp, to offer his proposals.

The detachment under Captain William Popham,² was composed of drafts intended to recruit the Bengal battalions serving with General Goddard, but in consequence of the renewal of the war, they were not allowed to march across India, as had been originally ordered, and were

¹ Given up at the convention of Wurgaom in January, 1779.

² Duff, vol. ii. p. 418. The Bombay records furnish the best details of this force. Copies were not sent to Bengal. Not very regular in those days in sending copies, &c.

now selected for this service; the whole amounted to two thousand four hundred men, formed in three battalions, a small body of cavalry, and a detail of European artillery. Captain Popham crossed the Jumna in February; he immediately attacked a body of Mahrattahs, who were plundering in the neighbourhood of Gohud. Captain Popham next took Lahar, a place fifty miles west of Calpee, in possession of the Mahrattahs. After his return from Lahar, he encamped during the rains within ten miles of the celebrated fortress of Gwalior; it was in possession of Mahadajee Sindia, but within the territory of the rana of Gohud, and had been wrested from *his* father by the Mahrattahs. "Captain Popham was employed for two months in laying his scheme; and at last, assisted by spies, furnished through the *rana* of Gohud, he determined to carry his plan into execution. On the night of the 3rd August, 1780, he formed his party. The command of the advance was conferred on Captain Bruce,¹ who had before distinguished himself in the attack of the Mahrattah

¹ Bengal infantry. Lieutenant-general Robert Bruce, died 21st September, 1814. He commanded a corps of Hindostanee horse for many years.

horse, upon the first arrival of the detachment in the Gohud territory. The advance consisted of two companies of sepoys, chosen grenadiers and light infantry; and as the surprise of the natives was intended, twenty Europeans followed the sepoys,—a judicious¹ disposition, as they were near enough to gain the head of the column if necessary, and, where they were placed, less likely to lead to discovery; two battalions of sepoys followed. Scaling ladders applied to the foot of the scarped rock, which was sixteen feet high, enabled them to mount with ease. Thence they had to climb a steep ascent of about forty yards, to the foot of the second wall, which was thirty feet high. The spies ascended, made fast ladders of rope, by which the sepoys mounted with alacrity, and each man as he got inside squatted down. Twenty of the sepoys, with Captain Bruce, had entered the fort, when three of them so far forgot themselves as to shoot some of the garrison who lay asleep near them. This indiscretion occasioned an immediate alarm, but the sepoys stood their ground, their comrades mounted to their support, the garrison became intimidated, and the sun had scarcely risen on

¹ Duff, vol. ii. p. 420.

the 4th of August, when the assailants had obtained possession, almost without resistance, of the celebrated fortress of Gwalior." Captain Popham¹ was rewarded with the rank of major from the 4th August, 1780, the date of the capture of the fortress.² On the same night,³ Captain Abington made an attempt to surprise the strong fortress of Mullungurh (Bhow Mullun). "He succeeded in possessing himself of the lower hill; but the garrison, before his men could get sufficiently near to mingle with them, took the alarm, and made good their retreat to the upper fort, an enormous mass of perpendicular rock, that defied all attempts at an assault. The hill forts (Droogs) have usually the town below, but the garrison, or a party of them, in the upper fort. There is usually no way of getting possession of these upper forts, but by starving out the garrison, if in want of supplies, or by bribing the commandant. Even Napoleon did not scruple, at times, to use a gold or silver key.

¹ Mill, vol. iv. p. 60. He entered the Bengal army as captain, 7th August, 1768.

² Lord Gough, for his conduct at Talavera, had his brevet of lieutenant-colonel, 29th July, 1809, ante-dated to the date of the Duke's despatch, at his grace's recommendation.

³ Duff, vol. ii. p. 421.

CHAPTER III.

HYDER ALI KHAN.

Mill¹ says, Hyder Ali, after an irregular war with the Nairs, the whole country (Malabar) submitted, before the end of the year 1766, when he was recalled to Seringapatam by intelligence of the utmost importance. Mahdoo Rao had issued from Poona. Nizam Ally, with an English corps, was advancing from Hyderabad; the English had already sent to attack some of Hyder's districts, which interfered with the Carnatic; and all these powers were joined, according to report, in one grand confederacy for the conquest of Mysore. Nizam Ally, however, and the English, were the only enemies whom it was immediately necessary to oppose, and the nizam he easily converted into an ally. In this state of his kingdom and fortunes, he began his first war with the English, in 1767. He was exasperated, not only by the readiness with which, in the

¹ Mill, vol. iii. p. 471.

late treaty with the nizam, the English had agreed to join in hostilities against him, but by an actual invasion of his dominions (Baramahl), under the pretence that it formerly belonged to the Carnatic. He attacked Colonel Smith near Changama, whom he defeated. He detached into the Carnatic five thousand horse, who marched without opposition to the very precincts of Madras. The place was completely taken by surprise. Before the rains compelled the English army to retire into cantonments at Wandewash, Colonel Smith attacked the enemy before Trincomalee, with a loss¹ of above four thousand men, sixty four guns, and a large quantity of military stores. The nizam, immediately after the battle, withdrew from the scene of action, and Hyder fell back within his own frontier. Hyder made an overture towards peace in 1769.² It was received, however, with great haughtiness by the Madras government. In the same year, having drawn the English army to a considerable distance from Madras, he put himself at the head of six thousand horse, and marching one hundred and twenty miles in three days, he appeared suddenly on the mount of San Thomé,

¹ Wilks, vol. ii. p. 41.

² Mill, vol. iv. p. 76.

within seven miles of Madras. He despatched a message to the governor, requiring a negotiation for peace immediately to be opened. The government were struck with consternation. A treaty was concluded on the 4th April, 1769,—“A mutual restitution of conquests;” secondly, “mutual aid, and alliance in defensive wars.”

Shortly after the treaty, Hyder endeavoured to persuade the English of the great advantage which he and they would derive, from uniting Janojee Bhonsla¹ with them in a triple league. The Madras government declined complying with his request. “Early in 1770, the Mahrattahs invaded his country, and again he solicited assistance, if it were but a few troops for the sake of the manifestation on account of which he had requested them before. If a more substantial aid was afforded, he professed his readiness to pay three lakhs of rupees. It was not very easy for the English now to find a pretext. They evaded, procrastinated, and withheld, rather than refused compliance with his desire. The Mahrattahs reduced Hyder to great difficulties, nay dangers, and seemed resolved to annex his dominions to their spreading conquests.” “He

¹ Son of Rughojee of Berar.

endeavoured to persuade the English that their own interest was deeply concerned in combining with him against the Mahrattahs, who would touch upon their frontier." "The Mahrattahs, too, very earnestly pressed for the assistance of the English." They had, indeed, by superior numbers, driven Hyder from the open country. "The difficulties on the part of the president and council were uncommonly great. They state their views of them in their consultations, on the 30th of April, 1770. Their assistance would enable the Mahrattahs, indeed, to prevail over Hyder, but of all events that was, probably, the most alarming; The Mahrattahs would, in that case, immediately adjoin the Carnatic, with such an accumulated power as would enable them to conquer it whenever they pleased; and what, when they had power to conquer, the Mahrattahs would please, nobody acquainted with India entertained any doubt. If they assisted Hyder, that was immediate war with the Mahrattahs, accompanied with all its burdens and dangers. It was not clear, that both united could prevail over the Mahrattahs; and if they did, the power of Hyder would bring along with it a large share of the dangers to which they would be exposed

from the Mahrattahs, if sovereigns of Mysore. If they stood neuter, and thereby offended both parties, either Hyder or the Mahrattahs, most probably the latter, would prevail; and in that case, the victor, whoever he was, would wreak his vengeance on the rulers of the Carnatic. Amid these difficulties, they conceived it their wisest policy after all to remain neuter; to gain time, and take up arms only when the extremity could no longer be shunned."

The nawab of the Carnatic resolved to form an alliance with the Mahrattahs. He had a personal antipathy to Hyder Ali, and he expressed an extreme reluctance to join, or see the English concur in anything favourable to Hyder. It will be recollected that the treaty with Hyder of the 4th April, 1769, was of a compulsory nature, when the army was away from Madras. The Court of Directors¹ remarked,—“And the only imprudent article of the treaty, in which, however, there was nothing of humiliation, or inconsistency with the train of the Company's policy, was *the reciprocation of military assistance*; be-

¹ Mill, vol. iii. p. 479. Hyder was a usurper. He had imprisoned the raja, and in 1766, had just subdued the nairs of Malabar. P. 471.

cause of this the evident tendency was, to embroil them with other powers." In the month of November, 1771, the Mahrattahs were in possession of the whole of Mysore, excepting the principal fort. They had advanced to the borders of the Carnatic: but¹ "the Mahrattahs were afraid of provoking the English to join Hyder Ali."

1780. "Though Hyder² was deeply exasperated against the presidency of Madras for their continued evasion of treaty, and refusal of assistance, he was induced by the state of his affairs to make a fresh proposal in 1778. Harassed by the hostilities of the Poona government, he had been well pleased to support a pretender³ in the person of Rugoba. The English were now involved, not only in disputes with the Poona ministers, but actual operations for the reinstatement of that ejected chief; and in the beginning of July, 1778, Hyder, through his resident at Madras, made a new overture towards an alliance with the English, offering his assistance to establish Rugonath Rao in the office of peishwa, and requiring only a supply of arms and military stores, for which he would pay, and a

¹ Mill, vol. iv. p. 82.

² Vol. iv. p. 166.

³ Rugoba, grand uncle of Mahdoo Rao Narrain, who dying in 1795, declared Rugoba's son (Bajee Rao) to be peishwa.

body of troops, whose expenses he would defray. "The Madras government appears to have thought, that such an arrangement might be useful, and prevent the formation of a connexion between Hyder and the French: "they even acknowledged their belief, that had not the treaty of 1769 been evaded, Hyder never would have sought other allies than themselves." The supreme council approved in general of an alliance with Hyder; but being at that time anxious to form a connexion with the raja of Berar,¹ they directed a modification of the terms in regard to Rugoba, whose cause they said, was supported, "not as an end, but a means now deemed subordinate to the successful issue of the negotiation with Moodajee."²

"A friendly intercourse subsisted between Hyder and the French. He had been supplied by them with arms and military stores. A number of adventurers of that nation commanded and disciplined his troops, and they were united by a common hatred of the English power. A desire to save appearances, however, constrained Hyder to congratulate the English upon the reduction of Pondicherry; but he gave early intimation of

¹ Thus to have an ally among the Mahrattahs.

² Rajah of Berar.

the resentment with which he would regard any attempt upon Mahé, belonging to the French. Hyder threatened the invasion of the Carnatic as the retaliation for interfering with Mahé. It belonged to the French.

Before the end of November 1779, the nabob of the Carnatic¹ informed the governor of Madras that a treaty had been formed between Hyder and the Mahrattahs, to which Nizam Ally had acceded, for a system of combined hostilities against the English. The Madras government at first disbelieved the information, but were soon satisfied of the truth of the nabob's intelligence. On the 21st July, 1780, information was brought from the commander at Amboor, that Hyder² and his two sons, with the principal part of his army, had come through the pass. The next day brought undoubted intelligence that Porto Novo, on the coast, and Conjeveram, not fifty miles from the capital, had been plundered by the enemy. Hyder's army was said to amount to "one hundred thousand men: of his infantry, twenty thousand were formed into regular battalions, and most commanded by Europeans. His cavalry

¹ Mill, vol. iv. p. 171.

² Mill, vol. iv. p. 174.

amounted to thirty thousand, of which two thousand were Abyssinian horse, and constantly attended upon his person; ten thousand were Carnatic cavalry, well disciplined, of which one half had belonged to the nabob, and, after having been trained by English officers, had either deserted, or been disbanded for want of ability to pay them. He had one hundred pieces of cannon, managed by Europeans, and natives who had been trained by the English for the nabob; and Monsieur Lally, who had left the service of the subahdar¹ for that of Hyder, was present with his corps of Frenchman or other Europeans, to the amount of about four hundred men, and had a principal share in planning and conducting the operations of the army."

Colonel Baillie, who commanded a detachment in Guntoor, to the west of Masulipatam, of one hundred and fifty Europeans, infantry and artillery, and two thousand sepoys, was directed to attack Cudapah, or some other possessions of Hyder:² this was in July. Preparations were being made by the presidency; but it was clear that, with the imminent danger of such an attack,

¹ Of the Deccan. The Nizam.

² Mill, vol. iv. p. 177.

self-defence prescribed rather a concentration of the troops, than that distant and unconnected detached parties should be sent away, or suffered to be left at a distance from the scene of danger. "Not only every day brought fresh intelligence of the conquest and devastation effected by Hyder; Madras itself, on the 10th of August, was thrown into alarm. A party of the enemy's horse committed ravages as near as St. Thomas's Mount, and the inhabitants of the open town began to take flight." The Madras army at the presidency amounted to five thousand two hundred and nine men (Europeans, one thousand four hundred and eighty-one infantry, artillery two hundred and ninety-four); thirty-two field guns, four heavy guns and five mortars.

On the 25th August, the general (Macleod) left the presidency, and joined the army at St. Thomas's Mount. There was one regiment of cavalry; belonging to the nabob (Carnatic), commanded by European officers; it refused to march unless paid its arrears. They were disarmed, except fifty-six, who consented to serve.¹ There was also a company of marksmen.

It had been concerted that the detachment of

¹ Mill, vol. iv. p. 183.

Colonel Baillie should reach Conjeveram¹ on the day after the arrival of General Munro and the army. The army left the mount on the 26th of August. A letter from Colonel Baillie, received on the 31st, informed General Munro that the colonel had been delayed by a small river in his march. On the 3rd September, the enemy encamped five miles distant in front of the army near Conjeveram. On the 6th, the enemy moved his camp to the north-east; General Munro moved his ground. While this movement was performing, Hyder had sent forward his son, Tippoo Saib, with a large body of the flower of his army to cut off the English detachment with Colonel Baillie, who had now advanced to Perambaucum, distant from the main army about fifteen miles. Baillie made a disposition to resist a prodigious superiority of force; sustained a severe conflict of several hours, and at last repelled the assailants. On the 8th September, Baillie wrote to Munro that, upon a review of the battle, he found the movement requisite for joining him, beyond the powers of his detachment, and intimated the necessity, that the general should push forward with the main body of the army. With the concurrence of his

¹ Forty-six miles from Madras, S. W.

principal officers, he, the general, at nine o'clock at night, on the 8th September, detached Colonel Fletcher with the flank companies his majesty's seventy-third regiment, two companies of European grenadiers, one company of sepoy marksmen, and ten companies of sepoy grenadiers. The colonel declined taking any guns, as calculated to impede his march.

Baillie was directed,¹ on Colonel Fletcher's junction, to march on the evening of the 9th, and to march the whole night. The tents of the main army were struck, and the men lay on their arms. About twelve o'clock, a firing from guns and musketry was heard at a distance. It was soon perceived that the enemy's army had moved.² The general gave orders to march in the direction of the firing. After marching four miles, he ordered guns to be fired, as a signal of his approach; and, after a mile and a-half, he repeated the signal. A great smoke was suddenly perceived,³ and the firing ceased. Supposing that Baillie had repulsed the enemy, the general led the army back into the road, in hopes to meet

¹ Mill, vol. iv. p. 186.

² That Hyder had marched to Tippoo's support.

³ Baillie's tumbrils blew up.

him. After marching about two miles, he met wounded sepoy, who told him that Colonel Baillie was entirely defeated. The general marched back to Conjeveram, deeming the safety of the army to depend upon that movement.

Munro was ignorant of Hyder's movements, while Hyder knew of the march of Colonel Fletcher, and the number of his men, as well as that he left his guns behind. He sent a strong detachment to intercept him. The sagacity of Fletcher caused him to suspect his guide, and he, therefore, changed his route, and under cover of the night, evaded the danger. The junction of the two detachments, after the defeat by Baillie, of so large a portion of the enemy a few days before, struck alarm into the Mysorean camp. The European officers in Hyder's service regarded the junction as a masterly stroke of generalship, intended for the immediate attack of his army, both in front and rear. Lally himself entreated Hyder to retreat and save his army. Hyder's resolution was shaken, till two of his spies arriving, assured him that the English army at Conjeveram was not in motion, and making no preparations to move. Hyder had made up his mind.

Colonel Fletcher had joined Baillie at half-past six, A.M. on the 9th September. Colonel Baillie gave orders to be prepared to march between eight and nine o'clock at night.¹ During the night, Tippoo, who had commanded only a detachment of Hyder's army in the preceding attack,² apprised his father of his position, and of the advantage of supporting the attack with the whole of his army. At five, A.M. on the 10th September, Colonel Baillie's detachment began to advance. Soon the pagoda of Conjeveram began to appear; when they were informed that the whole host of Hyder was approaching. Presently after sixty guns, with an immense quantity of rockets, began to play upon this little army. Baillie had, as yet, defeated every attack of the enemy with vast slaughter. Hyder himself was perplexed. Colonel Baillie made a movement to his right, indicating an attack upon the enemy's guns, which increased the terrors of Hyder. He consulted Lally, who (believing that Munro was advancing upon Hyder's rear) advised him to break through the detachment. At half-past seven, A.M. Baillie's tumbrils blew up, and thus he could not use his guns. His destruction

¹ Mill, vol. iv. p. 189.

² On the 8th September.

became certain. He, at last, held up a flag of truce, for the purpose of saving the remains of his men, which was disregarded, and, but for the humane exertions of the French officers, every man would have been cut to pieces.¹

It was known² that Hyder was before Arcot on the 21st August, to the west of Madras, seventy-three miles distant. Colonel Baillie was in Guntoor, to the north of Madras, about two hundred miles distant. But it was even known on the 21st July that Hyder had come through the pass, so that there was ample time for Baillie to have reached Madras in time to have joined the main army before it marched for Conjeveram. It appears that Fletcher joined at half-past six on the morning of the 9th September. They reposed during the day. In the afternoon, Baillie ordered the troops to be ready to march. Between eight and nine o'clock (night), the troops moved off to the left by way of Subdeverim. A little after ten o'clock, several guns opened on the rear. The detachment countermarched, and formed in line,

¹ See 2nd vol. "Memoirs of the late war in Asia," published in 1788, for a narrative of the captivity and sufferings of the prisoners, by an officer in Baillie's detachment.

² Mill, vol. iv. p. 182.

and with its front towards Perambaucum. At last, the enemy's cannon began to do great execution. During the night, Tippoo had an opportunity of drawing his cannon to a strong post on the road, by which the English were obliged to pass, and of sending advice to his father. Colonel Baillie ought certainly to have marched on the night of the 9th, as he had been ordered to do. But Munro, instead of sending Fletcher, should have marched with his whole force, and have sent an order to Baillie to march towards the main army; and as the distance was only fifteen miles, the two forces must have met (marching towards each other) before noon on the 9th September.¹

But why did Munro leave Madras till Baillie had joined. Baillie crossed the river at Trepasore (which town is thirty miles W. by N. from Madras,) on the 3rd September. The nearer Colonel Baillie was to Madras the sooner could he join Munro; for Hyder was marching up to Madras from the *south*, and Baillie marching down to Madras from the *north*. Colonel Wilks²

¹ Baillie was attacked on the 8th of September; by Tippoo also on the night of the 9th, and morning of the 10th September, before Hyder came up.

² Vol. ii. p. 267.

says, the junction might have been effected at Madras without difficulty or danger, on the 25th or 26th (August). He says, that the junction of the two forces would have given a total of eight thousand and twenty-two (five thousand two hundred and nine, and two thousand eight hundred and thirteen), nearly as large an army as Sir E. Coote had at the battle of Porto Novo, where he defeated Hyder, on the 1st July, 1781. Hence General Munro might have insured a victory, instead of causing the defeat of our army at Perambaucum.

Bassein¹ surrendered to General Goddard, on the 11th December, 1780. He, hearing that the whole army (Mahrattah) had attacked the Bombay division, set off at the head of the cavalry, and the assembled grenadiers of the Bengal and Madras troops, with whom he reached Colonel Hartley's camp on the 13th. He expressed his admiration of the position which had been chosen, and of the judicious conduct of the troops. "The whole army was now united under General Goddard; and it unfortunately happened, that the orders from the Court of Directors before alluded to, which made Hartley the junior lieutenant-

¹ Duff, vol. ii. p. 429.

colonel on the Bombay establishment, until all those formerly his seniors should be promoted, was at this time promulgated; Lieutenant-colonel Baillie, of the Madras establishment, though just promoted to that rank, immediately claimed his right, and of course superseded him. Hartley represented the peculiar mortification to which he was subjected; but the order was irrevocable. He quitted the army, repaired to England, and laid his case before the Court of Directors, who, sensible of his merit, although they could not alter the constitution of their service, recommended him to his Majesty, by whom he was appointed Lieutenant-colonel of the seventy-third regiment. Although no longer engaged in Mahrattah warfare, he was afterwards distinguished on many occasions in India."¹ He served as major-general at the capture of Seringapatam in 1799, and died in October of that year.

On the 25th September, 1780, when intelligence had arrived, not only of the actual invasion by Hyder,² but of the discomfiture of Colonel Baillie, and the retreat of the army to the vicinity of Madras, with the poverty and helplessness of

¹ Bombay records.

² Mill, vol. iv. p. 196.

the Presidency; the governor-general proposed, that all the energy of the supreme government should be exerted, to re-establish the power of the Company on the coast; "He moved that the sum of fifteen lakhs of rupees (£150,000), and a large detachment of European infantry and artillery, should immediately be sent to the relief of Madras: he also moved that Sir Eyre Coote,¹ should be requested to take upon himself, as alone sufficient, the task of recovering the honour and authority of the British arms, and recommended that an offer of peace should be made without delay to the Mahrattah state." "It was resolved, that the strong measure should be taken of suspending the governor of Fort St. George, for his neglect of their commands in not restoring the circar of Guntoor."² On the 13th of October, 1780, Sir Eyre Coote sailed from Calcutta, with a battalion of European infantry (three hundred and thirty men), two companies of artillery (two hundred men), with six hundred and thirty Lascars, and between forty and fifty gentle-

¹ Became commander-in-chief of the Bengal army 25th March, 1779.

² Ordered to be restored on 12th June, 1780, to the nizam, to whom it belonged.

men volunteers. The prejudices of the sepoy, rendered it hazardous to attempt to send them by sea. "It was resolved to send them by land. Sir E. Coote landed at Madras on the 5th, and took his seat in council on the 7th November, 1780. Sir E. Coote brought with him the decree for the suspension of the governor, who disputed the competence of the supreme board. The majority of the council, however, recognised the suspension; and the senior member of the council succeeded to the chair.

Colonel T. D. Pearse of the Bengal artillery, was chosen by the governor-general to command the native infantry to march by land to Madras. It consisted of about five thousand sepoy, with a well selected artillery. He marched in February, 1781, from Bengal, *vid* Midnapoor, Cuttack, Ganjam, the northern circars along by the sea route,¹ Masulipatam, and Nellore, and arrived near Madras in August, 1780. Sir T. Munro says,² "The army (Coote's) halted a few days at Cuddalore, and then went to the northward to

¹ Colonel Baillie should have taken this route from Guntoor in August 1780.

² Gleig's Life, vol. i. p. 43. After the battle of Porto Novo.

meet the Bengal detachment, which it joined without any interruption, in the beginning of (August) 1781, near Pullicat. This detachment amounted, when it left Bengal, to five thousand men; but was now reduced by sickness and desertion to little more than two thousand." This sickness was the "*cholera morbus*," the first indication of its appearance in India in our time. It broke out near Ganjam in March, 1781, and lasted about six weeks. The desertions were caused by a desire to quit a part of the country where the *cholera* prevailed. It was supposed by Colonel Pearse,¹ that the greatest part of his loss was caused by the disease and by desertions to fly from the sickness prevailing in his camp. Both Europeans and natives were attacked. The next instance of the appearance of the *cholera* was in October, 1781. Negapatam was attacked by four thousand of our troops. Mill² says, "On the 21st October, the seamen and marines landed from the ships." Wilks³ says, the place surrendered on the 3rd November, 1781. "The monsoon set in with

¹ Memoirs, Mill, vol. iv. p. 212, calls it an "infectious disease." I doubt its being infectious.

² Mill, vol. iv. p. 224.

³ Wilks, vol. ii. p. 354.

such violence, immediately after the surrender of the place, that the admiral (Sir E. Hughes) was for upwards of three weeks unable to embark the seamen and marines, who had performed these valuable services; and the ships were during the same period placed in the most critical situation, from the fury of an incessant storm." These seamen and marines having to sleep on the damp ground, were attacked with *cramps and spasms*, occasioned by wet and fatigue.¹

The third instance of *cholera* occurred in 1786. Duff,² under that year says, "Just at this period, the following letter appears in the official correspondence of Hurray Punt, and in his own handwriting." "The loss sustained by the army, in consequence of the *cholera morbus* is very great; medicines are liberally supplied, some do recover, but by far the greater part die." The fourth instance of the appearance of the *cholera* was in 1817, as will appear, hereafter.

¹ Annual Register, 1782, p. 91, History of Europe.

² Duff, vol. iii. p. 17, *note*.

CHAPTER IV.

SIR E. COOTE'S OPERATIONS AGAINST HYDER, 1781.

SIR E. COOTE had taken his seat in council at Madras on the 7th November, 1780. He found according to Mill¹ a force of not more than seven thousand men, of whom seventeen hundred were Europeans. Wilks² makes the number eight thousand four hundred and seventy-six. Sir T. Munro³ gives only seven thousand two hundred, (one thousand four hundred Europeans, five thousand sepoy and eight hundred native cavalry), and sixty guns. Having written down his view of the state of affairs, and his plan of operations, he called a *council of war*, consisting of Sir Hector Munro, Lord Macleod, and Brigadier-general Stuart. He asked their opinion, and afterwards submitted the result to the select committee, and desired their opinion. All agreed in approving the plans of the general, and reposing unbounded confidence in his direction. On the 17th Janu-

¹ Mill, vol. iv. p. 203.

² Wilks, vol. ii. p. 316.

³ Gleig's Life; vol. i. p. 32.

ary, 1781, the army, under the command of General Coote, marched from the encampment at the mount. Hyder was struck with awe by the arrival of the new commander, and the reinforcements from Bengal.

“ On the 14th of June¹ the fleet returned with a reinforcement of troops from Bombay. While absent on the western coast, Sir E. Hughes had attacked the ships of Hyder, in his own ports of Calicut and Mangalore; and destroyed the rudiments of that maritime power, which it was one of the favourite objects of his ambition to erect.” Hyder Ali died on 7th December, 1782, and according to “ Captain Meadows Taylor’s History of his Life;” Hyder, some short time before his death, said to his confidential minister—“ What does it signify as to the loss to the English of Colonel Baillie’s detachment, they can get more men from Europe—unless I can form a navy, capable of meeting their ships at sea, I can do nothing.” On the death of Tippoo, in 1799, it was found that he had been for years carrying out the same maritime designs.

Early in the morning of the 1st July, the English army broke up the camp at Porto Novo, and

¹ Mill, vol. iv. p. 207.

commenced their march with the sea at a little distance on their right. Sir E. Coote had great want of intelligence. Sir T. Munro says,¹ Hyder had marched seventy miles in two days, and encamped four miles from Porto Novo. "The time he had so long wished for he imagined was now come, when he might, in one day, destroy the only army that remained to oppose him. His expedition showed his confidence of success. His troops were no less sanguine than himself. A little after daybreak, on the 1st of July, the general drew up the army in a large plain, which lay between the two camps. On his right was a chain of sand-hills, which ran along the coast, at the distance of about a mile from the sea in the rear; and on the left, woods and enclosures, but with an open space between; two miles to the left ran another chain of sand-hills, parallel to the former, and behind them lay the principal part of the Mysorean army." Coote saw that the enemy wished that he should advance across the plain, under the fire of the batteries they had constructed on every side; but he kept his ground till eleven o'clock, when, finding they did not choose to make the attack, he

¹ Gleig, vol. i. p. 40.

moved to the rear of the sand-hills on his right.¹ "The army marched in two lines, the first commanded by General Munro, the second by General Stuart. In the first were all the European infantry, with six battalions of sepoy's equally divided on the flanks; in the second, four battalions of sepoy's. One half of the cavalry formed on the right of the first; the other half, on the left of the second." The army, after marching a mile between the sand-banks and the sea shore, again defiled by an opening into the plain, where the enemy's infantry and artillery were drawn up, waiting our coming; but their horse still remained behind the sand-hills." Our troops formed under the fire of forty pieces of cannon. We returned not a shot. The enemy brought their guns nearer. As soon as the second line had formed, Sir Eyre gave orders to advance, and to open all the guns. Their fire was so heavy, that nothing could stand before it. The Mysorean infantry only staid to give one discharge; the

¹ While waiting in council to decide on the mode of attack, an officer moving near the sea shore, found a road which led to the rear of Hyder's entrenchment. Hyder had made this road to take our army in flank, if they stormed his batteries in front. Seeing the failure of his stratagem, he left his works, and moved parallel with the English army.

drivers hurried away the cannon, while the horse attempted to charge; but they were always broken before they reached the line. In a quarter of an hour the whole were dispersed. Munro adds, "Whilst the first line were engaged with Hyder, the second was attacked by Tippoo and Lally, who were repulsed by General Stuart in all their attacks to drive him from the sand-hills; and when Hyder fled, they followed him." Our loss was four hundred killed and wounded. The English did not possess cavalry sufficient¹ for an active pursuit, or they might have captured Hyder's guns and stores. The result was important; Hyder abandoned his designs upon the southern provinces. Tippoo raised the siege of Wandewash, and both retired with the whole of their army to the neighbourhood of Arcot.

On the 27th August, 1781, Coote was desirous of recovering Arcot.² He was in want of supplies. Tripassore was reported to contain great stores. The siege was resolved on. It surrendered in a few days, but contained only a small

¹ A regiment of horse, and a battalion of sepoy's remained on the beach to guard the baggage; and there were altogether only eight hundred cavalry.

² Mill, vol. iv. p. 212.

supply of provisions. Hyder was in full march to relieve it. He fell back a few miles, to what he reckoned a lucky spot, a strong position on the very ground where (Perambaucum) he had defeated Baillie, on the 10th September, 1780. Coote came in sight of Hyder's army on the 27th Aug., 1781. Hyder had the advantage of his guns bearing upon the advance of the English army,¹ which was rendered also difficult by a number of water-courses intersecting the ground. Sir Eyre found the enemy's position stronger than he had imagined. "Besides² three villages which they had occupied, the ground along their front, and on their flanks, was intersected in every direction by deep ditches and water-courses; their artillery fired from embrasures, cut in mounds of earth, which had been formed from the hollowing of the ditches, and the main body of the army lay behind them. The cannonade became general about ten o'clock, and continued with little intermission till sunset, for we found

¹ By the junction of Colonel Pearse, with above two thousand men, and deducting the loss of four hundred in the last battle, there were one thousand seven hundred or one thousand eight hundred more men than at Porto Novo, or about nine thousand men.

² Munro, (Gleig, vol. i. p. 44.)

it almost impossible to advance upon the enemy, as the cannon could not be brought on without much time and labour, over the broken ground in front. The enemy retired as we advanced, and always found cover in the ditches, and behind the banks. They were forced from them all before sunset; and after standing a short time a cannonade on open ground, they fled in great hurry and confusion towards Conjeveram. More than six thousand of them were killed or wounded. Our loss was about five hundred men." He adds, "that the strength of the enemy's situation made victory uncertain."

Colonel Pearse,¹ who commanded the Bengal part of the force, states that, towards the end of the action (or cannonade of eight hours), it was proposed to try and turn the enemy's left. On a movement in that direction, Hyder's army was seen moving off at sun set. Had the ground been properly examined, it must have been obvious that a flank movement was the best plan of attack, instead of suffering so long a cannonade, or as remarked by Munro, "the general, by attacking them in front, instead of turning their

¹ "Memoirs."—Came as major from the Royal Artillery in 1768, and had seen service in Europe.

left flank, a little beyond which the ground was clear, showed little knowledge of the country." Pearse was of the same opinion, and in his letter to Hastings sadly exposes Coote's want of generalship. It has always been said in Indian warfare, in Coote's time and since those days—the English never possessed a large body of cavalry, so as to have the means of getting information. The Emperor Napoleon rebuked one of his marshals, who pleaded want of intelligence, by writing to him.—“A general who commands a division, can march to a town, call for the mayor of the place, and demand to know the state of the country, and other matters.” Now, not having cavalry at command, there will still always be found persons to bring information, if *properly paid*: but not if rewarded as Sir Hector Munro did the messenger sent by Baillie to carry intelligence of the critical position he was in—when he gave him two pagodas (sixteen shillings.)

General Goddard,¹ by order from the Court of Directors was now (1781), commander-in-chief of the Bombay army, but still entrusted with his former powers from Bengal, and at liberty, in a great degree to follow his own plans.

¹ Duff, vol. ii. p. 435.

A detachment of Bengal troops¹ had been prepared to assist the rana of Gohud: Major Popham had cleared that country of the enemy, and Lieutenant-Colonel Carnac invaded Malwa, and advanced to Seronje, where he arrived on the 16th February, 1781. Mahadajce Sindia came up with his army, and Colonel Carnac, having taken post, allowed himself to be surrounded. He was much distressed for provisions, and applied for a reinforcement. In the mean time, Lieutenant-Colonel Carnac was attacked by Sindia, and cannonaded in his camp for seven days successively, when he determined to retreat. On the 9th March, he forced the town of Mahautpoor to give him supplies. Sindia followed, and "encamped every night at the distance of five or six miles from the British troops, having his heavy baggage at an equal distance in his rear. This disposition to guard against surprise continued for several nights, until Colonel Carnac, by Sindia's seeming want of enterprise, had thrown the wily Mahrattah off his guard; when, on the night of the 24th of March, he entered Sindia's camp, attacked and routed his forces, killed numbers of his men, took thirteen of his

¹ Duff, vol. ii. p. 446.

guns, three elephants, his principal standard, twenty-one camels, and many horses. This achievement, which deservedly ranks very high, and marks a military genius, was suggested by Captain Bruce, the same officer who led the escalade of Gwalior, 4th August, 1780. It was of the utmost importance, not only in raising the fame of the British arms, but particularly affecting Sindia, whose reputation had suffered, while that of the Bramin, partly supported by Holkar, was greatly increased by the supposed victory over General Goddard.”¹

1782. Colonel Braithwaite had commanded a detachment for some time at Tanjore. He had one hundred Europeans, one thousand five hundred native troops, and three hundred cavalry,² stationed for the purpose of protecting Tanjore, encamped on the banks of the Coleroon, at a distance of forty miles from the capital of that name, exposed to an open plain, but apparently secured by the intervention of several large and deep rivers. His position gave encouragement to Hyder. Tippoo, with ten thousand horse, an

¹ Retreat to Panwell in April 1781, and loss of four hundred and sixty-six killed and wounded.

² Mill, vol. iv. p. 244.

equal number of infantry, twenty pieces of cannon, and M. Lally with his European troops, four hundred strong, surrounded Colonel Braithwaite before he had even a suspicion of their march. His first endeavour was to reach Tanjore, or some other place of safety ; but the enemy's superior force rendered it impracticable. He next resolved to make a brave defence ; and the annals of war seldom exhibit a greater example of perseverance and courage. From the 16th to the 18th of February, 1781, surrounded on all sides, did they withstand incessant attacks. They were formed into a hollow square, with the guns divided among the faces, and the cavalry in the centre. Tippoo's guns were engaged to make breaches in the square, and when he thought he had made an impression, he urged on his cavalry to the charge, and as often were they repelled by showers of grape-shot and musketry ; when the English cavalry, issuing from the centre, at intervals suddenly made for their egress, pursued their retreat with great execution. After twenty-six hours of incessant conflict, when great numbers of the English force had fallen, Lally, at the head of his four hundred Europeans, supported by a large body of infantry, covered on his flanks

by cavalry, advanced with fixed bayonets to the attack. The troops were thrown into confusion. Lally with great difficulty restrained the rage of the barbarians. It is but justice to add, that Tippoo treated his prisoners, especially the officers and wounded men, with real attention and humanity. It is remarkable that, out of twenty officers, only one was killed, and eleven wounded. It is clear that Colonel Braithwaite was exposed to an attack from Hyder, before he could be supported by any of our troops. He should have been in an entrenched camp, close to Tanjore, where he could have protected the city as well as his own detachment. The fate of Baillie's force ought to have been a warning to the Madras government.

On the 3rd April, 1782, the French admiral, having landed two thousand men at Porto Novo, joined Tippoo's army. The arrival of so important an aid as that of two thousand Frenchmen, augmented to an alarming degree the army of Tippoo. Cuddalore¹ fell to their united force, and afforded a convenient station, both naval and military, for the French. In the meantime, the 2nd battalion of the 42nd Highlanders, raised by

¹ Mill. vol. iv. p. 246.

Lord M'Leod, and the 98th and 100th regiments, raised, the former by Mr. Fullarton, the latter by Mr. Mackenzie Humberstone (promoted to lieutenant-colonels on the occasion), together with Major-General Meadows, arrived in India. The general and Colonel Fullerton, and near two thousand men, landed at Madras on the 12th of February, 1782. Colonel Humberstone, with part of the two regiments (the fleet having separated), reached Bombay on the 22nd of January, 1782. Hearing alarming intelligence of Hyder Ali's overrunning the Carnatic, he, to cause a diversion, and avoid the danger of going round to Madras, landed at Calicut, on the Malabar coast.

On the 29th of June, 1782, by a letter from the governor-general to Lord Macartney (governor),¹ the conclusion of peace with the Mah-rattahs was announced at Madras. This was an important circumstance, as Hyder's army was in full force, and he had just obtained an addition of two thousand French troops, by which Cuddalore, a little to the south of Pondicherry, had been obtained by the French, whose fleet was equal to that of the English; and, in point of fact, the

¹ Mill, vol. iv. p. 249.

French fleet, under Admiral Suffrein, exhibited a superiority to the English in the celerity of its movements. The English admiral, by delaying to sail from Madras for Trincomallee (Ceylon) till the 20th of August, allowed Suffrein to take the forts on the 31st of that month. Sir E. Hughes did not arrive off that port till the 2nd of September, when he found the French in possession.¹ It was known at Madras on the 5th of August, that the French fleet had sailed on the 1st of the month to the southward.²

Another reinforcement of troops arrived on the 19th of October, 1782, with Commodore Sir Richard Bickerton, of three regiments of one thousand men each, Sir John Burgoyne's regiment of light horse, amounting to three hundred and forty, and about one thousand recruits raised by the Company, chiefly in Ireland; but as soon as Sir Richard was apprised of the motions of Sir E. Hughes, he immediately put to sea, and proceeded after him to Bombay.³ This strong

¹ Being the period of the S. W. monsoon. Ships are often a long time in beating down the bay, which the admiral must have been aware of.

² Mill, vol. iv. p. 256.

³ He had five sail of the line; had "touched at Bombay, and was on his way round for Madras." Sir E. Hughes went to refit his fleet.

reinforcement of European troops gave the English a very great superiority, for in January and August, 1782, no less than seven thousand three hundred and forty European soldiers had been landed in India. Wilks,¹ mentioning the sailing of Sir E. Hughes from Madras on the 15th of October, 1782, states the "singular coincidence of Monsieur Suffrein having sailed from Cuddalore in fair weather on the 15th of October, the same day that the English fleet was driven in the utmost danger from the roads at Madras by a hurricane, which, as usual, soon changing its direction, strewed the shore for several miles with the wreck of country ships." Mill says they contained thirty thousand bags of rice; that there were only thirty thousand bags in the warehouses at Madras, while the monthly consumption was fifty thousand bags. Lord Macartney, as Wilks remarks, "justly apprehensive for even the safety of Madras, if the hostile fleet should winter at Trincomalee, and be thus on the spot, not only to co-operate with the expected army under Monsieur Bussy, but to intercept the supplies of grain from Bengal, which constituted the sole hope of averting the miseries of

¹ Wilks, vol. ii. p. 397.

famine at Madras," solicited the admiral "to risk the English fleet, for the purpose of covering a decisive attempt to reduce Cuddalore, and thus decide the war before the arrival of Monsieur Bussy." But the admiral had more than once declared his professional conviction of the absolute necessity of repairing to Bombay. Pondicherry is about one hundred miles from Madras. We had retaken it in 1778. Cuddalore is only a few miles south of Pondicherry. The possession of the former by the French, not only would facilitate the capture of the latter, but also endanger Madras itself.

Sir Eyre Coote had returned to Madras with the army. He had sustained a second paralytic attack. No longer equal to the toils of command,¹ he sailed for Bengal, and General Stuart remained at the head of the army, now encamped at Madras, with provisions for not many days, and its pay six months in arrears.

An event now occurred which was of very great importance, the death of Hyder Ali, at the age of eighty years. He died at Chittore, in the Carnatic, about eighty miles from Madras, on the 7th December, 1782. At this time Tip-

¹ Mill, vol. iv. p. 257.

poo, his son and successor, was at a great distance, having been detached to the western coast to oppose Colonel Humberstone's invasion. This officer¹ had landed at Calicut on the 18th of February, 1782, and taken several forts in Hyder's territories. Wilks² says, that as soon as Hyder's recovery became improbable, it was suggested by Poornea (the minister) that his death should be concealed, as the only possible means of carrying on the necessary authority to keep the army together until the arrival of Tippoo. This project was concerted with Kishen Rao, and with the public officers and domestics to whom the event must be known. Immediately after his decease, the body was deposited in a large chest filled with *abeer* (a powder composed of various fragrant substances,) and sent off from camp to Seringapatam.

Wilks says, successive couriers were dispatched to Tippoo to apprise him of the event. "The whole arrangements of the army, the weekly relief of the two thousand horse, which constantly hung round Madras, the issue of pay, the adjustment of military accounts, the answers to letters received from the envoys at the different courts,

¹ Mill, vol. iv. p. 242.

² Vol. ii. p. 414.

and all the business of the state, went on as usual. The principal officers of the army, and the foreign envoys made their daily inquiries, and were answered that Hyder, although extremely weak, was in a state of slow, but progressive amendment. The French physicians, sent from Cuddalore to attend him, on the first serious symptoms, had, of course, conveyed to Monsieur Cossigny, who now commanded the troops, confidential intelligence of the whole proceedings." "The most trusty chiefs of the army were successively, and without any circumstances to excite suspicion, admitted into Hyder's tent, for the purpose of communicating the plan which had been adopted,"—they were all faithful to their trust, except Mahommed Ameen, the son of Ibraheem Saheb, and cousin-german to the deceased. He formed a project to cut off the persons exercising the powers of government, and to proclaim Abd-ul-Kerrem, Hyder's second son, a person of defective intellect, as a pageant who would permit them to exercise the government in his name.¹ Mahommed Ameen's plot was discovered by Poornea—and he and his coadjutor,

¹ Thus, as it were, proposing to imitate the example of the Mahrattahs to the emperor of Delhi (Shah Allum) in 1771.

Shems-u-deen, were put in irons and sent off under a strong guard. On the 16th day after Hyder's decease, the army marched in the direction of Tippoo's approach. "The closed palanquin of Hyder, with the accustomed retinue, issued at the usual hour from the canvas inclosure of his tents; and the march performed in the usual manner,—observing of course the proper attentions, not to disturb the patient in the palanquin."

Tippoo first heard of his father's death on the 11th December, and abandoned, for the present, all operations in Malabar. "He reached his father's tent on the 2nd January, 1783; and made the most ample acknowledgments to the persons who had conducted, during this most critical interval, the charge of the public affairs, and particularly to Poornea, who had first suggested the arrangement. On the same evening he gave audience to all the principal officers of his army. "The actual strength of the Mysorean armies in the field at the time of Hyder's death, exclusively of garrisons and provincial troops, but including a new levy of five thousand horse raised on the northern frontier, subsequently to the intelli-

gence of the Mahrattah peace,¹ was, according to the return of actual payments made by Poornea as treasurer, eighty-eight thousand.² 1783 —Shortly after his arrival in camp, Tippoo was joined³ by a French force from Cuddalore, consisting of nine hundred Europeans, two hundred and fifty Caffres and Topasses, two thousand sepoy, and twenty-two guns; “ While at the same time, the whole of the British force in the Carnatic, capable of taking the field, amounted to no more than two thousand nine hundred and forty-five Europeans,⁴ and eleven thousand five hundred and forty-five natives.” General Stuart offered the enemy battle near Wandewash—They retired in haste. He marched towards Vellore, and heard there that Tippoo was retreating from the Carnatic.

In the middle of January, 1783, General Mathews, with an army of twelve hundred Europeans, eight battalions of sepoy, and a pro-

¹ Known to Lord Macartney at Madras on 20th June, 1782.

² The military officers of Mysore estimated 120,000; the difference between it and effective, Wilks observes, is well known.

³ Mill, vol. iv. p. 203.

Many had been landed at Bombay.

portion of artillery and Lascars, from Bombay, after taking the fort of Onore by storm, moved towards the great pass of the Hussain Gurry Ghaut. "This movement, intended to advance upon Bednore, was in consequence of positive orders from the Bombay government, and in opposition to the opinion of General Mathews."¹ Bednoro was a district in the N. W. extremity of the raja of Mysore's territories, situated on the summit of that range of western hills, which overlooks the provinces of Canara and Malabar, and named the Western Ghauts. These mountains, elevated from four thousand to five thousand feet above the level of the sea, present to the west a surface in many places nearly perpendicular to the horizon, and by their height, intercept the clouds of the western monsoon.² "The ascent consisted of a winding road of about five miles in length, defended by batteries or redoubts at every turning." The army entered the pass on the morning of the 25th, and carried everything with the bayonet, and a strong redoubt at the top of the Ghaut was taken by clambering up the rocks and gaining the rear of it. On the 26th advanced to Hyder-nagur, or Bedore, the

¹ Wilks, vol. ii. p. 448.

² Hamilton's Gazetteer.

rich capital of one of the most important of all the dependencies of Mysore. The governor surrendered the city of Bednore, the country, and all its dependencies. Most of the minor forts submitted, but Ananpore, Mangalore, and some others, held out. Ananpore, was carried on the 14th February. Mangalore surrendered.

The army became dispersed in detachments to occupy almost every town and mud fort in the country. A vast treasure was found in Bednore, besides jewels. "Nothing, it is said, was dreamt of but riches; intelligence, fortifications, and subsistence, were all equally neglected. In this state of supine insensibility, Tippoo suddenly appeared on the 9th of April, drove in a detachment stationed four miles distant at Fattiput, seized the town of Bednore, with a considerable quantity of ammunition neglectfully remaining without the magazine; laid siege to the fort, and sent detachments to occupy the ghauts, and surrounding country. The English in Bednore were then cut off from retreat; the fortifications were ruinous, their ammunition was expended, their provisions were low, and their numbers were diminishing by disease and fatigue as well as the sword. Honourable terms being promised, they

surrendered by capitulation on the 30th April; but, instead of being sent according to agreement to the coast, they were put in irons and marched like felons to a dreadful imprisonment in the strong fortresses of Mysore. After this important success, Tippoo proceeded to Mangalore, in which the remains of the English army had collected themselves, with such provisions as the suddenness of the emergency allowed them to procure. On the possession of Mangalore, the chief fortress and the best harbour of Canara, Tippoo, as well as his father, set an extraordinary value. On the 16th of May, a reconnoitring party of his horse appeared on a height near the town. On the 20th the picquets, on the 23rd the outposts of the garrison, were driven in, and the investment of the place was rendered complete."

Mill quotes the treasure taken by General Matthew at £801,000. It is said by Wilks,¹ that when Hyder conquered the country in 1763, the available property, including money and jewels, which he realised, "may, without risk of exaggeration, be estimated at £12,000,000, and was, throughout life, habitually spoken of by Hyder as the foundation of all his subsequent greatness."

¹ Wilks, vol. i. pp. 452 & 454.

And "it is certain, that he formed the deliberate determination of transferring to Hyder Nuggur the seat of his general government, and of blending Seringapatam, with all its remembrances, among the general mass of his minor possessions." But adds, "Hyder could never have intended to establish his capital, his family, and his treasures at a place of no military strength." The "Annual Register" for 1783, and Colonel Wilks, admits that the public treasure was divided amongst the English troops. Colonel Price¹ says, the amount of the treasure was enormously exaggerated; but the imprudent and unwarrantable manner in which, at the last extremity, it was distributed, and that, after it had been determined to capitulate, furnished too plausible an apology for that breach of the capitulation of which the sultan became immediately guilty." Wilks says, that there is reason to believe "Tippoo had pre-determined to seek some pretext for infringing his conditions."

The march of Tippoo from the Carnatic had been caused by the operations of General Mathews. "During the march of Tippoo from

¹ Mill, vol. iv. p. 269 (*note 1*). He served with one of Mathews's detachments.

the Carnatic to the west side of his kingdom,¹ and the operations which preceded his arrival at Mangalore, the following occurrences took place at Madras." Having ascertained the departure of the enemy, he returned with the army, and on the 20th of February encamped near the Mount. The policy of supporting the English army in Bednore against the army of Tippoo,² by strong incursions on the southern and eastern parts of his dominions, presented itself, in the strongest point of view, to the governor and council. The army stationed in Tanjore³ and the southern provinces were ordered to march to the west, and to General Stuart it was recommended to march upon Tippoo's frontier, in the direction of Vellore. This he declared to be impossible; and while the army remained inactive, Suffrein, whom the British fleet had not yet returned to oppose, found no difficulty in landing Bussy, with a reinforcement of French, at Cuddalore. It was an object of great importance to recover possession of that place, before the works should be strengthened, and the

¹ Mill, vol. iv. p. 270.

² Thus transferring the war to his own country.

³ No flying detachment like Colonel Braithwaite's.

army of Tippoo, with the French troops which were with him, should be able to return. But the general caused delays.

Colonel Humberstone, who had landed at Calicut on the 18th of February, 1782, was now to be employed. Mr. Sullivan, of the civil service at Trichinopoly, proposed the plan to be executed,¹—Colonel Humberstone to act on the Malabar Coast; the army of the south, under Colonel Fullarton,² on the Coromandel Coast. The object was to form a line of communication from one coast to the other, through the middle of Tippoo's dominions; that is, in attacking the province of Coimbatore. Another plan was, to cause a disturbance in Mysore, by setting up the pretensions of the deposed raja of Mysore. In April and May, 1783, the forts of Caroor, Aravarcouchy, and Dindigal, were reduced. Colonel Fullarton assumed command of the southern army, and at once augmented his force by battalions from Tanjore, Trichinopoly, and Tinivelly. On the 25th May, 1783, he marched from Dindigal to, and took, Daraporam on the 2nd June.

¹ Mill, vol. iv. p. 276.

² Amounting to 13,636 men on the 25th September, 1783.

These were the operations to the south and south east of Coimbatore, which is south of Mysore.

General Stuart had delayed at Madras, expecting the arrival of Sir Eyre Coote, whom he wished to assume the command of the army to march against Cuddalore. At last he marched on the 21st April, 1783, towards Cuddalore, a distance of about one hundred and two miles from Madras. He occupied forty days in reaching that place, which is usually reached in twelve days.¹

The fleet had returned to Madras on the 12th of April, augmented to seventeen sail, four frigates, and some smaller vessels; and soon after a fleet of ten Indiamen, and three store-ships, with one thousand recruits to the army, arrived under convoy of the "Bristol" man-of-war, after a narrow escape from the French squadron. The army arrived on the 7th June. On the 13th, the general made three attacks on the works, which partly succeeded and partly failed, with the loss of sixty-two officers and nine hundred and twenty men, almost all Europeans.²

¹ Mill, vol. iv. p. 270.

² Wilks, vol. ii. p. 440, says, "one attack succeeded; one partially; a third failed.

On the 20th of June, the English and French fleets engaged, the former of eighteen, the latter of sixteen sail of the line. The crews of the English ships were much crippled by sickness. The French had plenty of men, but their ships were so leaky that many were obliged to work at the pumps during the battle. The combatants were parted by night. The French fleet were out of sight the next day. The British admiral next day sailed for Madras. The French admiral was at Cuddalore on the 23rd of June, and relanded two thousand four hundred men which had been furnished to the fleet. The garrison made a sally on the 25th of June, which was repulsed.¹ A grand effort was preparing for the 4th of July; and so much were the English reduced by the sword, by sickness, and fatigue, that the most fatal consequences were probable and feared. Sir E. Hughes at Madras, and the British army exposed to Suffrein and Bussy at Cuddalore, presented a dismal prospect to the governor of Madras, when intelligence was received of the signature in Europe of a treaty of peace between

¹ Bernadotte, late king of Sweden, wounded in the sally. The late Sir David Ochterlony (Bengal), then a lieutenant, was wounded at Cuddalore.

the English and French. It was immediately resolved, though official intelligence had not yet arrived, to send a flag of truce to Bussy, recommending an immediate cessation of arms. To this proposal the French commander acceded, with less difficulty than might have been expected. Bussy even consented to invite Tippoo to a participation in the peace, and to send positive orders to the French troops to retire immediately from his service.

Colonel Fullarton¹ had been summoned by General Stuart, by an order dated 31st May, 1783, and reached within three forced marches of Cuddalore, when he heard of the cessation of hostilities, and he returned towards the south in July. The force he brought was about five thousand men. "Conscious," he wrote to the Madras board, "that the public safety could have no existence, if his (General Stuart's) army were defeated." After the siege of Cuddalore, the colonel was reinforced by five hundred Europeans, and two battalions of sepoy, for his future operations; and a second detachment of

¹ His work (1788), pp. 112 to 115:—"Narrative of Operations of the Southern Army."

equal strength subsequently joined him. Colonel Fullarton was of opinion¹ that the division of the army under his command, in the south, was augmented sufficiently to penetrate into the very heart of Mysore. Measures were pursued for creating a diversion in favour of the detachment besieged in Bangalore.

General Stuart was recalled to Madras, and the governor submitted to council a motion, that the general should be dismissed the Company's service.² It was unanimously voted against the general. General Stuart intimated his determination to retain the command of the king's troops; and Sir John Burgoyne, the next in rank, intimated his intention to obey General Stuart. Decisive acts were resorted to. The town major, and the governor's private secretary, and a party of sepoys proceeded to the villa of the general,³ and brought him quietly a prisoner to the fort, where he remained a few days, and was then embarked for England.

The force employed by Tippoo in May 1782

¹ Mill, vol. iv. p. 275.

² He was a king's officer.

³ He had lost a leg in the battle of the 27th August, 1781.

against Mangalore,¹ in the investment of the place, amounted to sixty thousand horse, thirty thousand disciplined sepoy, six hundred French infantry, under Colonel Cossigny, Lally's corps of Europeans and natives, a French troop of dismounted cavalry, many thousands of irregular troops, and nearly one hundred guns. The British garrison consisted of six hundred and ninety-six Europeans, including officers, and two thousand eight hundred and fifty sepoy, besides pioneers and camp followers. With mortars, the French threw into the place large stones weighing one hundred and fifty pounds. The enemy made two assaults on the 4th and 6th July. At last, a cessation of hostilities was concluded on the 2nd August, 1783. Still the enemy failed in their agreement of supplying provisions to the troops, and the garrison was almost starved. At length, on the 23rd January, 1784, the gallant Colonel Campbell offered, on honourable terms, to withdraw the troops. The sultan was too eager to put an end to a siege which, by desertion and

¹ Mill, vol. iv. p. 282. He might have caused a diversion in favour of the French before Cuddalore, by leaving a force to blockade Mangalore, and have marched with the rest to Cuddalore.

death, had cost him nearly half his army, to brave the constancy of so firm a foe ; and they marched to Tellicherry with arms, accoutrements, and the honours of war."

Upon the evacuation of the Carnatic by Tippoo in 1783, when he found his western dominions were attacked by General Mathews, an overture of peace was made to Tippoo through a brahmin in the confidence of the raja of Tanjore.¹ A favourable answer was sent, but the negotiation was broken off. To the application of Bussy, before mentioned, an answer was returned, offering peace upon certain conditions, and expressing a desire to send two ambassadors to Madras. Upon the arrival of the vakeels, it appeared that a peace, upon the basis of a mutual restitution of conquests, might be effected. The situation of the English prisoners, "to whose feelings, and even lives, a few weeks were of importance, it was deemed expedient to send three commissioners along with Tippoo's vakeels, to expedite on the spot the business of negotiation." These were again broken off in January 1784. Negotiations²

¹ Mill, vol. iv. p. 274. This was just after the peace with France was known (June 1783).

² Mill, vol. iv. p. 285.

were again renewed, and on the 11th March, 1784, Tippoo signed a treaty by which, on the general condition of a mutual restitution of conquests, peace was obtained. The fact is, Bussy insisted on the French officers leaving his service, so that he not only lost the use of the French troops, and of the use of their fleet, but even of the aid of the French officers. The peace of 1783 included France, Spain, the United States of America, and the States General of the United Provinces (the Dutch).

Rugonath Rao,¹ under the treaty of Salbye (1783), was to choose a place of residence, and fixed upon Kopergaom, on the Godavery, where he died. He only survived this humiliation a few months. Bajee Rao at this time was scarcely nine years old. He became peishwa in 1795, on the death of the young peishwa (Mahdoo Rao Narrain), who particularly desired that he should be placed on the musnud. The treaty of Salbye between the English, the peishwa and the Mah-rattahs, restored all the territory we had acquired under the treaty of Poorundhur, by which Rugonath Rao was to be made peishwa, and, for the aid of the English, was to cede Salsette and

¹ Duff, vol. ii. p. 473.

Bassein. It has been contended, that our interference in favour of Rugonath Rao was improper. He had been in charge of the government during the minority of his nephew, Mahdoo Rao. He died in 1772, at an early age. He was succeeded by his brother, Narrain Rao. He was murdered on the 30th August, 1773. On the¹ death of Narrain Rao, Rugoba was immediately acknowledged peishwa. Duff says,² "Rugonath Rao was suspected, but there was no proof of his being the author of the outrage." "They" (the ministers) "were generally of opinion that, whilst there remained a shadow of doubt, it was on every account advisable to support Rugoba's right to the succession." On the 6th September, 1774, Rugoba³ had agreed for the aid of troops to carry him to Poona, to cede Salsette⁴ and Bassein to the Company, and to grant other advantages. Towards the end of November 1774,⁵ the Bombay government received intelligence from the Company's resident at Goa, "that great preparations

¹ Mill, vol. iii. p. 509.

² Duff, vol. ii. p. 248.

³ Duff, vol. ii. p. 274.

⁴ Taken from the Portuguese in 1760 by the Mahrattahs.

⁵ Mill, vol. iii. p. 607. A force expected from Europe, and also preparations at Goa.—Duff, vol. ii. pp. 276, 277.

were making by the Portuguese for the recovery of their lost possessions, and, in particular, of Salsette and Bassein." . On the 13th December, 1774, "a part of the Portuguese fleet anchored in the mouth of the harbour of Bombay." Hearing of the above intelligence, the Bombay government had sent a force and taken the fort of Tannah, on the island of Salsette. The French had, in 1763, recovered possession of Pondicherry, and were desirous of extending their influence in India. It was therefore natural for the government of India to assist Rugonath Rao in ascending the musnud at Poona, and thus obtaining an ally who should be able to govern the acts of the Mahrattahs; for, since the raja of Satara (the descendant of Sivajee) was imprisoned, the peishwa (or prime minister) was, in fact, the ostensible head of the Mahrattahs, and the chief with whom treaties were made. This will show sufficient ground for forming such an alliance with Rugonath Rao. In the same manner, he had previously formed alliances with the nabob of the Carnatic, with the raja of Tanjore, and with the nizam of the Deccan. In the latter case, this prince became, first, the ally of the French, then of the English. Every European nation, indeed,

had formed such alliances. The Company's settlements at Madras and Bombay were always liable to attacks by sea as well as by land. In Bengal, the result of the battle of Plassy (1757), and subsequent events, led to our becoming possessed of the grant of the "Dewancee."

The state of Hindostan since the death of Aurungzeb,¹ in 1707, had been of so disturbed a nature, that each Mahommedan prince endeavoured to achieve with his sword his own greatness. In 1742, the Mahrattahs had attacked Calcutta, which occasioned the "Mahrattah Ditch" to be made for its protection. The battle of Panniput (1761) caused the defeat of the Mahrattahs, but in a few years they began to regain their strength.² "The (Mahrattah) army, which crossed the Nerbuddah in 1769, under Visajee Kishén, as chief in command, consisted, when the whole were united in Malwa, of nearly fifty thousand horse." "There was also a large body of infantry, with a numerous artillery, chiefly natives of Hindostan and Malwa, including men of all casts. The Arabs, Abyssynians, and Sindians, of whom there was a

¹ "The ornament of the throne."

² Duff, vol. ii. p. 218.

small proportion, were accounted the best soldiers of the army, and were mostly obtained from the seaports of Cambay and Surat." Sivajee, the founder of the Mahrattah empire, had no possessions to the north of the Nerbuddah.¹ It was on the decadence of the Mahommedan empire, that the Mahrattahs rose in power. So little was the authority of the emperor of Delhi in the year 1771, that he was obliged to place himself under the protection of the Mahrattahs for the purpose of securing his occupying a throne, to which he had succeeded, in respect to the title of emperor, ten years before. It is now known that Nana Furnuwees, the Mahrattah minister, instigated Hyder Ali to make his attack on Madras, in the year 1780. His letters to Tantia Joosee, who was his agent, have been translated by an officer of rank, who is well known, and who has held political positions which enabled him to gain this knowledge. Of course it would have been an advantage to the Mahrattahs to be able to have the French as a counterpoise in the political scale, to be balanced against the English. Nana signed the treaty of Poorundhur in 1776, but afterwards he took the

¹ Hindostan, south, commences after crossing that river.

opposite side, by excluding Rugonath Rao from the musnud at Poona. The English had the Portugucse, the Dutch, and French, who were watching for opportunities to further the interests of their nations, to contend against. The Dutch and French had their possessions on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar. These were sufficient for their commercial purposes. They had factories in Bengal; but the English company had extensive possessions, and could not confine themselves to the coasts of India; or some other European power would have supplanted them, and the English might have lost their trade with India.

CHAPTER V.

NAVAL OPERATIONS BETWEEN THE ENGLISH AND
FRENCH IN THE INDIAN SEAS FROM THE YEARS
1746 TO 1783.

THE declaration of war between England and France, in 1744, was known on the 14th of September.¹ Labourdonnais, having secured the Isle of France, sailed to India with nine sail, in 1746. A fleet of two ships of sixty guns, one of fifty, and a frigate of twenty guns, were despatched to India under Commodore Barnet, who, during the stormy season, went to the island of Mergui, a port opposite the Coromandel Coast. His fleet was reinforced by two fifty-gun ships, and a frigate of twenty guns. He died. Commodore Peyton succeeded to the command; a sixty-gun ship and a twenty-gun ship having been sent to England. They had a distant fight, in which neither gained any advantage. This was near Negapatam. The French were superior in number of ships.

1758—Near Cuddalore. The French con-

¹ Mill, vol. iii. p. 60.

sisted of nine sail, the English only of seven sail. The battle was indecisive.¹

1758—Off Carical, on the Coromandel Coast, on the 2nd of August. The French line consisted of eight sail; the English, as before, of seven sail.² The fight lasted scarcely an hour, when three of the French ships, being driven out of the line, the whole bore away under all the sail they could carry.

1782—Admiral Suffrein,³ near Madras, 1st of February. Suffrein, with ten ships of the line, two ships (including the recaptured "Hannibal") of fifty guns, six frigates, eight transports, and six prizes, hove in sight, reconnoitred Madras, and anchored a few miles to windward of the the English fleet, which was preparing for action. Sir E. Hughes, with only eight sail of the line, and one of fifty guns. On the 16th, the English admiral made a push at the French convoy, separated from the fleet, when he retook five of the vessels which had been captured on the coast, and a large transport, laden with provisions, ammunition, and troops. On the 17th, the French keeping the weather gauge, the two fleets came to action late in the day, and separated after a short

¹ Mill, vol. iii. p. 210.

² Mill, vol. iii. p. 229.

³ Mill, vol. iv. p. 243.

conflict on the approach of night, when the French steered to windward, and the English to Trincomalee. The French admiral proceeded to Porto Novo, and landed two thousand troops, or three thousand, including a regiment of Caffres.¹

1782—12th of April.² The English had now ten sail of the line, and one of fifty guns. The French, ten sail of the line, two of fifty guns, and six frigates. The French were to windward. The English near a lee-shore, near Trincomalee. A severe conflict ensued, in which the intrepid resolution of the English again counterbalanced the disadvantages of their situation; and the fleets, after suffering in nearly an equal degree, were parted by the night. So much were both disabled, that they lay for seven days within random-shot, only to prepare themselves to sail, and retired; the English to Trincomalee, the French to the Dutch harbour of Battacalo (Ceylon), without, on either side, attempting to renew the engagement. The French crews had been sickly.

1782.—Hyder had planned with the French

¹ *Histoire de la Guerre*, p. 297.

² Mill, vol. iv. p. 246. The same day as Rodney's victory. Wilks, vol. ii. p. 383, gives eleven English, seven hundred and thirty-two guns; French, twelve ships, seven hundred and seventy guns.

admiral,¹ to retake Negapatam. Suffrein in sailing to that port was deseried by the English fleet, by whom he was constrained to fight a battle by the skilful movement of Sir E. Hughes. Suffrein wished to gain the road without fighting. After refitting at Ceylon, both fleets had returned to the coast, about the end of June; the French to the port of Cuddalore, the English to that of Negapatam. They weighed anchor on the 3rd July, and on the 4th the action commenced; it was close, warm, and general. After an hour and a half, during which the fire had been equally well maintained on both sides, the French line appeared to be getting into disorder; and the English expected a speedy and glorious victory, when a sudden change of wind disturbed the order of battle, and enabled Suffrein dexterously to form a line with his ships which had suffered the least, to cover the disabled part of his fleet, and induced Sir E. Hughes to collect his scattered ships. At evening Sir E. Hughes east anchor between Negapatam and Nagore.² The French

¹ Mill, vol. iv. p. 260.

² It is said, that two of the French line-of-battle ships had struck during the action, when Suffrein fired into them, till they hoisted colours again, and were thus saved.

remained three leagues to leeward, and proceeded next morning to Cuddalore. The English, though they saw them, were too disabled to pursue. The English admiral, remained a fortnight at Negapatam, and went to Madras on the 20th to refit. In the meanwhile, Suffrein with characteristic activity was preparing his fleet for sea at Cuddalore. He would, when the exigency required it, work for days like a ship's carpenter. On the 5th August, the governor of Madras was informed, that the French fleet had actually sailed to the south on the 1st of the month. Greatly alarmed for the fate of Trincomalee, and and even of Negapatam, the governor and council, deemed it requisite to quicken the preparations of the admiral. He did not proceed to sea before the 20th of August; when he sailed to Trincomalee and found it already in the hands of the French. Suffrein, after proceeding to Point de Galle, where he was joined by the reinforcements from Europe and two ships of the line, anchored in Trincomalee Bay on the 25th; landed the troops early next morning; opened the batteries on the 29th; silenced those of the garrison before night; and summoned the place before morning. To anticipate the arrival of the Eng-

lish fleet, Suffrein offered the most honourable terms. The forts were surrendered on the 31st of August, and Sir E. Hughes arrived on the 2nd of September.

On the 3rd of September the fleet proceeded to sea. The English were eager to redeem, by a victory, the loss of Trincomalee. The French had twelve, the English eleven sail of the line; the French had four ships of fifty guns, the English only one.¹ The battle soon became general. After raging for three hours with great fury in every part of the line, the darkness of the night at last terminated one of the best-fought actions then recorded in the annals of naval warfare. The exertions of Suffrein himself were remarkable, for he was ill-seconded by his captains, of whom he broke six, immediately after the engagement. The French had Trincomalee to return to; but in crowding into it in the dark, one ship struck upon the rocks and was lost; and two others were disabled. Sir E. Hughes proceeded to Madras. Wilks says the French sailed to Cuddalore.

1783.—The fleet with Sir E. Hughes² had re-

Wilks, vol. ii. p. 396, gives the French fifteen, and the English, twelve sail of the line.

² Mill, vol. iv. p. 271.

turned to Madras on the 12th of April, augmented to seventeen sail of the line, four frigates, and some smaller vessels. The "Bristol" man-of-war joined, with ten Indiamen, and three store-ships. On the 17th of June, and two succeeding days, the fleets manœuvred to gain or keep the wind. They engaged at four p. m. on the 20th. The English consisted of eighteen sail, the French only sixteen,¹ and so leaky, that in most of them, it was necessary to pump during the battle. Suffrein, by dexterous management, contrived, in several instances, to place two of his ships upon one of the English, of which five were but little engaged. The combatants were parted by night; which, Wilks adds, "on the ensuing day Sir E. Hughes anxiously sought to renew, and his adversary to avoid, except at his own distance. A distant cannonade of three hours cost the English fleet five hundred and thirty-two men; and what was of more importance to Suffrein, a large proportion of their spars and rigging." Sir E. Hughes found, from the reports

¹ Wilks, vol. ii. p. 440, says, "Bussy sent one thousand two hundred troops on board the fleet on the 17th, which gave Suffrein three thousand men more than Sir E. Hughes had.

of each ship, the whole of his equipments so entirely crippled, his crews so lamentably reduced, and the want of water so extreme, that he deemed it indispensable to incur the mortification of bearing away for the roads of Madras; while Suffrein, wresting from his enemies the praise of superior address, and even the claim of victory, if victory belongs to him who attains his object, resumed his position in the anchorage of Cuddalore, where he not only returned the twelve thousand troops, but landed an aid of two thousand four hundred men from the fleet.

With regard to the state of the crews of the two fleets, it is to be observed, that the French in getting any reinforcements of ships of war, or of ships conveying troops only, always procured an addition of seamen to fill up vacancies. In August, 1782, Suffrein had reinforcements from Europe,¹ and two ships of the line. The English had reinforcements and five sail of the line soon after.² In April, 1783, the English had the arrival of³ a man-of-war, ten Indiamen, and three store-ships; still the French obtained more seamen and had more complete crews; to the want

¹ Mill, vol. iv. p. 252.

² Mill, vol. iv. p. 255.

³ Mill, vol. iv. p. 271.

of complete crews may be attributed the circumstance of the English, never from 1746 to 1783, having gained any decisive victory in the Indian seas—twenty years later we had not a sufficient number of ships of war to protect the commerce of India. Had not the peace of 1783 taken place in Europe, the French would have improved the infant navy of Tippoo, whose ships might have annoyed our trade along the coast.

With the peace of 1783, between France and England,¹ there was an end put to all further operations upon national grounds in India. The peace included France, Spain, the United States of America, and the United Provinces (the Dutch). France had restored to her Pondicherry and Carrical,² the possessions they had enjoyed in Bengal, and Orissa, at the commencement of the war; also Mahé, and power to restore their factory at Surat. The Dutch had Trincomalee³ restored, but Negapatam was retained.

In 1746, Commodore Barnet's ships wintered

¹ Mill, vol. iv. p. 537.

² Coast of Coromandel, as also is Negapatam.

³ We took it in 1782 (11th January). The French took it 31st August, 1782.

at Mergui.¹ In 1746, the English refitted their ships at Trincomalee.² The French, in 1747, went to Acheen to refit, and, at times, to the Mauritius.³ In 1759, two French ships were sent to Arracan for provisions.⁴ In 1760, the French⁵ sent a ship to Mergui, a seaport in the Burman dominions. The English, in 1757, obtained from Alòmpra,⁶ the founder of the present Burman dynasty, the island of Negrals in perpetuity. They had taken the side of the Burmans against the Peguers, supported by the French. Most of the settlers were murdered in 1759 by the Burmans. It contains an excellent harbour, and being on the east coast of the Bay of Bengal, would have been of value for refitting ships, instead of going to Bombay, when the Dutch or French had possession of Trincomalee. The French, again, often went to the Mauritius to refit, and particularly to obtain seamen sent there from the ships arriving at that island. In those days, no effort was made to intercept French ships reinforcing the island.

Admiral Suffrein returned to France in 1784,

¹ Orme, vol. i. p. 61.

² Orme, vol. i. p. 64.

³ Orme, vol. i. pp. 85, 88.

⁴ Orme, vol. ii. p. 550.

⁵ Orme, vol. ii. p. 616.

⁶ Symes's Ava.

and told Louis XVI. that the best mode for attacking the English in India, would be by landing in Arracan. The first Burmese war (1824—26) has instructed us in the nature and danger of that mode of attack, as Brigadier-General Morrison (E. S. division) took Arracan.¹

In 1784, the possessions of the East India Company were, the island of Bombay, Surat, and Tellicherry on the Malabar (or western) coast. At Madras, chiefly the town and fort of Madras, Masulipatam, Negapatam, Vellore, Arcot, and the Northern Circars. In Bengal, Fort William and Calcutta, and the country on the left bank of the river up to Moorshedabad, and on the right bank up to Allahabad, at a distance of five hundred miles from Calcutta.

1784.—The New India Bill, for the better government of the affairs of the East India Company, by Mr. Pitt,² passed on the 13th August, 1784. The Board of Control was created, to control the proceedings of the Court of Directors. A secret committee, composed of the two chairs and the senior director, was formed. Be-

¹ The recent operations will be given in an Appendix, as far as can be learnt at the time of application.

² Mill, vol. iv. p. 557.

fore this committee, all secret correspondence is laid and discussed. There are periodical communications between the president of the Board of Control and the two chairs. A great diminution in the powers of the Court of Proprietors took place. *They* had sent out Clive as governor in 1765, against the vote of the Court of Directors.¹ Mill says, with some modification, it was the same as Fox's bill. Mr. Pitt² objected to Fox's bill, "because it created a new and enormous influence, by vesting in certain nominees of the ministry, all the patronage of the east." By the new lease of the charter,³ granted on the 20th of August, 1833, by which the East India Company have lost the title of "*trading to the East Indies*," &c., the proprietors have lost much of their *right* and *power*. The earl of Derby, premier, in his speech in the House of Lords on the 2nd of April, 1852, said, "With that (Act) of 1833, the Court of Proprietors ceased, as I have said, to have any control or interest whatever in the affairs of India. The

¹ Mill, vol. iii. p. 362 (*note* 1).

² Mill, vol. iv. p. 549.

³ Lord Broughton in 1851, objected to the term "renewal of the *charter*." (The author's *italics*.)

whole business of the Court of Proprietors at this moment, consists in receiving the dividends upon their stock, which is now paying, I think, ten and a-half per cent., and also in electing the members of the Court of Directors. Further than that, they have *no functions whatever to perform*. It is true they may meet and discuss together, but with regard to the *legislation* of India, any decision or unanimous vote of the whole Court of Proprietors need not exercise the *slightest influence* over the *conduct of the government*. And, indeed, when you look to the present position of the Court of Proprietors, there is some reason why they should not exercise any power over the affairs of India, for they have no interest in it except such as they derive from the payment of dividends, which are made a first charge upon the revenue. The number of proprietors is, I think, one thousand eight hundred, the total number of votes being two thousand five hundred, of which something like one-fifth are held by the native proprietors. The power which devolves upon these proprietors, is in itself a material element in the machinery by which Indian affairs are conducted; but that is the *sole power* which they possess, with the excep-

tion, I believe, of a very insignificant, though a very proper power, of putting a check upon some *gratuities*, to the amount of not more than £600 a-year, voted by the directors.”¹ The payment of the dividends were guaranteed by the Act of 1833.

¹ By 53 Geo. III. c. 155, § 88 (1813), no *gratuities* above £600 can be paid by the Court of their own authority. Auber's "Analysis of the Constitution of the E. I. Company," p. 95,—“but no annually paid *pension*.”

CHAPTER VI.

SIR J. MACPHERSON.—LORD CORNWALLIS.

1785.—WARREN HASTINGS¹ had left India in 1785, and Mr. (Sir J.) Macpherson, as senior member of council, succeeded as governor-general. He wrote on the 4th March, 1785, "our arrears to the army are upwards of fifty lakhs,"² £500,000. On the 11th April, 1785, the Court of Directors wrote, "the pay of the soldier ought never to be in arrears while there is a rupee in the treasury. He must be paid; and any other article of expenditure must be postponed to that consideration."³

1786. In September 1786, Lord Cornwallis⁴ assumed the offices of governor-general and commander-in-chief. In Oude, before the Rohillah war, the nawab had paid for a brigade of Bengal

¹ Mill, vol. v. p. 2.

² Mill, vol. v. p. 11.

³ Paragraph 41. In the year 1817-18 (Mahrattah war), Sir J. Malcolm drew bills on Calcutta to pay his division at a discount of 20 per cent.

⁴ Mill, vol. v. p. 312.

troops;¹ and in 1777, a second brigade was paid by him, for the defence of his dominions. Lord Cornwallis found one of these brigades at Cawn-poor, and the other at Futtu Ghur, to keep in obedience his subjects. The governor-general “adhered to the resolution, that the troops should not be removed.” Oude was not then threatened by any particular danger. The sum to be paid he fixed at fifty lakhs of rupees yearly, £500,000.

1790. War with Tippoo Sultan of Mysore. On the 8th May, 1788, Tippoo descended from the Ghauts of Mysore,² and demanded the restitution of the raja of Cheika’s country. Tippoo also had demanded from the raja of Travaneore, our ally, the fort of Cranganore (and Jaycattah), which, he asserted, the Dutch had built upon ground belonging to *his* subject, and tributary to the raja of Cochin. On the 24th December, 1789, Tippoo encamped about four miles from the lines of Travaneore, which the raja had, about the year 1763, raised to defend his northern boundary. A ditch sixteen feet broad, and twenty

¹ Six battalions of sepoys, a troop of cavalry, and company of artillery.

² Mill, vol. v. p. 324.

feet deep ; a strong bamboo edge, parapet, a good rampart, with bastions nearly flanking each other, constituted the defences. The raja applied for aid, and Sir Archibald Campbell (governor of Madras) agreed, and two battalions and guns were sent from Bombay. On the 29th December, 1789, Tippoo, by surprise, turned the right flank of the lines, where no passage was supposed to exist. His troops were thrown into confusion, and fled in disorder, and with heavy loss, across the ditch. Tippoo himself, with difficulty, made his own escape. The supreme government received this intelligence on the 26th January, 1790.¹ The governor-general wrote to the Madras government, and expressed "his expectation that the Madras rulers had considered Tippoo as at war, from the first moment when they heard of the attack;" and that "his intention was to employ all the resources which were within his reach, to exact a full reparation from Tippoo for this wanton and unprovoked violation of treaty." And that "endeavours should be employed to secure the assistance both of the Mahrattahs and of the nizam ;² that instructions should be dispatched

¹ Mill, vol. v. p. 335.

² Ho had in former times been the ally both of the French and the English.

to the government of Bombay to attack his possessions on the coast of Malabar; and that in every part of India the army should be increased."

The nizam feared that the Mahrattahs, whom he considered as a villainous nation, might, in the absence of his troops from his dominions, attack them. The governor-general reckoned them as "the people whose friendship was of the greatest value." However, a treaty with the nizam, and another with the court of Poona (Mahrattahs) were signed. The objects, as declared to those powers, were, 1st. To exact indemnity for the expense of the war; 2nd. To make Tippoo restore to the nizam and peishwa whatever he or his (Tippoo's) father might have taken from those powers; 3rd. To wrest from him all that he possessed of the Carnatic and Payen Ghaut;¹ and 4th. To set the nairs of Malabar, whom he had cruelly treated, free from his dominion. General Meadows was now governor of Madras.

It was arranged² that General Meadows, with the principal part of the Carnatic army, should take possession of the Coimbatore country,³ and endeavour, through the Gujulhuttu Pass, to penetrate into the heart of Mysore; that General

¹ Below the Ghauts.

² Mill, vol. v. p. 346.

³ South of Mysore.

Abercrombie (governor of Bombay), with the army of Bombay, should reduce the territory of Tippoo on the Coast of Malabar, and effect a junction with General Meadows, if events should render it desirable ; and that Colonel Kelly should remain, for the security of the Carnatic, with a small army before the passes which led most directly from Mysore."

It was necessary to form a chain of posts from the Coromandel Coast to the foot of the pass ; and Tanjore, Trichinopoly, Caroor, Erroad, and Sattimungul, were the places selected. At Caroor, the general formed a magazine for provisions ; then marched to Daraporam, took it, and formed a depot, leaving there a garrison and the superfluous baggage. He then moved on to the city of Coimbatore, which was evacuated. Next Erroad was captured. Dindingal and Palacatcherry were also taken from the enemy. General Floyd surprised and took Sattimungul. The army was separated into three divisions of nearly equal strength ; General Meadows, with his headquarters at Coimbatore ; General Floyd, distant sixty miles, at Sattimungul, near to the bottom of the Gujulhutti pass ; and Colonel Stuart at Palacatcherry, thirty miles in the rear.

CHAPTER VII.

SECOND CAMPAIGN AGAINST TIPPOO.

IN December, 1790, Tippoo¹ proceeded towards Pondicherry, where he communicated with the French governor, and engaged a French gentleman to go on a mission for six thousand French to the king of France. The king, it is said, out of compunction for having aided the Americans in resisting the English, declined compliance."

General Abercrombie, governor of Bombay, could not take the field till late in the season. On the 14th of December, he took Cannonore. All places in Malabar belonging to Tippoo were subdued, and that whole province was in possession of the English. This was the end of the first campaign.

Second campaign, 1791. The governor-general had, in 1790, intended to take the field in person, and conduct the war. He gave up that

¹ Mill, vol. v. p. 355.

intention upon learning that General Meadows was appointed governor of Madras. But the result of the first campaign disappointed him, and he feared the nizam and Mahrattahs might make a separate peace. He headed the army,¹ and determined upon the route and line of Vellore, Amboor, and Bangalore. Tippoo (hearing of Cornwallis's march towards Vellore), on the 5th of February, rapidly ascended by the passes of Changama and Policode. Cornwallis, feigning to march to Amboor, turned to the north, and was at the head of the Mooglee pass before Tippoo could obstruct his march. On the 5th of March, 1791, Cornwallis took up his position before Bangalore. The pettah² was assaulted on the 7th. On the 21st, Bangalore was stormed and carried. Lord Cornwallis moved northward on the 28th. Early in April, he was joined by the nizam with ten thousand (nominally fifteen thousand) well-mounted horsemen. They were useless, as they could not protect their foragers.

Preparations were made at Bangalore for the siege of Seringapatam. By the beginning of

¹ Mill, vol. v. p. 375. Six Bengal battalions under Lieutenant Colonel Cockerell joined the army.

² "A considerable town, surrounded by a wall and ditch."

May the equipments were ready, except in the article of cattle. News of the French Revolution, it is said, induced his lordship to a degree of precipitation. He took the route of Caunkanhully, where Tippoo had destroyed the forage. On the 13th of May, Lord Cornwallis reached Arikera, nine miles from Seringapatam. The cattle failed; the followers were in great distress,¹ for he was obliged to destroy a quantity of grain from want of carriage.

General Abercrombie, with the Bombay army, was to ascend the Ghauts from Malabar,² and penetrate the centre of Tippoo's dominions, to co-operate from the east. They carried, guns, stores, &c., over fifty miles of mountains, guns being "hoisted over a succession of ascents by ropes and tackle." They reached Poodieherrum by 1st of March, 1791. Lord Cornwallis not being ready to advance, he ordered Abercrombie to halt; but on his (Lord Cornwallis's) return to Bangalore, sent him orders to advance to Periapatam, three marches from Seringapatam. Lord Cornwallis marched to the ford of Canianbuddy,

¹ With Captain Little's detachment, the followers picked grain out of the dung of horses.

² Mill, vol. v. p. 384.

eight miles above Seringapatam, to keep up his communication with the Bombay army. He wrote at length to General Abercrombie to return to Malabar. Lord Cornwallis had determined to retire, as the season was too far advanced. He destroyed his battering guns, as did Abercrombie, burying some at the head of the pass he ascended. On the 26th May, Lord Cornwallis commenced his return. Just then, a party of Mahrattahs appeared, reporting the near approach of two armies, led by the Poona chiefs, Hurry Punt and Perseram Bhow.¹ The latter had twenty thousand horse, and Hurry Punt twelve thousand horse and foot. They had been twenty-nine weeks at the siege of Dharwar, which surrendered.

The Mahrattahs wanted money. Lord Cornwallis adopted the bold expedient² "of writing to the governor and council of Madras on the 21st June, to take the treasure out of the China ships, and, coining it³ into rupees, to send it to

¹ Delayed by operations (which might have been put off) at Dharwar.

² Mill, vol. v. p. 392.

³ Dollars sent from England for the purchase of tea in China. The Mahrattahs wanted twelve lakhs rupees, (£120,000).

him with the utmost possible dispatch." When Lord Cornwallis retreated, Tippoo ordered a salute to be fired from Seringapatam, as if he had gained a victory. The ships of the season arrived before October, bringing reinforcements, and three hundred men were sent by Governor Brooke from St. Helena.

Third and last campaign, 1792. At length,¹ the third campaign commenced; and on the 5th February, 1792, the armies again appeared before Seringapatam. There was great delay in the march of the Mahrattahs under Perseram Bhow. The armies of the nizam and Hurry Punt remained useless and unemployed. Tippoo's army was estimated at five thousand cavalry, and from forty thousand to fifty thousand infantry. Lord Cornwallis formed his army into three columns, at half-past eight, P.M. (eight thousand seven hundred men),² and on the 6th February, 1792, attacked the lines before Seringapatam. The army had five hundred and thirty-five killed and wounded. Tippoo lost four thousand men, slain, and his army totally dispersed.

¹ Mill, vol. v. p. 424.

² Right, three thousand three hundred; centre (Cornwallis), three thousand seven hundred; and left, one thousand seven hundred men.

On the 8th February, 1792, Tippoo sent for Lieutenants (Sir John) Chalmers and Nash, retained as prisoners, in contempt of the capitulation of Coimbatore. He gave them presents and letters to Lord Cornwallis on the subject of peace.

Lord Cornwallis was preparing fifty heavy guns, and furnaces for heating shot, to set fire to the city, and to make breaches, which were sure of success. More troops were advancing to complete the blockade, and fifty thousand Brinjarries with bullocks were bringing in grain. On the 24th February, 1792, hostilities ceased, and Tippoo made a treaty,¹ ceding one-half of his territories to the allies, to pay three crores and thirty lakhs of rupees,² and to give up two of his sons as hostages. Tippoo's revenues were admitted to be, two crores thirty-seven lakhs rupees, (£2,500,000). It has before been stated that Hyder's treasure at Bednore amounted to £12,000,000 ; hence the great sums both he and Tippoo could expend on their military operations. Major Dirom³ gives the strength of their allied armies at eighty-three thousand eight hundred and thirteen men, and two hundred and fifty-four

¹ Mill, vol. v. p. 447.

² About £3,300,000.

³ Narrative, 1794, p. 241.

guns, on the 16th March, 1792, above the Ghauts, after their operations.

Lord Cornwallis gave the troops six month's batta out of the money extracted from Tippoo. He and General Meadows resigned their shares, and also of the prize money, to the army. There were five prize agents.¹ A committee of seven officers were appointed to inspect accounts, &c. Mill says,² "as the English over-rated the vices of Tippoo, so they greatly over-rated his power and consequence as an enemy.

It was found, after all, that his whole revenues amounted but to £2,500,000; and, instead of the mighty treasures which he and his father were supposed to have accumulated, and which, from the number of troops they had always kept up,³ and the expensive wars in which they had engaged, it was impossible they should have accumulated,⁴ the expense of only two campaigns was found to have so completely exhausted his finances, that he was unable to pay the grain

¹ Kings, two; Madras, two; and Bengal, one.

² Mill, vol. v. p. 459.

³ Mill, vol. iv. p. 175. In 1780, Hyder came with 100,000 men towards Madras.

⁴ Wilks, vol. i. p. 452, says, he obtained in 1763, in the Bednore country, £12,000,000 at least.

merchants for the most essential of all articles, when they conveyed it to his camp."

The nizam was desirous¹ of maintaining the useful connexion he had formed with the English. He had been, at times, under the guidance of the French, then under that of the English. He now regarded the English as a defence against the Mahrattahs. Between the English and Mahrattahs jealousies quickly arose. They saw, with regret, the British shield between them and the nizam. Before Tippoo was subdued, Mahadajec Sindia had marched an army towards Poona. He alarmed Nana Furnuwees, who governed in the peishwa's name; whose authority Sindia wished to usurp. He was regarded with suspicion by the English themselves. Sindia had, before the war, offered to join them; but his demands were exorbitant. One was, that the English should assist him in reducing the Rajpoot princes who resisted his conquests. Such a measure would have placed Sindia in strength to the north of the Nerbuddah. The Mahrattahs should never have been allowed to come to the north of the Nerbuddah, or into Hindostan.

At the peace, Hurry Punt wished to have, as

¹ Mill, vol. v. p. 463.

had been granted to the nizam,¹ a British subsidiary force. With the nizam, it was stipulated that they were not to act against our allies. Lord Cornwallis believed Hurry Punt desired this force to act against Sindia, already too powerful, and which had been caused by the policy of Mr. Hastings, in allowing him to become master of some of the Moghul provinces; assuming the authority of the emperor;² forming corps of infantry under European officers, mostly French; erecting foundries and arsenals. Had it been the policy of the British government to support the emperor when he left Allahabad in 1771, to go to Delhi, to ascend his throne, Sindia would not have gained such a prominent position in Hindostan. The government of Bengal were against the measure of granting the aid desired by the emperor. No doubt, it might have involved the English in a Mahrattah war had we attempted to place him and keep him on his throne. Lord Cornwallis regarded all attempts to check the career of Sindia "as either imprudent, or contrary to the act of parliament, and unlikely to obtain the concurrence of the ruling powers at home."

¹ Mill, vol. v. p. 320. By Lord Cornwallis, 1789.

² Blinded by Gholam Kader in 1788.

He had now a board of control to deal with. With regard to Sindia, he was making his army powerful by employing European officers to discipline his troops. The French officers, no doubt, expected that they might benefit their nation at some future period by inducing Sindia and the other native powers to support the French cause, in opposition to that of the English.

1793. In 1793, the French Revolution, and the war between England and France, induced the English to attack the French possessions in India.¹ The forces of Madras were sent against Pondicherry, with Major-General Sir John Braithwaite at their head. The whole of the French settlements in India were added to the English possessions. The debt of the East India Company in 1789, was £7,604,000; the interest thereon, £480,000.

Lord Cornwallis left India in 1793,² and was succeeded by Mr. Shore.³ The nawab of Bengal died, and was succeeded on the 28th of September, by Mubarak-ad-Dowla eldest son of Uzeez-ad-Dowla.

¹ Mill, vol. v. p. 467.

² Mill, vol. vi. p. 20.

³ Sir John, afterwards Lord Teignmouth.

There existed a treaty offensive and defensive between the English, the nizam, and the Mahrattahs. To prevent the chance of war between the two latter, Lord Cornwallis framed an "extraordinary treaty," and sent it to Hyderabad and Poona, that the allies were not to assist each other, "until they were convinced that the party requiring assistance had justice on his side, and all means of conciliation had proved fruitless." This clause was anti-Asiatic; the nizam agreed to it. Sindia regarded the English with distrust; and looked upon the power of Tippoo as a counterpoise to their power. The Mahrattahs wanted to exact the Ghaut.¹ During the reigns of Shah Aulum and Jchander (about 1712), it was exacted by them from the provinces in the Deccan. They desired to make all the native princes purchase the safety of their dominions at this cost. Mahadajee Sindia died on the 12th of February, 1794;² and was succeeded by his nephew, Dowlut Rao Sindia. He in March, 1795, attacked the nizam.³ "He advanced.

¹ Before 1707, the Mahrattahs demanded one-tenth of the imperial provinces in the Deccan, they agreeing not to plunder them.—Mill, vol. ii. p. 440.

² Duff, vol. iii. p. 86.

³ Mill, vol. vi. p. 33.

to Beder, if not with a view to actual aggression, at least with a view to interfere in the internal affairs of the Mahrattah government, a considerable time before the movement of the Mahrattah armies." The nizam had agreed to Lord Cornwallis's proviso as to the grant of assistance; we did not assist him, nor allow any portion of our two battalions with him to join his army. At length he was compelled to conclude a peace with the Mahrattahs, on such terms as they chose to dictate—ceding country to the value of thirty-five lakhs of rupees (£350,000), and the fort of Dowlatabad. Our conduct so offended the nizam that on his return to Hyderabad, he sent the English corps back to the Company's territory, and raised several corps under M. Raymond, a French officer. Mill says,¹ "The governor-general, however, would not risk offence to the Poona government, by any sort of interference more forcibly than words; and the successor of Mahadajee Sindia, his nephew Dowlut Rao, soon assembled his army from the remotest parts of his dominions, and obtained an ascendency at once in the Poona councils, and in the confederacy which was forming against the dominions of the nizam." It will

¹ Mill, vol. vi. p. 32.

be seen that in 1798, it cost the Marquis Wellesley a good deal of trouble to get rid of this French force at Hyderabad. The English, however, clearly could not aid the nizam in his attack; without involving us in a war with the Mahrattahs.

On the 27th October, 1795, Mahdoo Rao, the peishwa died. Bajee Rao, the son of Rugoba, was named his successor, by the dying prince; was favoured by Dowlut Rao Sindia, and became peishwa. The vizier of Oude, Asoph-ud-Dowla had succeeded to his father Shujah-ud-Dowla; he died in 1775, and Asoph died in 1797. His brother, Saadut Ally, was put aside for Vizier Ally (a spurious son of Asoph); but ultimately the illegitimacy of the latter being proved, the former was made nawab on the 21st January, 1798. When Saadut Ally came to the musnud,¹ he agreed to a subsidy raised to seventy-six lakhs of rupees, (£760,000,) and to make over to us the fort of Allahabad. Our troops to be stationed in Oude, were in number ten thousand men, if under any contingency they should exceed thirteen thousand men, the nawab was to pay the extra cost; if they should be less than eight thousand a proportionate deduction was to be made. In 1795

¹ Mill, vol. vi. p. 55.

we sent¹ an expedition from Madras and we took the Dutch settlements of Ceylon, Malacca, Banda and Amboyna. Also their possessions in India; and Cochin (on the Malabar coast) after great resistance. Also the Cape of Good Hope,

Second war with Tippoo Sultan, 1798.—There were suspicions regarding Tippoo and the Mah-rattahs. Lord Mornington, who had been appointed governor-general of India, touched at the Cape of Good Hope, where he learnt from Major Kirkpatrick,² the state of affairs regarding the ruler of Mysore. Lord Mornington gathered more information at Madras. He reached Calcutta, on the 17th May, 1798.³ Colonel Wellesley⁴ had before reached India with his regiment, the 33rd foot. On the 8th of June, a paper was received at Calcutta purporting to be a Proclamation issued by the governor at the Isle of France in favour of Tippoo, who had sent two ambassadors to the governor of that island, for the purpose of obtaining some French officers and men for the sultan. In June 1798, several persons who had been on the island had arrived in Calcutta, and in fact, stated that on the 7th March, 1798, about

¹ Mill, vol. vi. p. 69.

² Late resident at Hyderabad.

³ Mill, vol. vi. p. 78.

⁴ The Duke of Wellington.

two hundred French officers and men, had sailed on board the French frigate *La Preneuse*. The governor-general learnt that this ship reached Mangalore on the 26th April, and were well received by Tippoo. Lord Mornington at once resolved to assemble armies on the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar for the attack of the sultan at his capital.

The French islands in the Indian seas¹ had thrown off all connection with France. The Madras government were very much averse to engaging in a war against Tippoo. As will be seen, the proofs against the sultan were overwhelming, the governor-general writes,² to the Right Honourable Henry Dundas: "I wish it were in my power to express my satisfaction in the alacrity with which the government of Fort St. George, have executed my orders for the defence of the Carnatic. But I am concerned to state, that notwithstanding the cordial disposition of Lord Clive to second my exertions in the public service, unnecessary and unwarrantable delays have prevailed in the military equipments in that quarter, and the moving of the battering train

¹ Mill, vol. vi. p. 92.

² Despatches, vol. i. 12th November, 1798, p. 342.

towards the frontier, (a measure absolutely necessary for the purpose of giving effect to our negotiations with Tippoo), has been delayed several weeks." The objections of some of the members of the Madras council were on account of the danger, expense, and the want of troops. Lord Mornington on one occasion wrote: "I insisted on the immediate execution of my orders." General Harris who had been the acting governor till Lord Clive's arrival¹ was most zealous in his exertions to forward the expedition. That the army should have been so totally unprepared, must have appeared singular to his lordship who in his letter dated 25th February, 1798, from the Cape of Good Hope, had written to the Court of Directors,² alluding to the "apprehensions entertained of the return of Zemaun Shah (king of Cabul) towards the frontier of that province (Oude), the several movements of Tippoo Sultan and the sudden suspension of the expedition *embarked for the attack of Manilla.*" In the expedition to the latter, preparations must have been made both at Madras and Bombay.

The Earl of Mornington had for some years,

¹ About August 1798.

² Despatches, vol. i. p. 16. (The author's *italics*.)

before he was appointed governor-general of India, been a commissioner of the Board of Control, so that he had possessed the opportunity of obtaining a general knowledge of East India affairs before he quitted England. He had to provide an army on the north-western frontier, as a defence against the contingency of an invasion by Zemaun Shah. The shah¹ had in 1795 invaded the Punjab. In 1796 he prepared again to return to the Punjab. In 1797, he advanced unopposed to Lahore; but news of a rebellion in his own dominions, caused his retreat. In 1798, he left Peshawur on the 25th October, and advanced without molestation to Lahore. About the end of the year, news of the invasion of Khorasan by the King of Persia (Futeh Ali Shah) caused his return to Peshawur; when he wrote to the Emperor of Delhi to state the cause of his return and his being prevented marching to Delhi; but that he would embrace the earliest occasion of returning, to replace him (Shah Alum) on his throne, and cause the Mahommedan to be the paramount power in India. To meet this difficulty there were two plans—the one of a *potitical* nature, the latter a *military* arrangement;

¹ Elphinstone's Cabul, vol. ii. Appendix, p. 337.

while his lordship projected an attack on a formidable foe in the south of India, he was preparing for the defence of its north-west frontier. To meet the former, he directed the governor of Bombay in a letter, dated the 8th of October, 1798,¹ to send an agent to the court of Persia. Mehdy Ali Khan, the native agent at Bushire was despatched; and the result was that an attack was made, and Zemaun left the Punjab as before mentioned.

The military arrangements. The Earl of Mornington wrote to Major-General Sir J. H. Craig, on the 16th September, 1798.² "The most useful barrier against this invasion, in the first instance, would be the resistance of the Seiks, of the Rajpoots, especially the rajas of Jyenagur (Jypoor), and Jodpoor, and of Dowlut Rao Sindia." "The substitution of regular regiments from the Company's service, in place of the nabob's own troops; or, in other words, such an increase of our force in Oude, as would warrant nearly a total reduction of the nabob's present army."³ Finally, a force was assembled

¹ Despatches, vol. i. p. 286.

² Vol. i. p. 261.

³ About six thousand men were, in 1798, added to the Bengal army.

at Anoopshuhur, seventy miles south-east from Delhi, both as a protection to the frontier of Oude, and of our own territories.

In the interval of preparation, the governor-general negotiated with the nizam for the dismissal of the French officers, and the dissolution of their corps. Mill says of this force,¹ "After all the alarm which it occasioned, it consisted of less than fourteen thousand men." On the 1st of September, 1798, a treaty was concluded, and four battalions of sepoys were added to the former two, and the British government was pledged to protect the nizam against any unjust demands of the Mahrattahs. The dissolution of this force is best explained by his lordship's letter to the Right Honourable H. Dundas, president of the Board of Control.² "The detachment, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts, arrived at Hyderabad on the 10th of October; and on the 22nd of October, the British troops, under the orders of the nizam, and with the co-operation of a body of two thou-

¹ Mill, vol. vi. p. 94, Wellesley Despatches, vol. ii. p. 421, one hundred and twenty-four French officers.

² Despatches, vol. i. p. 339, 12th November, 1798; my *italics*.

sand of his cavalry, surrounded the camp of the French army, disarmed all the sepoys, and secured the persons of all the French officers then in camp. This operation was happily effected without bloodshed, and without contest. A mutiny having broken out in the French camp on the preceding day, and the sepoys having imprisoned their officers, the resident at Hyderabad and Lieutenant-Colonel Roberts, with the consent of the nizam, judiciously availed themselves of this favourable opportunity to execute this important measure, without difficulty or danger. The French officers, by my particular orders, were treated with every practical degree of attention and humanity; at the period of their arrest by our troops, their persons were in confinement, and their lives in danger from the mutiny prevailing in their camp; and the greatest difficulty which Colonel Roberts encountered, was that of rescuing the imprisoned officers from the violence of their own sepoys. Particular care was taken to save the property of the officers for their use, as well as to obtain for them *such arrears of pay and allowances as were due to them from his highness*; Captain Kirkpatrick in-

*forms me, that he has been completely successful in effecting both these desirable objects."*¹

There were political arrangements to be made at Poona. The governor-general in the same letter writes, "With respect to the camp at Poona, our affairs in that quarter also have taken a very favourable turn. Nana Furnuwees has been restored to the ministry, and has publicly taken charge of the affairs of government. I have already informed you, that the peishwa had concurred without hesitation in all my arrangements at Hyderabad, and had uniformly professed his determination to abide by his defensive engagements with us, in the event of hostilities with Tippoo. The restoration of Nana secures the peishwa's faithful execution of those engagements, and affords a strong ground of expectation of further improvements in the nature of our connexion with that state. Neither Tippoo nor the French will ever acquire any influence at

¹ Many expedients could be adopted to cause such a mutiny; but the most *simple*, no doubt, was to keep the sepoy in *arrears*. A proclamation was sent to the French camp, announcing their officers' dismissal, and "*declaring it treason in the soldiers to obey them.*" The sepoy confined their officers. There were eleven thousand sepoy.

Poona, while Nana shall hold the reins of power. Nana has too much wisdom to involve the Mahrattah empire in such desperate connexions." Nana died on the 13th of March, 1800,¹ "and with him," says Colonel Palmer (resident), "has departed all the wisdom and moderation of the Mahrattah government." Duff adds, "He was decidedly averse to the admission of a body of foreign troops² in the manner proposed by the Marquis Wellesley, if the energies of the government could possibly be restored without their aid. He respected the English, admired their sincerity and the vigour of their government; but, as political enemies, no one regarded them with more jealousy and alarm." The former peishwa, in 1791 and 1792, had joined the English against Tippoo. The then peishwa, in 1799, would not join them against the sultan.

Lord Mornington had heard of the landing of the French in Egypt, and of the battle of the Nile, and on the 4th of November, 1798, addressed a letter to Tippoo Sultan³ to inform him

¹ Duff, vol. iii. p. 188.

² Subsidiary force.

³ Despatches, vol. i. p. 321. He heard the news at Calcutta on the 18th October, 1798, of the French landing in Egypt; and on the 31st October, of the battle of the Nile (1st August).

thereof, and of the conduct of the French. He wrote, "They have committed this act of violence in contempt of the treaties subsisting between France and the Porte (Constantinople), and without any regard to the acknowledged authority of the grand seignor, so long established in Egypt." He reported the victory of the English over the French. Tippoo, as a Mahommedan, had appealed to the grand seignor to protect the Faithful, he being one of the same faith; also to the king of Cabool, to the king of Persia, and to all the Mahommedan princes of India. He did not seem to be aware that, while he was supported by the French at the Mauritius, who had thrown off their allegiance from the mother country, the French of regal France were attacking the grand seignor by the invasion of Egypt. Tippoo was thus patronising the countrymen of those who were the enemies of the grand master of the Faithful. To meet the case in all its bearings, Tippoo addressed a letter to Napoleon Buonaparte in Egypt, and also sent ambassadors to the Isle of France, and was preparing to send a mission to the Executive Directory in France.

The governor-general, who had previously sent the Hon. Colonel Wellesley and His Majesty's

33rd regiment to Madras, subsequently went to that presidency himself, to be on the spot to stimulate the exertions of the Madras authorities. The three campaigns in Mysore in 1790, 1791, and 1792, had made the armies of India familiar with the nature of the country where the operations were to be conducted. There must have been many officers present in India, who had before been employed in Mysore, where we were now to make another campaign. Wilks states,¹ that “although the strength of the army above the Ghauts, in 1792, exceeded in number, by upwards of six thousand men, that which was destined for the campaign of 1799, and nearly ten thousand if the corps of Nizam Ally be excluded, yet, in the former war, a number exceeding that difference was employed in the fortresses on the lines of communication;² and, as all the means of every description for the reduction of the enemy’s capital was now to accompany the army for terminating the war by a single blow, the plan of the campaign excluded the occupation of intermediate posts, and rendered disposable about an equal number of

¹ Wilks, vol. iii. p. 398.

² And Tippoo had lost half his country.

troops. The amount of those equipments, described by the modern technical designation of *materiel*, had never been equalled on any former occasion." The powers of the commander-in-chief (General Harris) were great; his authority was ordered to be obeyed, without reference, by all officers, civil and military. There was a political and diplomatic commission, composed of the Honourable Colonel Wellesley, Lieutenant Close, Lieutenant-Colonel Agnew, and Captain Macaulay, as secretary, to act under the orders of General Harris.

THE FORCE IN 1799.						TOTAL.
European Cavalry	884	} 2,035
Native ditto	1751	
European Artillery	608
European Infantry	4,381
Native ditto	10,005
Gun Lascars	1,483
Pioneers	1,000
						20,802
Subsidiary force serving with Nizam Ally	6,536
His Infantry (formerly French)	13,021
						30,959
Bombay Army	6,000
Grand total						30,959

¹ The remnant of the corps disbanded in October, 1798.

Battering Guns	40
Field Ordnance	57
Howitzers	7

Besides the field train, with the contingent of Nizam Ally, and besides his regular and irregular horse, about 6000.

Army of 1792 43,118 men.

“ On the 3rd of February, 1799, his lordship dispatched his commands to General Harris,¹ to enter the territory of Mysore, with the army which had been assembled at Vellore, and to General Stuart to co-operate with the Bombay army from Malabar; while at the same time he gave intimation to the allied courts and the British admiral on the coast, that he now considered the Company as at war with Tippoo Sultan.” General Harris entered the Mysore country on the 5th of March, 1799. The route for General Harris’s army was by Talgautporam and Cankanelle.² The Bombay army, *viâ* Seedasseer.

¹ Mill, vol. vi. 111. The order of march was, the cavalry were in advance, the baggage on the right, and the nizam’s contingent moved parallel, at some distance, on the right flank of the army; a strong rear-guard protected the interval between the columns. By this order of march, the whole of the baggage being between two columns, was well secured.—Boatson, p. 61.

² Boatson’s “History of the War in Mysore,” surveyor-general to the army, p. 61.

The Mahrattahs did not join; they were afraid of reducing Tippoo too low. He was considered as a counterpoise against the English.

Seringapatam was stormed by four thousand three hundred and seventy-six men in two columns.¹ Major-general Baird commanded the right column, and Lieutenant-colonel Dunlop the left. A forlorn hope of each attack consisted of a serjeant and twelve Europeans, who were followed by two subalterns' parties; that of the right column commanded by Lieutenant Hill of the 74th, that of the left column by Lieutenant Lawrence² of the 77th. There were during the siege:—

	KILLED.	WOUNDED.	MISSING.
European officers . . .	22	45	
European N. C. O. and rank and file . . .	181	122	22
Native Soldiers . . .	119	420	100
	<hr/> 322	<hr/> 587	<hr/> 122
Total killed, wounded and missing . . .			1031

Of the above officers, twenty-five were killed and wounded in the assault.

¹ Beatson, p. 125.

² Father of Lieut.-Colonel Sir H. M. Lawrence, K.C.B. and of Lieut.-Colonels A. W. and G. St. P. Lawrence, (Madras and Bengal armies).

There were found in the fort:—

Brass guns	373
Mortars	60
Howitzers	11
Iron guns	466
Mortars	12
Total	<hr/> 922

Of which two hundred and eighty-seven were mounted on the fortifications. The number of French in Seringapatam amounted to about one hundred and twenty, including twenty officers. The whole had commissions from the French government. Colonel Beatson gives the treasure found, including jewels, £1,143,216; but the rupee is reckoned at two shillings and sixpence. Mill gives the amount at £1,000,000, of which the jewels, valued at £360,000,¹ and many officers complained of getting too great a share of jewels, which were overvalued.

The division of territory. The Company took the province of Canara, the district of Coimbatore and Daraporam,² and territories lying between the British possessions in the Carnatic, and those of Malabar. The nizam got Gooty and Gurrum-

¹ Mill, vol. vi. p. 159. At two shillings the rupee, the value would be 914,572/.; but the jewels were overvalued.

² Beatson, p. 311.

condah. The raja of Mysore was restored and obtained a share. The peishwa was offered a share, but obtained none; as he declined the conditions of a defensive alliance.

On the capture of Seringapatam there were found in Tippoo's Library¹ a correspondence with France, the Isle of France, and with Napoleon in Egypt. Also letters to Constantinople, calling upon the Sultan to defend the *faithful*, who were in danger from the English power. The Porte took the side of the English. Tippoo wrote also to Zemaun Shah at Cabool, and to the other native princes of India.

Mission to Persia, 1799. Captain (afterwards Sir J.) Malcolm was sent to Persia as ambassador. He sailed from Bombay in the end of 1799, arrived in Persia in 1800 and in 1801, commercial and political treaties were signed between the British and Persian governments. It was known that the French had landed in Egypt; but the result of that expedition was yet unknown. We had destroyed the French fleet on the 1st of August, 1798, at the bay of Aboukir. The attempt to invade India *via* Persia was a probable event. Sir J. M'Neill, formerly ambas-

¹ Mill, vol. vi. p. 154.

sador at the Persian court,¹ in his "Progress and present Position of Russia" (1838), states that "Prince Nassau Siegen presented to Catherine of Russia in 1787, a project, drawn up by a Frenchman, for marching an army through Bokhara and Cashmeer to Bengal, to drive the English out of India, this to be preceded by a manifesto declarative of the intention to re-establish the Great Moghul² on the throne of India; and though Potemkin derided it, the plan was favorably received by the empress; and has never been forgotten in Russia." We know that Napoleon and the Emperor of Russia in a secret treaty at Tilsit in 1807, had formed a plan for the invasion of India. Mehdi Ali Khan had been sent to the Persian court early in 1799, in consequence of Zemaun Shah's march into the Punjab. The Marquis Wellesley had now more extended views as to his policy in regard to Persia. He wrote to the Court of Directors:³ "The policy which dictated my opinion, was calculated to provide not only against the menaced invasion

¹ Sir J. M'Neill, p. 46.

² He had been in the hands of the Mahrattahs since 1771.

³ Despatches, vol. ii. p. 578.—28th September, 1801.

of Zemaun Shah, but also against the views which other powers may entertain of attacking the British possessions in India. The object is important in proportion to the hazard to which the British interests would be exposed, by a connexion between the court of Persia, and those European powers, whose views have long been directed to this quarter of the British dominions.¹ Great advantages in a commercial point of view, were likewise to be expected from the connexion which I proposed to form with the court of Persia." He wrote that Zemaun Shah of Cabool had formed a connexion with Tippoo Sultan in 1798, and now contrasted the present state of affairs, by the vicinity of the King of Persia's force to Affghanistan. The marquis desired to exclude our enemies from the Persian sea-ports; to secure the commerce of the gulf of Persia, and the settlements of British merchants in the ports of the Persian dominions.² Malcolm had made advantageous arrangements with the imaum of Muscat, and had produced on the mind of the

¹ The policy of England towards Persia has been very unstatesman-like,—half-and-half measures.

² The people of Asiatic countries are too poor to take much of our manufactures.

pasha of Bagdad an impression favourable to British interests. By the treaty it was stipulated,¹ "That the King of Persia should lay waste with a great army, the country of the Affghans, if ever they should proceed to the invasion of India, and conclude no peace without engagements binding them to abstain from all aggressions upon the English. That should any army belonging to the French, attempt to form any settlement on any of the islands or shores of Persia, a force should be employed by the two contracting states to co-operate for their extirpation; and that if even any individuals of the French nation should request permission to reside in Persia, it should not be granted." The English bound themselves to defend Persia against the *French* or *Affghans*. We never dreamed of the *Russians*.

¹ Mill, vol. vi. p. 187.

CHAPTER VIII.

EXPEDITION TO EGYPT.

ON the 18th June, 1798, the Secret Committees of the Court of Directors¹ wrote to the Governor general that they had been informed by his Majesty's ministers that a large armament had sailed from Toulon on the 19th May, 1798, and that it was not impossible that India might be the object of attack, "by way of the Red Sea, or its coast, after the conquest of Egypt; or even by the Black Sea; or by Bussora." That his Majesty's ministers intended to send at least 4000 more troops to India. It was not till the 18th October, 1798, that the Governor-general received authentic intelligence of the invasion of Egypt. The Marquis Wellesley was in favour of the proposal to aid the expedition to Egypt, which was to be despatched from England under General Sir Ralph Abercrombie. Lord Elgin, the ambassador at Constantinople, wrote the

¹ Mill, vol. vi. p. 99.

Governor-general, on the 22nd Dec. 1799¹ that Kleber remained in Egypt with fifteen thousand men, and that Buonaparte was at the head of the new government in France. Lord Elgin proposed a "powerful diversion from India, through the Red Sea, for the purpose of accelerating the evacuation of Egypt by the French, but after a full discussion of this subject with General Stuart," he writes, "I am satisfied that it would be a useless waste of treasure and blood to attempt such an expedition on a large scale, unless the whole plan of co-operation from the Mediterranean had been previously concerted." The idea was originally proposed by the Marquis who,² on the 16th May, 1799, wrote to Mr. Dundas, as soon as he had heard of the fall of Seringapatam, "If the French should be established in Egypt, it might be advisable to consider whether an expedition might not be fitted out from India, to co-operate, by way of the Red Sea, with any attempt which might be undertaken from the Mediterranean. I cannot venture to prepare any such expedition without orders

¹ Marquis of Wellesley's letter, 5th March, 1801, to Right Hon. H. Dundas.—Despatches, vol. ii. p. 227.

² Despatches, vol. i. p. 537.

from England; but if I should receive them, you may be assured that they will be executed with alacrity and diligence not only by me, but by the whole army of India.

In his letter to Vice Admiral Rainier, the naval commander-in-chief in India, he writes,¹ alluding to the expedition to Egypt, "I find myself compelled to suspend a second time the final execution of his Majesty's commands respecting Batavia." To Vice-admiral Sir Roger Curtis, at the Cape, he wrote, 24th Oct. 1800,² his expectation that France would endeavour at an early period to throw a strong reinforcement into the Isle of France. On the 5th November, 1800, the Marquis wrote to the Honourable Colonel Wellesley,³ appointing him to the command of an expedition to be assembled at Trincomalee, in the end of December, 1800, to be applied "to proceed up the Red Sea, in order to co-operate with the British force, which may be employed in Egypt from the side of the Mediterranean." Then "that a blow might be struck with every prospect of success against the Isle

¹ Despatches, vol. ii. p. 401.—22nd October, 1800.

² Despatches, vol. ii. p. 406.

³ Despatches, vol. ii. p. 413.

of France," if the troops should not be required for Egypt.¹ At last Mr. Dundas's orders of the 6th October, 1800, were received on the 6th February, 1801,² directing one thousand European and two thousand Native Infantry to be sent from India to the proposed place of rendezvous in the Red Sea, with as little delay as possible, to co-operate with Sir Home Popham. Mr. Dundas had,³ by a letter dated October, 1800, to Sir Ralph Abercrombie, informed him that the force he was to command would be fifteen thousand men; and that in order to ensure the success of the British force, five thousand men are ordered to co-operate from India, and to possess themselves of the French posts on the Red Sea.

On the 10th February, 1801,⁴ the Marquis having decided on sending the force to Egypt, wrote to Major-general Baird, who was to command it.⁵ The force he stated to be:—

¹ 10th, 19th, and 80th foot, Bengal volunteers (1,000), and artillery.

² Despatches, vol. ii. p. 436.

³ Despatches, vol. ii. p. 416.

⁴ Despatches, vol. ii. p. 440.

⁵ General Baird urged his claim to the command.

	MEN
At Ceylon, H. M.'s 10th Regts. . . .	1,000
„ „ 19th „ . . .	750
„ „ 80th „ . . .	750
„ Detachments H. M.'s 86th and 88th Regts. . . .	500
	<hr/> 8,000
Bengal native volunteers	1,000
European and native artillery, about two companies, with lascars attached, com- puted	200
At Bombay—Native infantry	1,800
European artillery, about one company, &c. . . .	100
	<hr/> 5,900
Some artillery from Madras	100
	<hr/>
Total	6,000

The 19th foot did not go.

Rear Admiral Blankett sailed from Bombay for the Red Sea, on the 28th December, 1800; he had the Bombay frigate, two bomb vessels, three small cruisers, one armed vessel—four hundred and fifty tons, one store ship, two brigs from one hundred to two hundred tons, capable of being converted into fire-ships, one launch fitted as a gun-boat, with a twenty-four pound carronade, three ketches, one hundred and fifty tons each, two armed boats eighty tons each.

There was a difficulty in obtaining men of

war to accompany the expedition. The Marquis states, in his letter 5th February, 1801,¹ to Vice Admiral Rainier, "Your Excellency has stated as the ground of your determination not to co-operate in the proposed expedition against the Isle of France, involved no question of detail, the reasons of your Excellency's dissent being founded simply on the want of his Majesty's express commands to authorize your co-operation in the intended enterprise." The Marquis observes "I conceive that his Majesty's naval commander is not only justified in complying with my application, but absolutely required to aid me, unless the condition of his ships shall preclude their co-operation; or unless, in his conscientious judgment, the attempt which I propose may appear to be impracticable, or dangerous to the public service. The want of his Majesty's express commands will never be received either by his Majesty, or by the public, as an admissible justification of the conduct of any public officer for declining to co-operate against the enemy in an attack which appears to be practicable, and

¹ Despatches, vol. ii. p. 755. (Most secret, B.) This was written on the day before Mr. Dundas's order came, when the expedition was altered to Egypt.

which promises advantage to the general cause.”¹ The Secretary of State, Lord Hobart, in his letter to the Marquis dated 5th May, 1802, says,² “Upon the subject of your proposed attack upon the Mauritius,”—“No doubt can be entertained that his dissent to co-operate with your Lordship in that expedition, proceeded from a sense of duty. I am to express his Majesty’s entire approbation of the general principles laid down by you lordship in your letter of the 5th of February 1801, with respect to the conduct of the naval and military services.” This letter was received on 18th September, 1802, and conveyed the order for the return of the Indian army, from Egypt. In his letter to the admiral, dated 10th February, 1801,³ the Marquis wrote that it was possible that before the armament from India arrived in the Red Sea, the French may have been compelled to evacuate Egypt. In this case, or if it should be found impracticable for the troops from India to act with effect on the coasts of the Red Sea, it is my wish that the armament

¹ Mr. Dundas’s letter, signifying his Majesty’s pleasure as to sending troops from India to the Red Sea, arrived next day.

² Despatches, vol. ii. p. 701.

³ Despatches, vol. ii. p. 759.

should be employed as speedily as possible in the reduction of the Isles of France and Bourbon, or of Batavia, according as the condition of the armament at the period of leaving the Red Sea, shall appear to recommend in the judgment of the naval and military officers in the chief command of the forces.”¹

Sir Robert T. Wilson² gives the forces under Lieutenant-General Sir Ralph Abercrombie at fifteen thousand three hundred and thirty men. The troops landed on the 8th March, 1801. General Baird reached Bombay on the 31st March, 1801. Some ships sailed on the 3rd April.³ The Honourable Colonel Wellesley was to have sailed in the “Susannah”⁴ as second in command; but he was in a bad state of health, and his services were much required in Mysore. Sir R. Wilson says,⁵ General Baird’s object was to land at Suez. Unfortunately, the monsoon had commenced before he entered the Red Sea,

¹ The expedition against the French islands took place in 1810, and against Java in 1811.

² “History of the Expedition to Egypt,” (published 1808), p. 18.

³ “Life of General Baird,” vol. i. p. 239.

⁴ She was lost.

⁵ Vol. i. p. 262.

and it was found impossible to gain his destination; but, learning at Jedda the successes of the English on the 21st March, transmitted to him by Admiral Blankett, he determined to land at Cossir, and brave the difficulties of the desert. On the 8th of June, 1801, he arrived at Cossir. He found Colonel Murray, the adjutant-general, there, who had been sent on in advance. The vizier's firmans had procured him five thousand camels. He arrived at Kinnéh on the 30th of June, and immediately arranged the march of the remaining divisions, facilitating their passage by establishing posts at the different wells in the desert, and digging others. It was not till the latter end of July that his army had assembled, and even then several detachments were missing. The collected force, including the troops from the Cape,¹ amounted to five thousand two hundred and twenty-six rank and file:—

	MEN.
East India Company's artillery . .	448
" " Native troops . .	1,040
King's troops	2,838
	<hr/>
	5,226

¹ 61st, and detachments of 66th and 88th foot; the 19th foot did not go; these, and the troop, 8th light dragoons, came from the Cape (dismounted).

There were a detachment of the royal artillery, Bengal horse¹ and foot, and Madras and Bombay foot artillery; engineers, royal, Bengal, Madras and Bombay; Madras pioneers; his majesty's 8th light dragoons, 10th foot, 61st foot, 80th foot, 86th foot, 88th foot, Bengal volunteers, native infantry, 1st Bombay native infantry, 7th Bombay native infantry, including officers, sergeants, drummers, &c. Sir R. Wilson gives six thousand three hundred and ninety-three, and, including lascars (four hundred and forty), and public and private servants, a total of seven thousand five hundred and forty-six persons. General Baird reached the island of Rhoda, near Cairo, on the 27th August. Baird reached Rosetta on the 30th of August, 1801, and was pushing on to Alexandria, when he heard from General Hutchinson (then commander-in-chief), that the French general (Menou) had sent a flag of truce to treat for the surrender of Alexandria.

In the landing in Egypt, General Abercrombie lost six hundred and forty, killed and wounded. In all the operations, three thousand six hundred and ninety-five men, and eighty-nine horses, were

¹ First time used by the Indian army under Captain Clement Brown.

killed; wounded and missing.¹ On the 30th March, 1801, the army is stated² to be nineteen thousand four hundred and ten men; while Sir R. Wilson³ at the commencement states, that the "British army consisted of the following regiments, amounting to fifteen thousand three hundred and thirty men, including nine hundred and ninety-nine sick, and five hundred Maltese, and all kinds and descriptions of men attached to an army, except officers. Its effective force in the field could not be, therefore, at the highest computation, above twelve thousand; and, indeed, that number, within two hundred, was the return given in to the commander-in-chief." The above did not include General Baird's army. There is no explanation to show how the army, which was on the 8th of March, on landing, fifteen thousand three hundred and thirty men, should have amounted to nineteen thousand four hundred and ten men, after the losses in the various operations. The 89th foot descended the Nile with Baird's force.

¹ Wilson, vol. ii. pp. 145 and 3529, to the 21st March, 1801, inclusive.

² Wilson, vol. ii. p. 141.

³ Wilson, vol. i. p. 13.

On the 30th of August,¹ General Hope went into Alexandria to sign the capitulation. On the morning of the 2nd September, 1801, Lord Keith came to shore to ratify the terms, and a capitulation was concluded, which embraced every desirable object, without unnecessarily degrading the conquered. In the evening of the 1st September, General Baird and Colonel Auchmuty² arrived at General Hutchinson's tent, "His army had been encamped on the island of Rhoda until the 28th of August, when it re-embarked in *jerms*,³ and reached Rosetta on the 31st. The Indian army in very fine order, disembarked and encamped near Aboumandour. Whilst at Rhoda, this army had attracted much surprise and admiration. The Turks were astonished at the novel spectacle of men of colour being so well disciplined and trained; indeed, the general magnificence of the establishment of the Indian army was so different from what they had been accustomed to see in General Hutchinson's, that the contrast could not fail of being striking. But General Baird

¹ Wilson, vol. ii. p. 37.

² Afterwards Sir Samuel.

³ *Jerms*, decked boats, with two latteen sails, not drawing much water; well calculated for crossing the bar at Cairo.

proved to them also that his troops were not enfeebled, or himself rendered inactive by these superior comforts. Every morning at day-light he manœuvred his army for several hours, and in the evening again formed his parade. Never were finer men seen than those which composed this force, and no soldiers could possibly be in higher order."

General Baird had passed his army from Kinneh, by divisions in germs. Ten days were necessary to perform this voyage, the distance being near five hundred miles. Nothing particular had occurred during the passage. The inhabitants furnished, when required by catchief, or Arab officer, the different supplies very readily, for which, to their astonishment, they were immediately paid. "The heat in the boats has been very great, the thermometer being generally above a hundred degrees."

Alexandria¹ could not have long resisted the necessity of a capitulation; a fact known to General Hutchinson. The garrison was in great distress, and threatened by the near approach of famine.² Wilson says, "The walls of old Alex-

¹ "Annual Register," 1801, p. 238.

² Wilson, p. 37, says Menon invited General Hope to dinner; "The repast was only horse-flesh."

andria could not have resisted an hour's battering, and the breach once made, the Turks could have entered the ruins, in which they would have fought as well, if not better, than European regulars." He adds, "General Menon's force did not justify his longer resistance."¹ Of the whole number of French sent to Egypt in the course of three years, there returned twenty-three thousand.² Sir Ralph Abercrombie was killed in the action of the 21st March, 1801; Napoleon Buonaparte left Egypt and returned to France in October, 1799. His successor, Kleber, was assassinated at Cairo, in June, 1801.

The Indian expedition had to contend with many difficulties. "The navigation of the Red Sea was arduous,³ difficult, and dangerous, from rocks and shoals, and contrary winds, blowing sometimes directly from the quarter of their destination. Two of their transports were lost, and many others damaged." The Susannah transport was lost. It is said the Honourable Colonel Wellesley was to have sailed in that vessel, had he gone as second in command. It

¹ Wilson, p. 51.

² "Annual Register," p. 239. The French (p. 226) were said to be thirty thousand when we landed.

³ "Annual Register," 1801, p. 237.

was a fortunate thing for Great Britain, that he remained in India.

The Desert—"This long and toilsome march they could not have performed without the friendly aid of the Mamalukes and Arabs."

From the return of the garrison of Alexandria it appears there were :¹

Cavalry and infantry, including officers and non-commissioned officers	5,965
Artillery	750
Corps of dromedaries, Syrians, horse and foot guides, together	278
Marine artillery	290
Sappers and miners	139
Seamen (doing duty in garrison)	1,230
	<hr/>
	8,661
Artificers	122
Greeks	118
Invalids	240
Sick	1,387
	<hr/>
	10,528
Civil department	685
	<hr/>
Grand total	11,213

The arrival of Baird's army more than replaced the loss of the British army from the 8th March,

¹ Wilson, vol. ii. p. 53.

to the 25th August, 1801. Wilson¹ gives a return of nineteen thousand four hundred and ten of all ranks, on the 21st February, 1801, before the landing, and states the rank and file "present, fit for duty," at fourteen thousand eight hundred and ninety-five men, and adds, "but on the debarkation in Egypt, so many men were necessarily left on board ship to take care of the sick, stores, &c., that not twelve thousand fighting men rank and file landed." There is no doubt that the advance of Baird's army near Cairo in August, and the addition to the British force under General Hutchinson must have hastened the capitulation of Alexandria.

Wilson says,² "In a military point of view, Egypt is of vast importance. The Ottoman empire totters, and India must be terror-struck if France should be ever allowed the possession." He says that the destruction of Tippoo Sultan, and the occupation of the sea ports on that coast render a "maritime expedition from Egypt nearly impossible." "Few perhaps," he adds, "know that Paul I. drew from the archives this import-

¹ Wilson, vol. ii. p. 139. The killed and missing of all ranks were six hundred and thirty-two.

² Wilson, vol. ii. p. 89.

ant project,¹ and attempted, in concert with France, the realization; when fortunately for humanity and his country, death defeated his schemes of ambition and unnatural enmity." He says in a note, "One division was already on its march, which was to have been followed by another: when a corps of fifty thousand men would have assembled in the autumn of 1801, on the borders of the Caspian Sea."

In March or April, 1799, a detachment was sent to the island of Perrim, in the Red Sea, consisting of two companies of his Majesty's 84th regiment, and a company of Bombay Artillery, under Colonel Murray, 84th regiment. The object was to endeavour to prevent the French from invading India by that route. It was under the impression that cannon shot would reach across the straits—the narrowest part being three miles, the broadest several miles. The island had no water or vegetation of any kind; water and provisions were procured from the Abyssinian coast.

The island of Perrim, or Mapan, is midway between Aden and Mocha, in the Straits of Bab-

¹ Wilson, vol. ii. p. 93. That given to the Empress Catherine of Russia, in 1787.

el-Mandeb, and in the middle of the straits. The side towards the coast of Africa is about three miles; that towards Abyssinia, or the opposite coast, is twelve or sixteen miles, and there are eight little islands, called the eight brothers, or Sowamba, in the above distance, between the island and the Abyssinian shore. To prevent the French coming down the Red Sea in vessels from Suez, and passing through the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb, might have been effected, if batteries erected on the island could command the straits on both sides. The distance on the Abyssinian side was too great, and the eight little islands intervened. The island has a good harbour in the shape of a horse-shoe. After staying several months there, they sailed with Admiral Blankett; but not being able to beat up to Suez against the monsoon, they sailed to Aden, remained there some months, then left it and worked up to Suez, with a view of joining the Turkish army, but the treaty of El-Arish had been signed by Sir W. Sidney Smith. Lord Keith objected to the provision of the treaty by which the French were to be sent to France as prisoners of war; upon which Kleber declined

to have anything to do with the treaty.¹ Lord Nelson wrote,² "But I cannot bring myself to believe that they (French) would entirely quit Egypt; and, if they would, I never would consent to one of them returning to the continent of Europe, during the war."

Our possession of Aden, with a naval force there, would now command the Red Sea, and prevent any expedition coming down that sea from Suez. During the campaign on the Sutilej, (1845-46) a proposal was spoken of to obtain the pasha's consent for troops, without their arms, being allowed a passage through Egypt.

Egypt.—Its importance.—Napoleon³ said, that whatever European nation obtained possession of Egypt would conquer India. It was remarked by the author, that so long as Great Britain secured a superior navy in the Red Sea, no other power could invade India from Egypt, upon which a very high official observed to him, that the British navy in India was not of sufficient

An officer of the Bombay army, who accompanied Colonel Murray, as well as Sir D. Dundas's force to Egypt, gave this information.

² Despatches, vol. iv. p. 157.

³ Dr. O'Mera's "Voice from St. Helena."

strength. Marquis Wellesley¹ wrote on the 22nd of October, 1800, to Vice-admiral Rainier, the naval commander-in-chief, regarding the naval preparations for the expedition, "Your Excellency may be assured that I shall employ every possible effort to provide for the protection of the sand heads, and of the northern part of the bay of Bengal against the enemy's cruizers, and that I shall direct the government of Bombay to adopt similar measures for the defence of the trade on that side of India, with a view to enable your Excellency to concentrate your force with more facility, for the urgent and important purposes of offensive or defensive operations on an extended scale." The marquis obtained no assistance from the navy in the expedition to Egypt, the Bombay marine (now Indian navy) and armed vessels took that duty, and Indiamen armed *en flute* were appointed as cruizers in the bay of Bengal.

Provisions and tonnage for the expedition.—The marquis in writing to Lieutenant-general Sir R. Abercrombie² says, "And by commencing these arrangements at the opening of the season for salting provisions, I was enabled to command

¹ Despatches, vol. ii. p. 404.

² Despatches, vol. ii. p. 461.—28th February, 1801.

such a supply of the article of salt provisions, as if now ordered, would not be procurable before the month of December, 1801, or of January, 1802. A similar advantage enabled me to secure the necessary transport at the proper season; and for this purpose I was compelled to employ the whole available tonnage off the port of Calcutta." He next said, "the season for salting will not re-commence in any part of India until the month of November. I expect, however, that a considerable supply of this article may be procurable from the American and Danish ships, which frequent the ports of India, and which usually import salt provisions as an article of trade.¹

Addresses to the Arab chiefs.—The shereef of Meeea, the imaum of Senna, and the sultan of Aden² were addressed, calling upon them to aid the operations of the expedition. He said, "You have no other security for the preservation of your independence, and for the maintenance of your rights, than a determination to resist the force, and to frustrate the frauds of the French nation. You are called upon, therefore, by every motive of interest and of self-preservation, by

¹ Too uncertain a resource to rely upon.

² Despatches, vol. ii. p. 471.

every principle of national honour and religious attachment, to unite your efforts with the combined exertions of the British power, and of the Ottoman state, for the expulsion of the French from Egypt."

Amount of supplies sent;¹ provisions for three thousand five hundred Europeans, shipped from Bengal, Bombay, and Fort St. George.

	DAYS.
Salt provisions, 1 lb. each per day, for	372
Biscuit, 1 lb. " "	281
Rum, $\frac{1}{2}$ pint " "	294
Tea, 1 lb. for five men per week	440
Sugar, 1 lb. each per week	379
Rice, 1 lb. " "	379
Salt, 1 oz. each per day	200

Provisions for five thousand Natives.

Salt, 1 oz. per day	160
Sugar, 2 oz. " "	131
Mustard Seed, 1 oz. per day	196
Dholl, ² 6 oz. "	304
Ghee, 2 oz. "	189
Turmeric, $\frac{1}{2}$ oz. "	44
Garlic, $\frac{1}{2}$ oz. "	52
Chillies, $\frac{1}{2}$ oz. "	52
Boot gram, 6 oz. "	138

¹ Despatches, vol. v. p. 158.—Extract dated 23rd of February, 1801.

² Split peas.

					DAYS.
Tamarinds,	2 oz.	„	.	.	89
Churah, ¹	16 oz.	„	.	.	52
Oil,	1 oz.	„	.	.	44
Sweetmeats,	6 oz.	„	.	.	20
Parched gram,	4 oz.	„	.	.	18
Rice,	1½ lb.	„	.	.	236
Water for 8,500 men	126
Firewood,	„	.	.	.	314
Wheat, 1 lb. each per day, for 8,500 men	79
Vinegar, 1 quart to five men per week	250

Hospital Stores.

Maderia	.	.	.	45 pipes.
Port Wine	.	.	.	244 dozens.
Lime Juice	.	.	.	385 gallons.
Vinegar	.	.	.	1,175 „
Essence of Malt	.	.	.	3 casks.
Molasses	.	.	.	9 maunds, 30 seas. ²
Medicines and instruments	.	.	.	20 cases.

General Stores.

Wax Candles, maunds 183 (about)	15,000 lbs.
Cheese	5,636 „
Potatoes	177,828 „
Tobacco	141,217 „

Proposed to despatch in the next month.

Biscuit, for 2 months	3,000 maunds (240,000 lbs).
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¹ "Grain reduced to coarse particles, to be chucked into the mouth." This, and the sweetmeats and parched grain, were to be used when the sepoys could not cook.

² About 800 lbs.

Raisins, for 2 months	.	400 maunds (32,800 lbs).
Rum, 70 days	.	15,000 gallons.
Sugar, 200 "	.	1,500 maunds.
Ghee, 90 "	.	700 "
Turmeric, 60 "	.	187 "
Garlic, 60 "	.	187 "
Chillies, 60 "	.	187 "
Oil, 90 "	.	360 "
Boot gram	.	2,000 "
Rice	.	6,000 "

The troops returned to India from Egypt in July and August 1802. Medals were given to the troops. The European officers received gold medals. On the 15th November, 1801, the news arrived at Alexandria, that the preliminaries of peace had been signed.¹ Peace was signed on the 25th March, 1802. It had been supposed that a convention had been signed between France and Portugal, or to be in agitation. The marquis writes to the president of the committee of Canton² that, agreeably to orders from his majesty's ministers, Vice-Admiral Rainier "will certainly appoint a naval force for the purpose of protecting the settlement of Macao (Portuguese) from any attempt on the part of the government of France to gain possession of it."

¹ Wilson, vol. ii. p. 78.

² Despatches, vol. ii. p. 612.

It is probable, that the Mauritius and Bourbon would have been attacked on the return of the troops from Egypt; but the treaty had been signed on the 25th March, and the troops did not return to India till August.

Oude.—1801. On the 14th November, 1801, a treaty with the vizier of Oude¹ was ratified by the Marquis Wellesley, “by which the nawab ceded a country, producing 13,523,474 rupees of revenue, including expense of collection; and the authority of the British government over the remainder was provided for by the words, “And the honourable the East India Company hereby guarantee to his excellency the vizier, and to his heirs and successors, the possession of the territories which will remain to his excellency after his territorial cession, together with *the exercise of his and their authority* within the said dominions. His excellency engages that he will establish in his reserved dominions such a system of administration (to be carried into effect by his own officers), as shall be conducive to the prosperity of his subjects, and be calculated to secure the lives and property of the inhabitants. And his excellency will always advise with, and *act in*

¹ Mill, vol. vi. p. 245.

conformity to, the counsel of the officers of the said honourable Company." The Company's troops were not paid with regularity by the vizier, and were often in arrears. The marquis obtained a grant of territory in lieu of the nawab's paying the troops in the irregular manner noticed. A certain portion of the Company's troops stationed in the nawab's dominions received "double full batta;" this allowance was now discontinued. Sadat Khan, the founder of the family of Oude, is only noticed in 1720.¹

Resignation of the Marquis Wellesley.² On the 1st of January, 1802, the marquis conveyed to the court his wish to be relieved before the end of the current year. He assigned no other causes, "than the successful accomplishment of the most essential branches of his general plan for the security of India; the prosperity of the existing state of affairs, and his expectation of completing in the course of the year as great a proportion of improvement in the affairs of India, as he could hope to accomplish within any period

¹ Elphinstone's "History of India," vol. ii, p. 587. It was only after the battle of Panniput (7th January, 1761) that he rose to power.

² Mill, vol. vi. p. 354. Despatches, vol. ii. p. 616.

of time to which his government could be reasonably protracted." To Mr. Addington, the secretary of state,¹ his lordship is more explicit, wherein he imputes to the court of directors a want of confidence in him. It appears that in 1805, the draft of a despatch, censuring his lordship² for the policy pursued by the Bengal government in 1803 and 1804, was signed by twenty-three of the Court of Directors; which draft was cancelled by the Board of Control. The marquis was solicited to remain, and very fortunate it was for India.

The treaty of Amiens,³ signed 25th March, 1802, contained an article (article xix.) regarding Egypt. "The present definite treaty of peace is declared common to the sublime Ottoman Porte, the ally of his Britannic majesty; and the Sublime Porte shall be invited to transmit its act of accession as soon as possible." The Marquis Cornwallis was our ambassador in Paris. He was unwell, and unable to attend the signing on the

¹ Despatches, vol. iii. introduction p. iv., 10th January, 1802.

² E. I. Affairs, vol. 1882, Appendix, p. 138.

³ Annual Register, 1802, p. 608, including France, Spain, the Dutch, and Great Britain. (Signed), Buonaparte, Cornwallis, Azara, and Schimmelpenninck.

exact day, but wrote that he would sign next day, and to consider his signature as affixed. During the day he received a letter from his own minister, objecting to a certain part of one of the articles. He kept his promise, and signed the treaty. Napoleon formed a high opinion of the marquis from this strict adherence to his word; but said he should expect one of his ambassadors to act differently. *

CHAPTER IX.

THE MAHRATTAH WAR, 1803.

THE peishwa had declined in 1799 to join us against Tippoo. The marquis was convinced that the peishwa was perfectly favourable to the British interests, though he would not enter into our defensive policy.¹ At the end of the war in 1799, doubts of his faith were confirmed, “by a correspondence between Tippoo Sultan and his agents at Poona, and by letters from Nana Furnuwees,² and other Mahrattah chieftains, to Tippoo Sultan, which were discovered among the records of Seringapatam. The combined evidence of those documents, and of the peishwa’s conduct during the war, affords unequivocal proofs of the hostility of his disposition towards the British power, and justifies a conclusion, that, if fortune had appeared to favour the enemy, the peishwa would openly have espoused his cause.”

¹ Mill, vol. vi. p. 374.

² He died on the 13th March, 1800.—Duff, vol. iii. p. 187.

Holkar as connected with Poona.—Juswunt Rao Holkar succeeded Tukajee Holkar in 1797.¹ He collected an army on the Nerbuddah, and on the 14th of October, 1801, was defeated by Sindia. The governor-general now proposed "the system of general defensive alliance and guarantee." Holkar, early in 1802, recovered his loss of troops and artillery. He demanded the release of the infant Khundee Rao, the son of Mulhar Rao.² Juswunt Rao was the youngest son of Tukajee. Sindia had possession of the infant who was of right the heir. Sindia had destroyed Mulhar Rao. Etojee was murdered. Cashee Rao was declared to be imbecile. Dowlut Rao Sindia held despotic authority over the peishwa. Holkar would listen to no accommodation, till the infant was restored.³ He met Sindia's army at Poona on the 25th of October, 1802; Holkar obtained a decisive victory. In the disturbed state of

¹ Mill, vol. vi. p. 381.

² Tukajee's sons were, Cashee Rao, Mulhar Rao, Etojee (or Wittojee) Holkar, and Juswunt Rao Holkar. (*See* Duff, vol. iii. p. 148.) The two latter illegitimate.

³ The son of Mulhar Rao. Cashee Rao, being imbecile, Mulhar Rao (legitimate son) had the best claim on the death of his father. Sindia of course wished to gain by holding Khundee Rao in his hands.

affairs, the governor-general wished the restoration of the peishwa; he had consented to receive a "permanent force of the Company's infantry, to the extent of six battalions," with the usual artillery, and to assign twenty-five lakhs rupees (£250,000) of territory in Hindostan. Both Holkar and Sindia dreaded this plan, as it would place the head of the Mahrattah nation¹ in the hands of the English, and under their control. Alarmed, the peishwa fled.² Holkar, no doubt, wished to seize the peishwa's person, and exercise the same control as Sindia had done; Holkar's object seemed evident. "Disappointed in this prospect, Holkar turned his views to Aimrut Rao, the adopted son of the peishwa's father, the late Rugoba (Rugonath Rao);" the attempt to elevate the latter, in 1779, to the office of peishwa nearly caused the destruction of a portion of the Bombay army. He placed him on the musnud. Mr. H. H. Wilson says, "as regent for his son Vinayak Rao."

The governor-general resolved to restore Bajee Rao.³ He did not think that Sindia would op-

¹ The Raja of Sattara being in prison.

² Mill, vol. vi. p. 397.

³ Mill, vol. vi. p. 408.—10th February, 1802.

pose the measure singly, or united with Holkar; nor did he suspect the Berar raja's interference. Colonel Collins (resident) had reported that there was to be an interview between Sindia and the Berar raja;¹ and that Sindia had made peace with Holkar. Sindia told Colonel Collins, "after my interview with the raja (Berar), you shall be informed whether it will be peace or war." On the 4th of July, 1803, Colonel Collins² had an interview in the tent of the Berar raja with him and Sindia. Sindia declared "that the treaty of Bassein (31st of December, 1802), contained no stipulation injurious to the rights of any of the feudatory Mahrattah chieftains; but on the contrary, expressly provided for their security and independence." But what they objected to was not the terms, but the persons who made them and carried them out. The Berar raja and Sindia considered it a (Mahrattah) family measure, in which they ought to be consulted. This will the more strongly appear in the case of the raja of Berar who, in 1817 (in the succeeding war), received the same peishwa's commission as commander-in-chief!

¹ Mill, vol. vi. p. 422.

² Mill, vol. vi. p. 431.

On the 31st July, 1803, Colonel Collins had a last interview. These chieftains proposed "that the forces¹ of the raja, and of Sindia should, in conjunction retire to Boorhanpoor;² While the British general (Wellesley) should withdraw his troops to their usual stations. This was to withdraw our troops from the position they were in to aid the peishwa; and have these two chiefs in an attitude of defiance, and with the power of marching on and seizing Poona. The Berar raja had always maintained pretensions to the supreme ministerial authority in the Mahrattah empire, founded on his affinity to the reigning raja of Satara.³ It would, therefore, seem strange that the raja never thought of the restoration of the raja of Satara to power. We did release the raja in 1818, and gave him a little principality.

War was now declared.⁴ On the western side of India, exclusive of Guzerat, on the 4th June, 1803, the forces ready amounted to twenty-five thousand six hundred and fifty-three men; of

¹ Mill, vol. vi. p. 435.

² North-west side of the river Taptee. Lat. 21. deg. 20 min. north; long. 76 deg. 20 min. east.

³ Mill, vol. vi. p. 440.

⁴ The peishwa was restored by General Wellesley, on 7th May, 1803. (Mill, vol. vi. p. 419.)

these nine thousand nine hundred and twelve were under General Wellesley ; of the rest under Colonel Stevenson, eight thousand three hundred and eighty-nine, and Colonel Murray in Guzerat seven thousand three hundred and fifty-two.¹ Major-general Campbell had a reserve of four thousand and thirty-two men at Moodgul, fourteen marches from Hyderabad. There was a force on the Bengal side of one thousand three hundred men under Colonel Fenwick at Midnapoor not far from Calcutta ; of two thousand men under Major-general Deare, stationed at Mirzapoor, on the Ganges, as a protection to the province and city of Benares. A force of four thousand nine hundred and sixteen was assembled under Colonel Harcourt, of Madras and Bengal troops for the conquest of Cuttack, belonging to the raja of Berar. A force was assembled on the south bank of Soane under Lieutenant-colonel Broughton. A force of three thousand five hundred men under Lieutenant-colonel Powell, were collected near Allahabad, for the purpose of invading the province of Bundelcund : while the grand army under General Lake, commander-in-chief

¹ Thorn's "Memoir of the War from 1803 to 1806," pp 70 to 75.

in India, amounted to ten thousand five hundred men, these two forces acted under his excellency's orders. The total British force was about fifty thousand men. The Mahrattah forces were estimated¹ at two hundred and fifty thousand: and forty thousand men organized and drilled by French officers under M. Perron; and one thousand guns.

The Marquis was desirous of striking a blow before the cold season should allow the Mahrattahs to cross the Nerbuddah into Hindostan. On the 29th August, 1803, General Lake defeated Perron's troops under the walls of Allyghur²—stormed and carried the fort on the 4th September, fought the battle of Delhi on the 11th September,³ when he released the Emperor, Shah Allum, who had been imprisoned for many years by the Mahrattahs. His eyes had been put out by Ghoolam Khadir. General Lake took Agra on the 18th October, 1803. M. Perron allowed his second in command (M. Pedron) to make his military arrangements, while he himself returned with his body guard to Agra. The capture of Allyghur was effected by blowing

¹ Thorn, p. 315.

² Thorn, p. 91.

³ Thorn, p. 111.

open the gate. General Wellesley wrote,¹ "I think that General Lake's capture of Allyghur is one of the most extraordinary feats that I have heard of in this country. I never attacked a fort that I did not attempt the same thing, namely, to blow open the gates, but I have never succeeded; I have always taken them by escalade, which appears to have been impossible in this instance." Lake wrote,² on the 4th of September, 1803, to the Marquis, "I am convinced that after a regular siege, we must have had the same difficulties to encounter; the strength of the place cannot be described but by a drawing." A seventy-four might sail in the ditch. The engineer and Colonel Horsford (Artillery) both think that, after a breach had been made, we should have lost as many men as we now have, besides what would have fallen during a siege, which would have lasted nearly a month. All these points being considered, the delay that would have been caused in the execution of your orders, and the certainty of giving spirit to the Mahrattah chiefs, who would then have been inclined to flock to the Frenchman's standard, I feel happy at having

¹ Despatches, vol. ii. p. 414.—14th October.

² Marquis of Wellesley's Despatches, vol. iii. p. 293.

gained the fort, which stood out for more than an hour." The loss was two hundred and sixty-three of all ranks, killed and wounded. Lieut. Lucan, late lieutenant of his Majesty's service, 74th, who had lately quitted the service of Sindia, to whom this fort belonged, guided the party in. The assault of the storming party was covered by a "heavy fire from the two batteries already mentioned."¹ The storming party consisted of four companies of his Majesty's 76th regiment, and two battalions and four companies of native infantry—above two thousand men.

General Lake marched from Allyghur on the 7th September, 1803, and arrived within six miles of Delhi on the 11th of September.² The enemy's force was under M. Louis Bourquein, amounting to nineteen thousand men, of whom six thousand were cavalry. Lake's force amounted to about four thousand five hundred men. The enemy crossed the river to attack our troops, and advanced, leaving his entrenchments. The cavalry had advanced in the first instance, but

¹ Thorn, p. 96. During the night, two covering batteries of four eighteen-pounders each, were erected to protect the approach of the storming party.

² Thorn, p. 110.

as soon as the infantry came up the cavalry retired to the rear. The infantry charged and took the enemy's guns, sixty-eight in number. The enemy fled, and were pursued by our cavalry, and the galloper guns¹ destroyed many of the fugitives. The importance of this victory was very great. General Lake wrote² to the Marquis, "such a fire of cannon has seldom been seen, if ever, against which our army marched up within one hundred yards without taking a firelock from off their shoulders, when they gave one volley, charged instantly and drove the enemy; they then opened ranks and let the cavalry through, who did their duty in the most gallant and judicious manner possible." "There ought always to be one European battalion to four native ones,³ this at least I think necessary. I have seen a great deal of these people lately, and am quite convinced that without king's troops very little is to be expected; in short, the infantry of this army, as well as cavalry,

¹ In December, 1802, the galloper-guns of the cavalry were first introduced, and afterwards six guns were brigaded under a subaltern in action.

² Despatches, vol. iii. p. 310.—12th September, 1803.

³ The 76th foot was the only European regiment at Allyghur, Delhi, or at Laswaree.

should be remodelled." Our loss was four hundred and seventy-eight of all ranks killed and wounded. There was great importance in this victory, as by it the Emperor Shah Allum, was restored to his throne. He had been in the hands of the Mahrattahs since 1771, ever since he left the protection of the English at Allahabad. Sindia governed all his actions, so that the Emperor was only nominally sovereign of Hindostan. The Emperor sent his son, Prince Mirza Akbar Shah, to introduce General Lake into his presence,¹ which took place on the 16th of September, 1803.

Having settled affairs at Delhi,² General Lake marched from Delhi towards Agra on the 24th September, 1803. Lieutenant-Colonel Ochterlony, deputy adjutant-general of the Bengal army, was appointed Resident at Delhi, where a garrison was left of one battalion and four companies of a corps of Mewathies,³ raised under the command of British officers who had been in Sindia's service; but which service, on the commencement of hostilities with that chieftain, they had quitted, to join the army under General Lake. A proela-

¹ Thorn, p. 124.

² Thorn, p. 175.

³ People from the country between Delhi and Laswaree.

mation had about this time been published, calling upon all British officers to leave the service of Sindia, and the native powers at war with the British, offering a pension to them, and also a pension to foreign officers in the same service. It is believed that almost all came over. On the 2nd October, the army reached Muttra, where it found a detachment under Colonel Vandeleur. Here, Colonel Dudunaigue and Messrs. Smith and Lapenet, who had been detached with some regular battalions by Sindia, in the month of July, from the Deccan, to reinforce General Perron in Hindostan, surrendered themselves prisoners of war to Colonel Vandeleur. The army arrived at Agra on 8th October, and on the 9th October General Lake concluded a treaty, offensive and defensive, with the raja of Bheutpoor, who was the first chief who solicited our protection.¹ The raja sent five thousand cavalry to co-operate with our army before Agra.

General Lake summoned the fort of Agra; no answer was returned. The garrison was so jealous of their European officers, that they placed them in confinement. Seven battalions of the enemy, with a number of guns, were encamped on the

¹ Thorn, p. 181.

glacis, and occupied the town. The battalions were attacked, and twenty-six guns taken, and also the troops in the town, where we seized and held a mosque near the end of the town, towards the Tripolia, opposite the grand gateway. Our loss was two hundred and twenty-eight, killed and wounded. Two days after, the remainder of the enemy's battalions on the outside of the fort agreed to surrender; and on the 13th October, two thousand five hundred men marched into the British camp. The operations of the siege were commenced. Colonels Hessing and Sutherland had signed a paper, signed by fifteen native officers, or sirdars, which the latter officer brought to General Lake on the 12th, offering to surrender. Captain Salkeld¹ returned to the fort with Colonel Sutherland, when he found a difference of opinion among the chiefs. On the 17th October, our batteries opened on the fort. The enemy capitulated on the morning of the 18th. Thus we obtained possession of this celebrated fort with very little loss. The fort is not considered very strong, as the walls are very high; the ditch is deep and wide. It answers well for

¹ Deputy quarter-master-general, and guide, and intelligence department.

the deposit of arms and military stores. The garrison, five thousand or six thousand men, marched out, and our troops occupied the fort. Twenty tumbrils of treasure, to the amount of twenty-two lakhs rupees (about £220,000) were found in the fort, with guns, ammunition, and stores in abundance. M. Perron claimed this treasure as personal property. The governor-general declined giving any answer till he received an explanation from General Lake. Colonel Hessing, the late governor, admitted that the treasure was public property. The prize property was divided before the governor-general's order was received. General Lake marched from Agra on the 27th October.¹ The governor-general's private letter, sent express at half-past seven, P.M. on the 29th October, 1803,² states, "I am particularly anxious to send you an order for the distribution of prizes; I hope to be able to furnish it to-morrow." An officer of the author's own regiment, who served with the army, received his share before the army left Agra.

Sindia³ had sent fifteen battalions of sepoys, formed by General Perron from the Deccan,

¹ Thorn, p. 211.

² Despatches, vol. iii. p. 420.

³ Despatches, vol. iii. p. 210.

under Monsieur Dudunaigue. He and some other officers and troops had surrendered at Muttra to Colonel Vandeleur. It was expected that this force, with that which was at Delhi, would have been sufficient to check the progress of the English, and to maintain possession of Delhi and Agra. The battle of Delhi had thwarted these views; and during the siege of Agra, the force sent by Sindia, though augmented by the two battalions which escaped from Delhi, made no attempt to prevent the fall of that important fortress, but took up a strong position in the rear of our army. The enemy's object was to wait for a favourable opportunity to re-take Delhi, as essential to the restoration of the Mahrattah power over the imperial dominions. General Lake's object was to destroy this force. Had the army taken the field in the middle of *October*, as is the most usual practice, instead of on the 29th of *August*, 1803, Allyghur would have had a stronger force to defend it, and the battle of Delhi would have been more obstinately contested, and Delhi might have been fortified. General Lake marched from Agra on the 27th of *October*, 1803. The army halted next day at Karowleyby owing to a tremendous storm of rain.

On the 29th it marched to the N. W. of Futtypore Sikree; in the afternoon a heavy cannonade was heard, occasioned by the bombardment of Cutumbo, which was destroyed by the enemy. This indicated the vicinity of the enemy. The next day (30th) the army effected a forced march of twenty miles, leaving the heavy guns and baggage at Futtypore, with two battalions of sepoys: On the 31st October, the army encamped¹ near Cutumbo. General Lake now resolved to push on with the cavalry, with whom he might keep the enemy employed, and endeavour to seize their guns and baggage, till the infantry came up. They were ordered to march on the 1st November at three, A.M. The cavalry marched at eleven o'clock at night (31st of October); and after a march of twenty-five miles in little more than six hours, came up with the enemy at sunrise on the 1st of November. Their infantry consisted of the regular seventeen battalions before-mentioned (nine thousand men), and seventy-two guns, and from four thousand to five thousand cavalry. On General Lake's approach it "appeared that the enemy were upon the retreat, and that in such confusion as to induce

¹ Despatches, vol. iii. p. 212.

the British general to make an instant attack upon them, without waiting for the infantry." A well-known general officer who was with the Bengal cavalry, states that, part of the enemy's guns were chained, and another portion had moved through a pass in a low range of hills (Mewattce.) General Lake charged the guns which were chained, and failed in keeping all of the four guns he had taken, and took up a position to await the arrival of the infantry. The enemy then brought back the guns which had gone through the pass.— Thus the seventy-two guns were brought together.

The Duke of Wellington, it is stated, said that an enemy's guns should be attacked when in motion; on the march. Had Lake known that the guns were chained, he would most probably not have charged them; but have taken up a position to hold the enemy in check till the infantry arrived. In the Peninsular War the British cavalry, under Lord Combermere, was often employed to watch the movements of the French army; the enemy opened a fire upon the cavalry, and Lord Combermere said he avoided suffering loss in killed and wounded, by moving backwards and forwards in open column of troops or squadrons, by which plan the enemy's shot pas-

sed between the troops, and did little damage. At Laswaree the cavalry, according to Thorn, "Having penetrated through the enemy's line, they immediately formed again and charged backwards and forwards three times, with surprising order and effect, amidst the continued roar of cannon, and an incessant shower of grape and chain-shot," and, "though all the guns (immediately opposed to our troops,) were virtually taken and in our possession, yet for the want of draught bullocks and infantry to secure what we had so dearly earned, only two out of the number taken could be brought away."

The infantry came up about noon. At this period a message was sent by the enemy to the commander-in-chief, offering to surrender all their guns upon certain conditions; to which a favourable answer was returned. After the lapse of an hour, preparations having been made, and the guns not being delivered up, General Lake formed his infantry into two columns of attack. The enemy's infantry had originally (31st of October) been in one line. They had formed two lines, and disposed all the guns in double lines in front of the front line; the rear guns being in rear of the intervals of the front line of guns. The for-

tified village of Mohaulpoor¹ was between the enemy's two lines of infantry. The front line in front, and the rear line in rear of the village. Our cavalry were employed, partly to support the infantry, and some to watch the enemy's cavalry in the rear, and in attacking the enemy's left flank. The galloper guns were placed in batteries to support the infantry. General Lake with the right column attacked the guns of the right wing of the enemy. Thorn says, "The effect of this fire, which was terrible in the extreme, was felt with peculiar severity by the 76th regiment, which fine body, by heading the attack, as usual, became the direct object of destruction. So great indeed was the loss of this corps, and such was the furious fire of the enemy, that the commander-in-chief deemed it more advisable to hasten the attack with that regiment, and those of the native infantry, consisting of the second battalion twelfth and sixth companies of the second battalion sixteenth, which had closed to the front, than to wait till the remainder of

¹ The village of Laswarce was near the bank of a rivulet, which covered the right flanks of the enemy's lines of infantry.

the column should be formed, whose advance had been much delayed by unavoidable impediments." The left wing was very little engaged. The guns were at last captured.

The loss in killed and wounded amounted to eight hundred and twenty-four. Of these the cavalry lost two hundred and fifty-eight, his Majesty's 76th regiment, two hundred and thirteen; the 2nd battalion, 12th and the companies 16th Native Infantry,¹ lost one hundred and eighty-eight; leaving the remainder, sixty-five, to be divided among all the other corps—and five hundred and fifty-three horses killed, wounded and missing. The guns captured were seventy-one in number. Lake's secret letter better explains the nature of the battle than the official despatch to the Marquis Wellesley.² On the 2nd November, "These battalions (Sindia's) are most uncommonly well appointed, have a most numerous artillery, as well served as they can possibly be, the gunners standing to their guns until killed by the bayonet; all the sepoys

¹ The 16th were removed to the brigade in which his Majesty's 76th were, owing to gallant conduct in the attack on the town of Agra in October 1803.

² Despatches, vol. iii. p. 445. (The author's *italics*.)

of the enemy behaved exceedingly well, and *if they had been commanded by French officers,¹ the event would have been, I fear, extremely doubtful. I never was in so severe a business in my life, or anything like it, and pray to God I never may be in such a situation again.* Their army is better appointed than ours, no expense is spared whatever, they have three times the number of men to a gun as we have, their bullocks, of which they have many more than we have, are of a very superior sort; all their men's knapsacks and baggage are carried upon camels, by which means they can march double the distance. We have taken all their bazar, baggage, and everything belonging to them; an amazing number were killed—indeed the victory has been decisive. The action of yesterday has convinced me how impossible it is to do anything without British troops, and of them there ought to be a very great proportion.” “Had we been beaten by these brigades, the consequences attending such a defeat must have been most fatal. *These fellows fought like devils, or rather heroes,* and had we not made a disposition for attack in a style that we should have done against the most

¹ The proclamation brought them over.

formidable army we could have been opposed to, I verily believe, from the position they had taken, *we must have failed.*" These seventeen battalions constituted the flower of Sindia's establishment,¹—they were called the "*Deccan invincibles.*"

In the battle of Delhi there were nineteen thousand men, thirteen thousand infantry, and six thousand cavalry, and sixty-eight guns. In the battle of Laswaree—nine thousand infantry and four thousand to five thousand cavalry, and seventy-one guns. The British were about four thousand five hundred men at Delhi. At Laswaree there were two regiments of dragoons, and three more of native cavalry, added to the army, which was about seven thousand men. At Delhi we lost four hundred and seventy-eight—at Laswaree, eight hundred and twenty-four men killed and wounded. If we look at the battle of Delhi, we find the British one to about four of the enemy. At Laswaree as seven to about fourteen. The loss against less numbers is nearly double. The position at Laswaree, and the attack by cavalry, and then by both on the same day, and the nature of the position account

¹ Thorn, p. 223.

in some degree for the greater loss. Still there is no doubt that the Laswaree troops were better; it was a touch-and-go affair; Delhi never was. The troops in crossing the rivulet had swampy ground to pass over, inundated by the enemy cutting a *bund* in the hills.

The operations under the Honourable Major-General Wellesley. Battle of Assaye, 23rd Sept. 1803.—Thorn¹ states the British force to have been one thousand two hundred cavalry, European and native; one thousand three hundred infantry and artillery, with two thousand sepoy; in all about four thousand five hundred men. The Maharattah (Peshwah) and Mysore cavalry, with the general's force, were about three thousand men. The British found the enemy across the river Kaitna, and the Mahrattah and Mysore cavalry were posted beyond the river to keep the enemy's horse in check. Thorn gives the enemy's force at sixteen regular battalions of infantry (Pohlman's brigade) or six thousand men; that of Duponts at two thousand five hundred, and four battalions of the Begum sunroo, at two thousand more; the whole making ten thousand five hundred men, dis-

¹ Thorn, p. 274.

ciplined troops, commanded by European officers, exclusive of artillery, the Raja of Berar's infantry, and the irregular infantry of Sindia. A well appointed artillery, exceeding one hundred guns, and several large bodies of horse, said to be thirty thousand or more. It was originally intended that Colonel Stevenson's division should have joined, but circumstances prevented the junction. They had met on the 21st and had concerted a joint attack, to be made on the twenty-fourth September.

General Wellesley considered his force equal to the task, so leaving some troops with his baggage at Naulniah (where he had intended to encamp), he marched to attack the enemy. They were originally drawn up in a peninsula, formed by the rivers Kaitna and Jootee, in a line facing the Kaitna, and about half a mile distant from it; the cavalry on the right in the neighbourhood of Bokerdun, reaching to their line of infantry, which, with the guns, was posted near the fortified village of Assaye. Their cavalry were on the right, and the infantry and guns were on the left. The village of Assaye was in rear of the enemy's left, and the distance between the rivers was about a mile and a-quarter. The

enemy, expecting their left flank to be turned, formed their right wing of infantry, with its right resting on the Kaitna, and the left on the village of Assaye; their left wing being formed to the rear, at a right angle with the left of the front line, *en potence*, and with their rear to the Jooee, the left flank resting on Assaye; there being nine battalions in the front, and seven in the second line. About a mile and a-half in front of the enemy's new line, was the junction of the two rivers, so that when General Wellesley formed his army in front of the enemy's front line, the battle field was in the form of a triangle, the enemy forming the base of it. General Wellesley occupied the centre of the space, by which means his flanks and rear were covered, the junction of the rivers being in rear of his centre. The enemy had more than half their guns in the front line, the rest in the other line, (*en potence*.) The General drew up his infantry in two lines, and the cavalry in his rear.

General Wellesley wrote on the 24th Sept. to the Governor-general,¹ that he had heard on the 23rd, that the enemy's cavalry had moved off that morning, and that their infantry and

¹ Despatches, vol. ii. p. 323.

guns were about to follow. He had marched on the 22nd by the eastern route round the hills between Budnapoor and Jaulna. Colonel Stevenson by the western route. General Wellesley conceiving that by waiting for Colonel Stevenson the enemy might escape, resolved to attack them. The enemy might get their guns down the Ghaut Pass, and escape. Mr. H. H. Wilson,¹ says that Ameer Khan relates that when Sindia and the Berar Raja heard that the peishwa had come to terms with the English, they sent a confidential messenger to Holkar. "Holkar consulted Ameer Khan on the subject, by whose advice certain conditions were proposed to the allied chiefs, to which they acceded; and in consequence, Ameer Khan, with a select body of Holkar's troops, *was on his march to join the confederates, when the news of the battle of Assaye arrested his progress, and he returned to Holkar.* This demonstration of which there can be no doubt, as it is related by Ameer Khan himself, does not seem to have been known to the English

¹ Mill, vol. vi. p. 509. (The author's *italics*.) "Memoir of Ameer Khan, from his own Dictation; translated from the Persian by H. T. Prinsep, Esq. Calcutta, 1832." (The author's *italics*.)

authorities." It is not stated where Ameer Khan's force was when he heard of the battle, but it is probable the enemy knew of the chance of being joined by the Ameer. Colonel, (now Lieutenant-General) Welsh, in his *Military Reminiscences*¹ writes, "Some of the prisoners said it was generally understood, that when Colonel Stevenson and our force had united, we intended to offer them battle; but that when they first discovered only one body advancing, they thought them actually mad, as it was their own intention to have attacked our little camp the same day." Alison says,² in allusion to Generals Wellesley and Stevenson's divisions, "In moving forwards thus parallel to each other, the two corps were not more than twelve miles asunder, but the intervening hills rendered any mutual support impossible." Colonel Stevenson had been written to, and did not arrive till the next morning at Bokerdun, with part of his force, eight miles from the field of action. General Wellesley states the separation of the two corps to have been necessary, as both could not pass through the same defiles in one day; and

¹ "Of Thirty Years," vol. i. p. 174.

² "Modern History of Europe," vol. vii. p. 164.

that if one of the roads through the hills were left open, the enemy might have passed to the southward, while we were going to the northward. General Wellesley considered that if he marched back to Naulniah, (five or six miles from the enemy's position) he would be attacked on his march; and the enemy were very powerful in cavalry.

General Wellesley after a cannonade for some time advanced and carried the enemy's guns in their front line,¹ when, forming afresh, they proceeded to attack a second line, where the rest of the enemy's infantry and cavalry with half of their artillery were posted, and well drawn up with the river Joore in their rear. "At this moment a body of the enemy's cavalry charged in our rear, and with their own gunners and other rallied fugitives, took possession not only of their own guns which we had captured, but also of those of the British; killing our artillerymen, and turning the guns on our line."² They were enabled thus to succeed at this moment, because our cavalry had

¹ "Colonel Welsh's Reminiscences," vol. i. p. 171." The colonel's corps had left the general's camp on the 11th of September, and was not far off.

² The men of the enemy's captured guns lay down as if dead; but, now, got up.

just then charged a large body of the enemy in front, who had, with the assistance of a very heavy and destructive fire from their guns, not only galled, but nearly annihilated the gallant 74th, and picquets on our extreme right. This last line, although it stood well, was at length broken, and the guns captured; while our cavalry pursuing the fugitives, fell in with an immense column, who, though retreating, opposed them, and killed Colonel Maxwell, the brigadier; nor were they completely routed without a severe struggle, and heavy loss on our side. The second line being put *hors de combat*, the general, who was everywhere, placed himself at the head of the 78th regiment, faced about and charged the enemy, who were in possession of the first line of guns, and routed them with great slaughter. Here ended the conflict; those who had captured our guns making off as soon as they saw their danger; though about half-past five a body of ten thousand cavalry came in sight, and made some demonstrations, but dared not charge; and at eight o'clock in the evening they entirely disappeared."

Writing to Major Malcolm¹ on the 28th. of

¹ Despatches, vol. ii. p. 354.

September, 1803, General Wellesley says, " Their infantry is the best I have ever seen in India, excepting our own, and they and their equipments far surpass Tippoo's. I assure you that their fire was so heavy, that I much doubted at one time, whether I should be able to prevail upon our troops to advance; and all agree that the battle was the fiercest that has ever been seen in India. Our troops behaved admirably: the sepoy's astonished me. These circumstances and the vast loss which I sustained, make it clear that we ought not to attack them again, unless we have something nearer in equality of numbers." Colonel Welsh¹ says, " a number of orderly books, kept by the European officers, were taken among the spoils, by which it appeared, that they had ten thousand eight hundred regular infantry, and thirty thousand cavalry in the action." This gives a force of forty thousand eight hundred men; " Whilst our small body consisted of two European regiments—the 74th and 78th (nine hundred men) and four native battalions,—the first of the 4th; first of the 8th; first of the 10th; and second of the 12th; amounting to two thousand four hundred infantry; the

¹ " Welsh's Reminiscences," vol. i. p. 174.

19th dragoons, three hundred,¹ and the 4th, 5th, and 7th native cavalry, three hundred each, making twelve hundred, being a total of four thousand five hundred. There were originally two thousand four hundred Mysore cavalry, and about three thousand Mahrattah horse but both, probably, three thousand five hundred present, making a total of eight thousand men in the action.² But these three thousand five hundred horse were posted beyond the river Kaitna, and were not employed during the action, except to watch the enemy's horse. The number of guns taken was³ one hundred and twenty, several of them left at different places during the flight of the enemy."

General Wellesley had six hundred and twenty-six killed and fifteen hundred and eighty officers and men wounded; total two thousand two hundred and six men, and three hundred and twenty-five horses. He gives the enemy's loss⁴ at twelve hundred killed on the field of battle, and "I sup-

¹ Duff, vol. iii. p. 241, says, "three hundred and sixty swords." He makes the enemy's force fifty thousand men.

² "Alison's Modern Empire," vol. vii. p. 164, gives eight thousand men.

³ Despatches, vol. ii. p. 356.

⁴ Despatches, vol. ii. p. 372.

pose about four times that number wounded." He imputed his own great loss to a mistake committed by the picquets. "The enemy's cannonade was terrible,¹ but the result shows what a small number of British troops can do. The best of it is, that if it had not been for a mistake of the picquets, by which the 74th were led into a scrape, we should have gained the victory with half the loss; and I should not have introduced the cavalry into the action at all, till all the infantry had been broken; and the cavalry would not have been exposed to the cannonade, but would have been fresh for a pursuit. In this manner also we should have destroyed many more of the enemy than we did."

This victory, besides destroying Sindia's artillery, and the best part of his army, enabled Colonel Stevenson to take Boorhanpoor and Asseerghur, on the 16th and 21st of October, 1803, in less than a month after the battle, while General Wellesley's force was free to act in any other direction.

The battle of Argaum, 28th November, 1803. The British troops under General Wellesley,²

¹ Despatches, vol. ii. p. 412.

² Thorn, p. 300.

came up with a large body of Sindia's and the Berar cavalry, accompanied by the greater part of Ragojee Bhooslah's regular infantry, and a large portion of artillery, and as Sindia had not fulfilled the conditions of the truce which he had himself sought, the general resolved, notwithstanding the remonstrances and protestations of the ambassador still in his camp, to attack the enemy with all possible vigour. He immediately, therefore, moved forward to Parterly, where he was joined by Colonel Stevenson. The troops had marched a great distance.

General Wellesley¹ perceived a long line of the enemy's infantry, cavalry and artillery, regularly drawn up on the plains of Argaum, immediately in front of that village, and about six miles from Parterly, where he intended to encamp. He marched on in one column, the British cavalry leading, covering the rear and left by the Moghul and Mysore cavalry. The enemy's infantry and guns were in the left of their centre, with a body of cavalry on the left. Sindia's army, consisting of one very heavy body of cavalry, was on the right, having upon its right a body of Pindarries

¹ Despatches, vol. i. p. 529. Letter, 30th November, 1803, to the governor-general.

and other light troops. Their line extended above five miles, having in their rear the village and extensive gardens and enclosures of Argaum, and in their front a plain much cut by water courses. He writes, "I formed the army in two lines; the infantry in the first, the cavalry in the second and supporting the right, and the Moghul and Mysore cavalry the left, nearly parallel to that of the enemy; with the right rather advanced in order to press upon the enemy's left." Some confusion took place in forming the troops. "When formed, the whole advanced in the greatest order; the 74th and 78th regiments were attacked by a large body, (supposed to be Persians,) and all these were destroyed. Sindia's cavalry charged the first battalion 6th regiment, which was on the left of our line, and were repulsed; and their whole line retired in disorder before our troops, leaving in our hands thirty-eight pieces of cannon and all their ammunition. The British cavalry then pursued them for several miles, destroyed great numbers, and took many elephants and camels, and much baggage. The Moghul and Mysore cavalry also pursued the fugitives, and did them great mischief. Unfortunately sufficient daylight did not remain to do all that I could have

wished; but the cavalry continued their pursuit by moonlight, and all the troops were under arms till a late hour in the night." The British loss was three hundred and forty-six officers and men, killed and wounded, and forty-four horses.

In a letter to Major Shaw, military secretary to the Governor-General,¹ General Wellesley writes—"If we had had daylight an hour more not a man would have escaped. We should have had that time if my native infantry had not been panic-struck and got into confusion when the cannonade commenced. What do you think of nearly three entire battalions, who behaved so admirably in the battle of Assaye, being broke, and running off when the cannonade commenced at Argaum, which was not to be compared to that at Assaye? Luckily, I happened to be at no great distance from them, and I was able to rally them and re-establish the battle. If I had not been there I am convinced we should have lost the day. But as it was, so much time elapsed before I could form them again, that we had not daylight enough for everything that we should certainly have performed. The troops

¹ Despatches, vol. i. p. 538. 2nd December, 1803.

were under arms, and I was on horseback, from six in the morning until twelve at night.”

The fort of Gawilghur, belonging to the Raja of Berar,¹ was taken on the 14th of December, 1803, which led to a peace with the Berar Raja on the 17th of December, 1803; called the treaty of Deogaum;² and on the 30th of December, 1803, a treaty of peace, called the the treaty of Surjee Anjengaum, was signed with Sindia.

The Gwalior affair and Sindia. Thorn³ states that “Ambajee, in the month of October (1803), made an offer to renounce his dependence upon Sindia, and to become tributary to the English on certain conditions.” A treaty was concluded with that chief on the 16th of December, 1803, by which “all the lands in the possession of Ambajee, situate to the north of Gwalior, and including that fortress, were ceded to the British Government, which, on its side, secured to him the independent sovereignty of the remaining territory that had been under his dominion,” except the hereditary estates of the Rana of Gohud,

¹ Despatches, vol. ii. p. 583.

² Despatches, vol. ii. p. 588.

³ Despatches, vol. ii. p. 245.

“ who had obtained a guarantee of the same for himself and family in a treaty of a prior date.” The British Government, on the principles of good faith and sound policy, could not comply with this demand of Ambajee:” he received the pledge of an ample indemnification for the loss in some other part of Bundelcund.” The Commander-in-Chief detached Lieut.-Colonel White, on the 21st of December, 1803, to take possession of Gwalior. There was treachery on the part of Ambajee, and the Commandant would not deliver up the fortress. A battering train was sent, and the place was surrendered on the 5th of February, 1804. After the dismemberment of the Moghul empire, Gwalior¹ came into the possession of the Rana of Gohud, from whom it was taken by the Mahrattahs. In 1780 the English took it from the Mahrattahs, and gave it up to the Rana of Gohud. Mahadajee-Sindhia, after a siege of many months, obtained possession of the fortress by bribing the garrison. A treaty was made between us and Sindia (Dowlut Rao, the nephew) on the 30th December, 1803. Sindia demanded the fortress. General Welles-

¹ “ Hamilton's Gazetteer, and authorities.”

ley writes,¹ on 17th March, 1804, to Major Malcolm, "Till I received the Governor-general's despatch regarding the peace, I thought that the state of the Rana of Gohud *existed*, but that despatch for the first time informed me that it was a state to be *restored*, and not one to be supported in independence, for which I was to provide." He then says, "Ambajee held the fort as a servant of Sindia. The fort was Sindia's, and Ambajee his amildar." On the 22nd May, 1804, General Wellesley wrote a third time to Major Malcolm,² "I am convinced I should not have made the peace, if I had insisted upon Gwalior."

When Lord Lake had followed³ Holkar, in 1805, into the Punjab, the gooroo mata (national council) held at Amrutsir agreed to withhold all aid from Holkar. Sindia's vakeel accompanied Lake's army, and a treaty of alliance (generally confirming the treaty of Surjee Anjengaum, except the refusal to acknowledge the *right* of Sindia to any claims upon Gwalior and Gohud, under the preceding treaty) was made, by which

¹ Despatches, vol. iii. p. 167. (The author's *italics*.)

² Despatches, vol. iii. p. 298.

³ Thorn, p. 491. (The author's *italics*.)

it was agreed to cede to him the former (Gwalior) from *friendly considerations*. The ratification reached camp on the 25th December, 1805, at Amrutsir. The Marquis Wellesley took an erroneous view of the Gwalior case, and General Wellesley proved his judgment to be correct. The acting Governor-general was now Sir George Barlow: Marquis Cornwallis had died on the 5th October, 1805.

Review of the war.¹ General Wellesley on the 12th August, 1803, took Ahmednaggur. On the 29th August General Lake defeated Perron's troop at Coel; on the same day Baroach in Guzerat, was taken by storm. Lake took the fort of Allyghur on the 4th September, on the 11th gained the battle of Delhi. On the 23rd Sept. Wellesley gained the battle of Assaye. On the 18th October, Lake took possession of the fortress of Agra. On the 1st November he gained the battle of Laswaree. On the 28th November, Wellesley gained the battle of Argaum. In October, Colonel Stevenson had taken Boorhanpoor and Asseerghur. Colonel Woodington had reduced Champaneer and Powan-ghur. Colonel Harcourt had been successful in

¹ Thorn, p. 312.

Cuttack; and Colonel Powell had attained advantages in Bundelcund. Both Sindia and the Berar Raja,¹ had pledged themselves to "retain no Frenchmen," in their service, or "the subjects of powers in a state of hostility to Great Britain; nor any of our own, without permission." The Marquis Wellesley had by his proclamation of August, 1803, brought over most of the foreign officers, as well as all our own. In the four great battles we had taken above three hundred guns, and in the fortresses a great many guns, and great quantities of military stores.

Holkar in 1804. Holkar had sent troops under Ameer Khan to join the confederates, as before stated, at the battle of Assaye. Mr. H. H. Wilson says,² "Again, after the battle of Laswaree, whilst yet Holkar was looked upon as neutral, he wrote to Ameer Khan, with many adjurations that he had made up his mind to enter the field against General Lake, and he therefore commanded the Ameer to join him as soon as possible." Thorn says,³ Holkar wrote

¹ Thorn, p. 317.

² Mill, vol. vi. p. 569.—*Note 1.* Memoirs of Ameer Khan.

³ Thorn, p. 325.

some letters to General Lake in a friendly style. On the 25th October, 1802, with twenty-eight battalions, (fourteen commanded by European officers) twenty-five thousand cavalry, and one hundred guns, Holkar had defeated Sindia at Poona. This chief, had he joined the confederates, might have turned the scale against us. Holkar had lately ravaged Kota, and next threatened Jypoor. Lake moved after him on the 27th December, 1803. In February, 1804, he carried on a treacherous correspondence with two Rohilla chiefs, and several Sikhs. Holkar proposed to these chiefs to send ten thousand horse, to be joined by six thousand of their horse. In March, 1804,¹ Holkar sent two vakeels with letters, demanding some districts in the Dooab, and in Bundelcund, and to collect the chout (or one fourth) of the landed revenue, according to the custom of his ancestors.

Meerbhan,² then in Holkar's service, came with a large body of horse to the frontiers of Bundelcund. Troops were detached against him. Meerbhan fell back to Seronge (in Malwa.) Holkar had, in February, 1804, written to

¹ Thorn, p. 332.

² Thorn, p. 335.

General Wellesley¹ demanding cessions in the Deccan. Holkar next sent an agent to Sindia for "his assistance in an immediate attack upon the British possessions," and commenced plundering the territories of the Raja of Jypoor. General Lake marched against Holkar. General Wellesley sent orders to Colonel Murray, commanding in Guzerat, to enter the province of Malwa, and attack Holkar at Indoor, and part of the Colonel's troops were to act in his country in the Deccan. General Lake detached two battalions of sepoy under the Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel Monson, on the 18th April, for Jypoor, about one hundred and forty miles west of Agra. Lieutenant-Colonel Don took Tonk Rampoor (sixty miles from Jypoor) on the 15th May, 1804. Holkar had lost his possessions in Hindostan north of the Chumbal. He was pressed by Colonel Monson's detachment, with the Jypoor troops on one side, while on the south Colonel Murray moved against him.

General Lake in May, broke up his army, and

¹ Despatches, vol. ii. p. 94, 16th July, 1803. General Wellesley wrote to Holkar before the war, and sent the letter by Kawder Nawaz Khan (A. D. C.), in his confidence. This was regarding the treaty of Bassein.

on 4th June, 1804, reached Agra, and Cawn-poor on the 20th June,¹ at the commencement of the rainy season. Thus Colonel Monson was left with his detachment in the province of Ajmeer, in a difficult country during the rainy season. He found that Colonel Murray did not advance to his support, but he (Colonel Monson) having learnt of Holkar's advance, on the 8th July, 1804, sent off his baggage, and followed with his infantry. He retired to the Mockundra Pass, leaving Lieutenant Lucan and Bapoojee Sindia, as a rear guard (three thousand horse) to follow. On the march he heard of the attack on his rear guard. He arrived at the Mockundra pass, where he took up a position. General Wellesley says,² "When he began to retreat, he ought not to have stopped longer than one night at Mockundra; because he must have been certain that the same circumstances which obliged him to retire to Mockundra, would also oblige him to quit that position." "The same reasoning holds good respecting Monson's halt at Rampoor, unless he intended

¹ Thorn, pp. 349, 353.

² Despatches, vol. iii. p. 461.

to fight. As he had been reinforced,¹ he ought, to have fallen back till he was certain of his supplies; and having waited till Holkar approached him, particularly as Holkar's army was not then in great strength in infantry and guns, he ought to have vigorously attacked him before he retired." "In respect to the operations of a corps in the situation of Monson's, they must be decided and quick." Colonel Monson had five battalions and guns.

He reached the Bannas river on the 22nd of August; next morning the enemy's cavalry made their appearance. On the 24th their guns arrived, or forty-eight days after Colonel Monson heard of Holkar's advance towards Mockundra. Colonel Monson, when the Bannas was fordable, (24th) sent all his troops across the river, and kept only his picquets on the side where the enemy were with their infantry and guns.² General Wellesley writes on the 12th September, 1804,³ "When his picquets were attacked on the Bannas, he ought to have supported them with his whole corps, leaving one battalion on

¹ Two battalions and their guns, and some Hindostanee horse at Rampoor.

² Many of Holkar's horse crossed over after our troops.

³ Despatches, vol. iii. p. 462.

the northern bank to take care of his baggage ; and if he had done so, he probably would have gained a victory, would have saved his baggage, and regained his honour."

The rains commenced on the 10th of July. Had Colonel Monson not been so far in advance of the Mockundra pass (fifty miles) and had he fallen back rapidly, he would have reached the Bannas river several days before Holkar's infantry and guns arrived at that river. Bapoojee Sindia was a traitor ; hence he sacrificed Lieutenant Lucan and the rear guard, which was destroyed by Holkar's cavalry. Monson had five battalions and fifteen guns, before he obtained his reinforcements, and might very easily have been joined by those reinforcements after he had crossed the river. Then there would have been a respectable force to meet Holkar in the field. It is said that Colonel Monson had not confidence in the sepoys. He had served at Seringapatam,¹ in 1791-92. General Wellesley well explains Colonel Monson's errors. The sepoys were confident, but wanted a leader. Lord Lake it is conceived committed an error in going into cantonments so far distant as Cawnpoor.² There

¹ Fifty-second foot.

² About one hundred and eighty miles.

was no apparent support for Monson. Lord Lake should have had a strong force at Agra, from which station the reinforcements were afterwards sent, and which station was near the frontier to which Monson was retreating.

Mr. H. H. Wilson says,¹ Colonel Monson reached Rampoorra on the 27th of July, and did not move again till the 22nd August.² "This delay," Lord Lake observes, in his despatches to Lord Wellesley, "was fatal." Now Monson reached the Baunnas on the 22nd of August, as Lord Lake says, "So swelled in consequence of the late rains as to be impassable. This occasioned a halt until the river might subside, during which the whole force of the enemy had assembled in the neighbourhood of the detachment. The river having become fordable, the detachment was ordered to cross it on the 24th of August." Lake continues, "When I was informed that the detachment, joined by the reinforcement,³ was at Rampoorra, I transmitted in-

¹ Mill, vol. vi. p. 584. (*Note.*)

² Lord Lake says in his letter (1st July, 1805) to Marquis Wellesley, (*Despatches*, vol. v. p. 291,) "on the 21st of August."

³ On the 14th of August.—*Memoir of Colonel Don*. E. I. Military Calendar, vol. ii. p. 548.

structions to Colonel Monson to make a stand at that place, if such measure appeared to him practicable." Wilson well observes, that Lake could not have heard of the junction of the reinforcements in less than a week after the event. In fact, Monson waited twenty-five days at Rampoorra, consuming his supplies. He had spiked, and left behind, his guns on the 15th of July.¹ He had been joined by two battalions of sepoys, a body of irregular horse, four six-pounders, two howitzers, and a supply of grain, sent from Agra. He left the four six-pounders at Rampoorra. He could not expect with his force, and two guns, to gain a victory over Holkar. He must have known that Holkar would advance. General Wellesley² says, "The difference between a good and a bad military position is nothing, when the troops are starving." There was no use in staying at Rampoorra, unless he could contend against Holkar. Lord Lake had long before written to Monson to suspend his retreat. Wilson says, "Lord Lake, therefore, seems to have been the cause of Colonel Monson's protracted stay at Rampoorra."

¹ Mill, vol. vi. p. 579.

² Despatches, vol. iii. p. 461. .

Lord Lake¹ excuses himself to the marquis for not leaving more troops at Agra, by writing, "No cantonments for European troops had been constructed on the banks of the Jumna, and I therefore proceeded to Cawnpoor with my European force."² An order for temporary barracks might have been issued before the army broke up in May. Wilson truly says, "Had not Monson's detachment been exposed to destruction, Holkar must have been exterminated in the early part of the ensuing campaign, or in the end of 1804, and an immense saving of treasure and life would have been effected, whilst all the political advantages expected from the war, and which, in impatience of its protracted continuance, were thrown away by Lord Wellesley's successors, would, in all probability, have been secured."

Lord Lake marched from Cawnpoor on the 3rd, and arrived at Agra³ on the 22nd of September. He marched from Secundra, near Agra, on the 1st of October, towards Muttra. There

¹ Wellesley's Despatches, vol. v. p. 286.

² His Majesty's 8th, 27th, and 29th Light Dragoons; two companies 22nd Foot, the whole of the 76th, and two companies Honourable Company's European regiment.

³ Mill, vol. vi. p. 585.

were four battalions of sepoy, and two regiments of native cavalry, with guns. They left Muttra on the 15th of October, and marched to Agra, leaving behind much grain and baggage, of which, and of the town, Holkar's horse took possession.¹ As Lord Lake advanced to, Holkar retired from, Muttra, and planned an important stratagem. Leaving his cavalry to engage the attention of the commander-in-chief, he secretly dispatched his infantry and guns to Delhi; and early on the morning of the 7th, Holkar's horse appeared before the walls of Delhi. Colonel D. Ochterlony,² the resident, reported to Lord Lake that, upon hearing of Monson's retreat and Holkar's advance, he at once widened the ramparts of Delhi for the use of guns, and made other preparations. He called in Lieut.-Colonel W. Burn, with the 2nd battalion of the 14th native infantry from Seharunpoor, an irregular corps of sepoy from Rotuk, and another of Nujeebs from Panniput, and some other irregulars, making in all about twelve hundred matchlock men, besides the 14th

¹ Thorn, p. 370.

² East India Affairs, vol. 1800 (years 1803 to 1806); and Thorn, p. 373.

native infantry, and four companies of the 2nd battalion 17th native infantry, altogether about two thousand two hundred men. On the arrival of Holkar's infantry and guns, the resident made over the command of the garrison to Lieutenant-Colonel W. Burn, the senior officer. There was a strong hostile feeling among the Mahommedan population of Delhi, and Colonel Ochterlony's time was fully occupied in preserving order in the city; there were enemies inside as well as outside the royal city.

On the morning of the 8th October, Holkar's infantry and artillery arrived. The main body encamped at some distance. A strong detachment took up a position, and with many guns opened a heavy cannonade on the south-east bastion; thirty or forty feet of the parapet had been levelled during the cannonade. During the night, the enemy erected batteries at breaching distance, which totally destroyed the parapet. On the evening of the 10th, a sally by Lieutenant Rose,¹ with two hundred men of the 14th native infantry, one hundred and fifty irregulars, with a reserve of fifty men and a six-pounder. They succeeded in getting possession of the enemy's bat-

¹ Lieutenant-General Sir J. Rose, K.C.B. Bengal army.

tery, and spiking their guns. On the morning of the 11th, the enemy again opened their battery upon the walls, but by a well-directed fire from a battery within the walls, near the point attacked, the enemy's guns were silenced. The enemy withdrew during the day and night, to carry on operations against the southern face of the city. A breach was soon made in the curtain, between the Turkoman and Ajmeer gates. On the 13th, there were indications of a serious attack. At daybreak, on the 14th, the enemy's guns opened in every direction; and under cover of this cannonade, a large body of infantry, preceded by ladders, made an assault upon the Lahore gate, but were driven back, leaving the ladders behind, which our sepoy's drew up over the walls. The enemy next drew attention from the real object of attack, by making a demonstration against the Ajmeer gate. In the evening, they drew some guns towards the Cashmeer gate. The garrison brought guns to bear, to defeat these feigned attacks. However, before the morning of the 15th of October, their whole force had moved off, and at daybreak their rear-guard of cavalry was seen at a distance. It was found that the enemy had prepared three mines,

laid for the bastions between the Turkoman and Ajmeer gates, one of which was actually carried under the very spot where it was intended to explode, and ready to be loaded. Nothing could exceed the fatigue of the officers and men, in the defence of a city ten miles in circumference, for nine days, especially when the decayed state of the walls are considered. As Thorn observes, "The place, in its most prosperous days, had always been given up on the first appearance of an enemy before its gates." The men could not be often relieved, and the resident, therefore, caused provisions and sweetmeats¹ to be served out at the expense of the government.

Had a retreat from the town been necessary, Colonel Burn had directed that the troops should move into the citadel (palace), which was to be considered as the place of rendezvous, or rallying point. Information had been sent to Lord Lake. It was the advance of his army which caused the sudden departure of Holkar's infantry and guns. Lord Lake bestowed well-deserved praise on the resident, and on Colonel Burn and other officers for their conduct on this arduous service. It

¹ Made of sugar and flour, &c., of which the natives are very fond.

has been erroneously said, that the resident was of opinion that the city could not be defended, but that Colonel Burn thought otherwise. Colonel Ochterlony, who had been deputy adjutant general of the army, had made preparations in August, before Colonel Burn had left Seharunpoor. His report to Lord Lake contradicts such a statement; and Colonel Burn, in his orders, gives the chief credit where it is justly due, to Colonel Ochterlony. Wilson¹ states Holkar's force to have been twenty thousand, and above one hundred guns. Colonel Wallace had taken the forts of Chandore and Galna, and we became possessed of Holkar's territories in the Deccan. Those in Malwa had been obtained by the detachment under Colonel Murray. Holkar was now plundering in all directions. He had now gone to Futtyghur.

Lord Lake,² hearing of Holkar being at Futtyghur on the 16th of November, 1804, made a night march with the cavalry. He had just heard of the victory over Holkar's brigades, at the battle of Deeg. Just at break of day, on the 17th of November, Lord Lake reached the

¹ Mill, vol. vi. p. 588.

² Thorn, p. 389.

outskirts of Holkar's camp. Several rounds of grape from the horse artillery guns, fired into the camp, awakened the men who were lying down beside their horses at their picquets. Holkar, who had heard of his misfortune at Deeg, was the first to fly. The explosion of one of our horse artillery tumbrils gave the alarm to the chiefs, but Holkar for some time would not believe the report of Lord Lake's arrival; when he was convinced of the reality, he took the road to Mynpooree, never stopping till he had recrossed the Kaleenuddee, eighteen miles distant from Futtyghur. Lord Lake made a forced march of fifty-eight miles, and pursued the enemy for ten miles.

A few days after Lord Lake left Delhi with the cavalry in pursuit of Holkar's horse,¹ the British infantry and artillery, under Major-General Fraser, marched from hence in search of his brigades of infantry and guns, which were known to be within the territory of the Bhurtpoor Raja. On the 12th November, General Fraser pitched his camp within a short distance of the enemy, who were discovered encamped between a large deep tank and an extensive morass; their right covered by a fortified village, and their left ex-

¹ Thorn, p. 394.

tending to the fort of Deeg. Preparations were made for the attack next morning. General Fraser's force consisted of his Majesty's 76th foot, the Company's European regiment, 2nd regiment of native cavalry, and six battalions of sepoys ; two of which were left for the protection of the baggage, under Lieutenant-Colonel Ball, with the irregular horse. The remaining six regiments marched to the attack at three A.M., on the 13th November. They made a considerable detour to avoid the morass. They arrived about day-break at the fortified village on the hill which covered the enemy's right. The troops were formed in two lines ; his Majesty's 76th regiment with charged bayonets took possession of the village, and running down the hill took the first range of guns ; the enemy retiring to other batteries. Our troops were opposed to a most destructive fire from the enemy's second range of guns. A cannon-shot took off Major-General Fraser's leg, when the Honourable Colonel Monson assumed the command. The troops drove the enemy from the second range of guns, and charged battery after battery, till coming close under the walls of the town, they were fired upon from the fort, and had several men killed.

In the meantime, a body of the enemy's horse came round, retook the first range of guns, and turned them against our troops; but a party of His Majesty's 76th drove them off. Colonel Monson having ordered up some guns, moved round under cover of their fire upon the enemy's left flank, who made a precipitate retreat into the morass, where numbers perished. Colonel Ball, with the reserved brigade which had been left with the baggage, now arrived to secure the captured guns. The 2nd and 3rd regiments of cavalry were employed during the action in keeping off the enemy's horse.

Thorn gives the enemy's force at twenty-four battalions,¹ a considerable body of horse, and one hundred and sixty guns, "according to the most accurate accounts." The British loss² was three hundred and fifty killed and wounded. It is supposed that near two thousand of the enemy were killed and drowned in endeavouring to effect their escape. We had five officers killed and seventeen wounded; we took eighty-seven

¹ Sometimes five hundred, six hundred, and seven hundred men each.

² Wellesley's Despatches, vol. iv. p. 233; and Appendix 661.

guns.¹ The remains of Holkar's army took shelter in the fort of Deeg. A treaty had been formed with the raja of Bhurtpoor in October, 1803, by Lord Lake, when the army was engaged at the siege of Agra. Deeg belonged to the raja, as well as the fort of Bhurtpoor. The raja was to be punished for protecting our enemy.

Lord Lake moved towards Deeg on the 1st of December, 1804.² Having been joined by the reserve under Colonel Don, with the battering train, &c., from Agra, the army marched on the 11th of December in two columns, parallel to each other, covered a-head by the reserve forming the advance guard, while the intermediate space, a distance of about six hundred yards between the two columns, was occupied by the artillery, baggage and provision train; the whole being closed by the union of all the picquets, strengthened by a regiment of cavalry, thus forming a powerful rear guard. This compact mode of marching and encamping in the form of an oblong square, protected on all sides, rendered every attempt of the enemy's horse on the march or in camp ineffectual; and protected the nume-

¹ Doubtful as to their having one hundred and sixty guns.

² Thorn, p. 406.

rous camp-followers ; “ of these non-combatants, there were not less than sixty thousand.”¹ The plain chosen for our camp being occupied by the enemy, they were dislodged, which was easily effected, and preparations made for the siege. Colonel Don with the reserve, took possession of a tope that night, selected for carrying on our approaches. By next morning a mortar battery was erected, and by the evening of the same day a breaching battery was commenced by volunteer parties from the regiments of dragoons, within seven hundred and fifty yards of the Shah Bourj (or king’s redoubt). The breaching battery was ready on the night of the 16th of December, and on the 17th in the morning opened from six eighteen-pounders, four twelve-pounders, and four mortars. This cannonade lasted several days ; it proved very ineffectual, and another battery of three eighteen pounders was erected during the night of the 20th, to the left of our army, and nearer to the enemy’s works, on which it kept up a smart enfilading fire. The besieged brought a number of guns on the plain outside the fort,

¹ Lake’s army was not above seven thousand men ;—above eight followers to each fighting man ! A very doubtful statement.

and placed them so judiciously under cover of natural embankments, that the same could not be touched by our batteries, while the latter was for the most part enfiladed by theirs; to divert which, we had several twelve and six-pounders on the plain playing on them from different points.¹

At length a practicable breach having been made, and the enemy's guns being mostly silenced, the storming party moved down to the trenches about half-past eleven o'clock on the night of the 23rd of December. There were three columns of attack, the right under Captain Kelly, of four companies of honourable Company's European regiment, and five companies of the first battalion 12th native infantry was ordered to carry the enemy's batteries and trenches, on the high ground near the Shah Bourj; whilst the left column, under Major Radcliffe, of the four remaining battalion companies of the Company's European regiment, and five of the first battalion 12th native infantry, was destined to carry the trenches and batteries on the enemy's right. The centre column led by Lieutenant-colonel Macrae, who had the command of the whole, consisting of the flank companies of

¹ From 1781 till February 1849 (battle of Goojerat in the Punjab), we have mostly been deficient in artillery.

his Majesty's 22nd, 76th, and those of the Company's European regiment, and of the first battalion of 8th native infantry, composed the storming party for the breach. The whole moved off so as to reach the different points of attack a little before twelve at night,¹ when each column performed its allotted part with equal gallantry and success. The storming party were exposed on their flanks to a most galling fire of cannon and musketry from the enemy's batteries and trenches; and though obliged to pass over broken and very unfavourable ground, rushed on to the breach, and gained possession of the works with resistless spirit; while the two remaining columns diverging outwards, attacked the enemy under the walls, carrying all their batteries at the point of the bayonet, in the face of a most destructive fire from all directions. The enemy's gunners stood firmly to their guns, and defended themselves to the last, making use of their tulwas (swords) with such desperate resolution, when they could no longer fire, that most of them were bayoneted. Several parties of the enemy rallied, and, favoured by the darkness of the night, tried to recover

¹ Night attacks are often dangerous, especially if there be no moon. The moon arose at half-past twelve.

their guns; but the moon rising at half-past twelve, shed a very seasonable light on the scene, and enabled our gallant fellows to secure the guns they had so hardly gained. By two o'clock in the morning of the 24th December, the British were in possession of the Shah Bourj and out-works, with all the guns placed outside, which were twenty-eight in number.¹

The enemy lost a number of men killed and wounded. Their extensive intrenchments were occupied with a large force, consisting of several battalions of the Raja of Bhurtpoor, and the remaining infantry of Jeswunt Rao Holkar. Our troops now prepared to assault the citadel. During the night of the 24th December the enemy evacuated the citadel. Thus on Christmas morning of 1804, the British were in complete possession of the town and fortress of Deeg, and of all the guns both within and on the outside, comprising the principal part of the remaining artillery of Holkar, besides a large quantity of grain, and two lakhs of rupees in specie of the public property. Our loss was

¹ Eighty-seven guns taken on the 13th November, and twenty-eight now, will give only one hundred and fifteen guns, instead of one hundred and sixty, as stated by Thorn.

forty-three killed and one hundred and eighty-four wounded, total two hundred and twenty-seven, including two officers killed and thirteen wounded. The number of guns taken in the town, citadel, and entrenchments under the walls, amounted to one hundred, of which sixteen were brass. The calibre of the iron guns were from seventy to sixty pounders, and twenty-eight-pounders and smaller calibre. Thus there was an intrenched camp, a fort, and citadel. The loss was small for the extent of the operations. Leaving a garrison in Deeg, Lord Lake marched on the 28th December, and was joined on the 31st, by Major-General Dowdeswell with his Majesty's 75th regiment, and a supply of stores.

CHAPTER X.

BHURTPoor,¹ 1805.

ON the 1st January, 1805, the whole army marched towards Bhurtpoor, and arrived before that fortress on the 2nd. It is 30 miles west-north-west from Agra. On the night of the 5th January, batteries were erected, and opened their fire on the morning of the 7th. On the afternoon of the 9th the breach in the town wall being reported practicable, an attack was made the same evening to prevent the enemy stockading the breach during the night. There were three columns of attack. The left column, 150 of the European regiment, and a battalion of sepoys. The right column, two companies of his Majesty's 75th, and a battalion of sepoys. The centre column, the flank companies of his Majesty's 22nd, 75th, and 76th, and of the Company's European regiment, amounting to

¹ Thorn, vol. iv. p. 15.

five hundred men, and a battalion of sepoy. The whole about three thousand men. They moved off at eight o'clock at night. The storm failed with a loss of four hundred and fifty-six killed and wounded. More batteries were erected. The enemy had stockaded the breach. On the 18th January, 1805, Major-General Smith, with three battalions of sepoy, and one hundred convalescent Europeans, in all about one thousand six hundred men, arrived in camp by a circuitous route. Ishmael Beg, a partisan of Holkar, who came over to us, joined with four hundred or five hundred horse.

Second storm, 21st January. Another breach made. To learn the breadth and depth of the ditch a havildar and two troopers of the 3rd native cavalry, volunteered their services. Dressed like the natives of the country, and pursued by men as if deserters, they got to the ditch by the stratagem of pretending to be enemies of the English and wishing to enter the fort, by which plan they passed along the ditch to a gateway and saw the breach, then galloped back to the army. They were rewarded and promoted. The storming party, one hundred and fifty men of the 76th, one hundred and twenty of the 75th,

one hundred of the 1st Europeans, and the fifty remaining men of the 22nd flankers, (420) to lead the advance. Supported by the remainder of the above regiments, and the 2nd battalions of 9th, 15th, and 22nd, native infantry. These amounted to above three thousand men. During the storm the cavalry of Holkar and Meer Khan appeared, which called forth the British cavalry. The storm again failed, with a loss of eighteen officers killed and wounded, besides five hundred and seventy-three men, Europeans and natives.

A detachment consisting of His Majesty's 29th light dragoons, and two corps of native cavalry, with three battalions of sepoy, marched to Agra to escort supplies coming from that place to the army. On the 28th January they marched from Agra with a convoy consisting of fifty thousand bullocks carrying grain, and about eight hundred hackeries laden with stores and ammunition, eight thousand rounds of eighteen-pound shot, and six lakhs of rupees. The next day they fell in with the enemy in great force. The raja of Bhurtpoor, and his auxiliaries, Holkar, Meer Khan, and Bappoojee Sindia,¹ united their whole cavalry to attack the convoy—but

¹ Who deserted Colonel Monson in his retreat.

Lord Lake, with the remaining cavalry in camp, and two corps of infantry marched and joined the convoy. They did not attack the convoy, which reached camp without the loss of a man or any of the cattle, on the 30th of January. On the 6th February the army changed ground, moving south-east to the right of the old camp, established a strong chain of posts, and prepared to renew the siege. The failure in the making any impression upon the convoy caused discontent among the chiefs. Meer Khan determined to act separately and proceeded to Rohilcund, his native country, where he expected to be joined by many others. He did not think Lord Lake could detach any troops from his army. He crossed the Jumna on the 7th February with his horse and many Pindarries. Lord Lake despatched the 8th, 27th, and 29th regiments of dragoons, and the 1st, 3rd, and 6th regiments of native cavalry, with the horse artillery, under Major-General Smith, in pursuit. General Smith came up with Meer Khan, near Afzulghur, close under the hills, on the 2nd of March, 1805. Leaving his baggage under the protection of the rear guard and the 3rd native cavalry, he, with the remaining troops, of about one thousand

four hundred regular cavalry, Skinner's irregular horse, and the horse artillery, moved to attack the enemy in two lines, at two P.M. The enemy advanced to meet them. The horse artillery and the galloper guns fired briskly on the advancing foe. A body of alighols,¹ concealed in a nullah, sprang up suddenly, and attacked the horse artillery. Captain Deare, his Majesty's 8th dragoons, without orders, charged them with his squadron, and the enemy were soon defeated; but our horses were too fatigued to continue the pursuit after the retreating horse. Our loss was thirty-five men killed and wounded. General Smith returned to Bhurtpoor after a tedious chase of more than seven hundred miles.

On the 10th of February, Lord Lake had been joined by a division of the Bombay army, under Major-General Jones, consisting of His Majesty's 86th, and eight companies of His Majesty's 65th, four battalions of sepoy, a troop of Bombay cavalry, and five hundred irregular horse.

The 3rd storm, 21st February, 1805. The storming party, under Lieutenant-Colonel Don, was formed of the principal portion of the European force in the Bengal army,² and three bat-

¹ Mahommedan irregular troops.

² Thorn, p. 451, of the troops with Lord Lake.

talions of sepoys ; one column, consisting of two hundred of the 86th regiment from the Bombay division, and the 1st battalion 8th regiment of Bengal infantry, under Captain Grant of the 86th, was ordered to carry the enemy's trenches and their guns on the outside of the town ; whilst the third column, composed of three hundred of the 65th regiment, and two battalions of Bombay sepoys, were to attack the Beem Narrain gate. The ditch was found to be impassable near the breach. The storming party consisted of about four thousand men. The colours of the 12th regiment Bengal native infantry were planted on the top of a bastion, but the ascent was so difficult that only one man at a time could get up. Fourteen officers climbed up to very near the summit, but seeing the attempt to be useless, Colonel Don recalled the party. Captain Grant took eleven of the enemy's guns. The storm was a third failure. Our loss was forty-nine Europeans and one hundred and thirteen natives killed, one hundred and seventy-six Europeans and five hundred and fifty-six natives wounded ; in all, eight hundred and ninety-four men. There was one officer killed, and twenty-seven wounded. It was resolved to batter the

bastion above-mentioned, to render it more easy of ascent. Lord Lake, as a last effort, called for volunteers, when they all volunteered to a man. The battering guns made a large gap at the bottom of the bastion, but the weight of the superincumbent part did not bring down the whole. The attempt was not abandoned.

Fourth storm, 22nd of February. The storming party¹ consisted of the whole European force, two battalions of native infantry of the Bengal army, the greater part of the 65th and 86th regiments, the grenadier battalion, and the flank companies of the 1st battalion 3rd regiment of the Bombay division, moved on to the attack about three o'clock in the afternoon of the 22nd of February, under the command of the Honourable Brigadier Monson. The force was about three thousand men. The bastion to be attacked was extremely steep, and there was no possibility of getting up to the summit. Several soldiers drove their bayonets into the wall, one over another, and endeavoured by these steps to reach the top, but were knocked down by logs of wood, and various missiles, from above. The enemy from the next bastion kept up a destructive fire.

¹ Thorn, p. 455.

Several efforts were made against the curtain. The enemy's grape told with fatal effect. The people on the walls threw down upon the heads of the troops ponderous pieces of timber, and flaming packs of cotton, previously dipped in oil, followed by pots filled with gunpowder and other combustibles, the explosion of which had a terrible effect.¹ The struggle was carried on with the most determined resolution on both sides. Brigadier Monson strained himself to the utmost in maintaining the unequal struggle; but after two hours arduous exertion, he was reluctantly compelled to relinquish the attempt, and return to the trenches. Our loss on this fatal occasion consisted of sixty-nine Europeans and fifty-six natives killed, four hundred and ten Europeans and four hundred and fifty-two natives wounded; in all, nine hundred and eighty-seven. There were six officers killed, and twenty-eight officers wounded.

Thorn gives the loss, in all the operations, at three thousand one hundred men, and one hundred and three officers killed and wounded.²

¹ Sometimes chuppurs (or roofs of native huts and houses, made of grass and bamboos) with oil thrown over them, are set on fire, and thrown into the ditch.

² The loss appears to have been in the four assaults, four hundred and fifty-six, five hundred and seventy-three,

He imputes the failure to the troops losing the road to the breach at the first assault. The guide was leading the centre column in the right direction, when the officer commanding it interfered. The enemy were seen leaving the breach, but returned on seeing the column make a detour in the wrong direction.¹ Thorn says, "The inhabitants were in the utmost confusion, and using every means to effect their escape from a town, the fate of which they considered as sealed." The loss on each succeeding attack increased in amount. The enemy gained confidence. After the last failure, the siege was converted into a blockade. Our guns were mostly blown at the touch-hole, and rendered unserviceable. Detachments were sent to Agra for fresh supplies. The army took up a position to the north-east of Bhurtpoor. Convoys with supplies and battering guns and ammunition, coming from Futtyghur and Allyghur, arrived daily in camp. The raja became alarmed that he would

eight hundred and ninety-four, and nine hundred and eighty-seven men—(two thousand nine hundred and ten); and fifteen officers killed, and ninety-five wounded—(one hundred and ten).

¹ The statement of the late Major-General Sir J. R. Lumley, Adjutant-General Bengal army.

be humbled at last. His treasury was exhausted, and he could no longer pay his allies, who were themselves humbled by the British arms. He availed himself of the intelligence of General Lake's being created a peer to congratulate him, and to intimate his desire for peace. In consequence, the vakeels of the raja were received in camp on the 10th of March. There was some delay in the negotiations, and the terms of the treaty were not signed till the 10th of April, 1805. The raja agreed to pay twenty lakhs of rupees (£200,000),¹ and not to entertain any Europeans in his service without our sanction; the fortress of Deeg to be retained till the British government were assured of his fidelity. On the 21st of April, the united force broke up. They marched in two columns, the left formed of the Bengal infantry, headed by the 1st brigade of cavalry, and the right column by the Bombay division, headed by the 2nd brigade of cavalry, the baggage being in the centre, between the two columns. A regiment of native cavalry and the reserve formed the advance, as the picquets and irregular horse did the rear-guard.

¹ Three lakhs rupees, to be paid in advance. It is believed that the whole was not paid.

On the march, they were joined by a detachment conveying thirty thousand bullocks carrying grain.¹

At the commencement of the siege, Lord Lake's army did not amount to above nine thousand men,² and ten guns for breaching, &c. When the army broke up, the Bengal army and Bombay divisions amounted to nine thousand nine hundred and ninety, and five thousand nine hundred and twenty; total, fifteen thousand nine hundred and ten men. The Bombay force joined after the second storm. Deducting one thousand eight hundred and eighty-one lost in the third and fourth storms, and the army before Bhurt-poor amounted at one time to seventeen thousand seven hundred and ninety-two men, or about two-thirds of the force employed in 1825-26, under Lord Combermere: while the siege-train, in 1825, was five times greater as to the number of guns, mortars, &c. The enemy were enabled to fill the ditch from a jheel (tank). At the siege in 1825, the first effort was to prevent

¹ From two hundred to two hundred and forty pounds each.

² Three battalions sepoys and one hundred Europeans joined after the first storm.

the enemy cutting the bund (embankment). The siege equipment in 1805 was wretchedly defective; and it must be recollected, that with all the aid of a large and powerful siege-train, we were obliged, in 1825, to have recourse to mining, in which department Lord Lake was very deficient. The enemy added more bastions since 1805, which was considered to have weakened the fortress. The Bombay division left the army on the 10th May, 1805, to return to their destination *vid* Rampoorra, the route by which Colonel Monson had retreated from Holkar's army.

Holkar was still roaming about the country. When the raja of Bhurtpoor made overtures for peace,¹ Holkar's horse were still near Bhurtpoor. Lord Lake attacked his camp, and killed a number of his men. They went off in bodies. The army was to be prepared to act against Holkar. Lord Lake kept his troops now more near the scene of action.² On the 4th June, 1805, the 8th, 24th, and 25th Light Dragoons (formerly 27th and 29th), encamped at Secundra, about six miles from the city. The other corps proceeded to Agra, while His Majesty's 75th and

¹ Thorn, p. 460.

² Thorn, p. 472.

76th regiments, with the Company's European regiment, were stationed at Futtypore,¹ under Colonel Monson; and the rest marched on to Muttra, with Major-General Smith. Thus was the whole (field) army kept on the west side of the Jumna, ready to move at a moment's warning, and to co-operate in any exigency.

¹ Futtypoor Sikree, about twenty-five miles from Agra.

CHAPTER XI.

THE Marquis Wellesley was succeeded as governor-general by Marquis Cornwallis, who arrived in Calcutta on the 30th July, 1805.¹ The Marquis Cornwallis objected to the scheme of alliances which he found had been established by his predecessor, and recurred to his former opinion regarding the impolicy of all connexion with the Mahrattah states,² as well as with the nizam. Lord Lake had received his instructions from Lord Cornwallis,³ to carry out certain political arrangements based upon the above opinions, but principally regarding the Rajpoot states. Lord Lake wrote,⁴ "If the Mahrattahs⁵ were thrown

¹ Mill, vol. vi. p. 639.

² Mill, vol. vi. p. 644.

³ The marquis came out as governor-general and commander-in-chief in India. Lord Lake tendered his resignation, determined to be *secundus nulli*.

⁴ Assistant-surgeon R. Leny (surgeon to Lord Lake) wrote most of his lordship's despatches and letters. He was afterwards secretary to the Medical Board, Calcutta.

⁵ Mill, vol. vi. p. 653.

back from the Company's frontier, to the distance originally planned,¹ a strong barrier would be interposed against them in every direction. To the north-west, the countries of Hurrianah, Bicaneer, Jodpore, and the northern parts of Jeypore, and the Shekawutee, dry, sandy, mountainous, and inhabited by a warlike race, could not be crossed by a hostile army without the greatest difficulty and loss. The roads further south, by Mewat or Bhurtpoor, somewhat less impassable, but more than one hundred and fifty miles in length, to the Jumna, through a country with many difficult passes, strong towns, and a warlike and predatory population, would, under a union with the chiefs in that direction, and a well-established line of defence on the part of the British government, be impracticable to a Mahrattah army. Though, from the southern part of the territories of Bhurtpoor, to the junction of the Chumbal with the Jumna, the approach from Malwa presented little difficulty; this line was short; the number of fords so far down the Jumna was much less than higher up, and a British corps, well posted, would afford in this

¹ Not to let the Mahrattahs regain a footing in the upper provinces of India.

direction all the security which could be desired. If the princes in this region were, for awhile, protected by the British government, they would recover from that state of disunion, poverty and weakness into which they had been thrown, partly by the policy, partly by the vices of the Mahrattah governments. If abandoned to themselves, they would soon be all subdued, either by Sindia, or some other conquering hero; and a state of things would be introduced, in the highest degree unfavourable to the interests of the British government."

Before the Governor-general received this remonstrance, he was too ill to discharge the functions of government. He died at Ghazeepoor on the 5th of October, 1805. Sir G. H. Barlow¹ succeeded as Governor-general. He stated his resolution to adhere to the plan of his predecessor in "abandoning all connexion with the petty states, and, generally, with the territories to the westward of the Jumna."

Holkar, after his flight from Lord Lake,² retreated into the Jodpore and Rajpoot country. Lord Lake, with five regiments of cavalry, four

¹ Mill, vol. vi. p. 658.

² Thorn, p. 478.

corps of infantry,¹ and horse artillery, followed Holkar into the Punjab. The Sikhs in a grand national council, agreed to withhold all aid from Holkar. At last, a treaty was signed between Holkar and the British government on the 7th January, 1806.² Sindia's vakeel had accompanied the British army. A treaty was made between Sindia and the British government. Gwalior, and the greatest part of Gohud, were ceded to Sindia, not as a right, but from considerations of friendship. The British government also engaged³ "to enter into no treaties with the rana of Oudipore, rajas of Jodpore, Kotah, and other chiefs, the tributaries of Sindia, in Malwa, Mewar or Marwar; and to interfere in no respect with the conquests made by Sindia from the Holkar family, between the rivers Taptee and Chumbul." This treaty was ratified on the 25th December, 1805. Meer Khan, Holkar's general, was sorely displeased at not being even noticed in the treaty between his master (Holkar) and the British

¹ Eighth, 24th, and 25th Light Dragoons; 3rd and 6th Native Cavalry, His Majesty's 22nd foot, Company's European regiment, 1st battalions of the 9th and 11th Native Infantry, and park of artillery.

² *Thorn*, p. 494.

³ *Mill*, vol. vi. p. 663.

government,¹ and sarcastically observed, that "*a fly could torment an elephant.*"² He certainly did torment the country in the Rajpoot states. Subsequently, (after the Mahrattah and Pindaree war) we gave him the title of Nawab Ameer Khan. It was singular, that there should have been two personages connected with the negotiation regarding Holkar, having only one eye. Holkar himself had but one eye, and Runjeet Sing, of Lahore, the mediator, had only one eye. The latter, many years afterwards, told Sir C. M. Wade,³ that he was truly glad to get rid of two such great personages as Lord Lake and Holkar. Holkar became mad in 1811, and Meer Khan had for many years the management of his affairs, in the name of Holkar's wife. The British army began to retrace its steps on the 9th of January, 1806.

Sir George Barlow⁴ disregarded Lord Lake's remonstrance in favour of the Raja of Jypoor and of Boondée. Lord Lake represented Boondée as commanding a principal pass into the northern

¹ Thorn, p. 497.

² The skin of the elephant is so thin, that a mosquito can annoy the animal.

³ The political agent.

⁴ Mill, vol. vi. p. 665.

provinces of the British empire. That the raja's services to our government had excited the utmost rage of Holkar, to whom he was tributary, by the aid he gave to Colonel Monson during his retreat. The raja of Jypoor had entered into the system of defensive alliance with the British government at an early period of the war with Sindia; Lord Cornwallis had, on the 3rd of August, 1805, directed the treaty to be treated as dissolved. At that time the armies of Sindia and Holkar were on the frontiers of Jypoor, and the Bombay army, then not far from the capital of Jypoor, drew their supplies from the raja's country. Before Lord Cornwallis's orders reached Lord Lake he had encouraged, naturally enough, the raja to found a claim for British protection for services in his power to render. When Holkar in October passed in the direction of Jypoor, the raja joined the Bombay army under General Jones, and by his aid enabled the General to maintain a position in that quarter of great importance. The Governor-general considered the obligations of the British government as dissolved by the early appearances of disaffection on the part of the raja, and not restored by his subsequent deserts." Mill adds, "Lord Lake was "

afterwards compelled to receive the bitter reproaches of the raja, through the mouth of one of his agents, at Delhi." Sir G. Barlow was placed in the peculiar position of succeeding to a governor-general who had only a few months before arrived from England. The home authorities had disapproved of the Mahrattah war, in its extended scale.¹ Lord Cornwallis wrote Lord Lake,² "This resolution" of "abandoning all connexion with the petty states, and generally, with the territories to the westward of the Jumna," is founded upon "my knowledge of the entire conformity of those grand principles to the provisions of the legislature, and to the orders of the Honourable the Court of Directors." He himself thought the measure expedient to the British interests in India. The Rajpoot states, not having the protection of the British government, were plundered for many years by Meer Khan and the Pindarees, till the Marquis of Hastings, in 1817, entered upon the Mahrattah and Pindaree war on a great scale, and restored

¹ The Directors had signed Lord Wellesley's recall; which the Board of Control over-ruled.—Book's East India Affairs, 1832; Appendix, p. 205.

² Mill, vol. vi. p. 658.

peace, happiness, and tranquility to the Rajpoot states, and throughout our frontier.

When the Court of Directors heard of the death of the Marquis Cornwallis,¹ they determined to nominate Sir George Barlow permanently as governor-general.² The Marquis Wellesley when governor-general, had recommended Mr. Barlow as his successor; and the Board of Control acquiesced in the nomination. The ministers heard of the Marquis's death in the end of January, 1806.³ A change of ministers took place on the death of Mr. Pitt. Lord Minto was one of the new ministers, as President of the Board of Control. On the 14th February, 1806, he urged on the Court of Directors the importance of investing Sir G. Barlow with the fullest powers, and recommending his appointment as governor-general. The Court signed a commission on the 25th of February. On the 10th of March, to the surprise of the Court, they were informed that ministers had determined to appoint the Earl of Lauderdale. The Court

¹ Mill, vol. vii. p. 106.

² He had been chief secretary to the government of Bengal, and was senior member of council.

³ Mill, vol. vii. p. 147.

refused to cancel their appointment. The ministry retaliated by a warrant under the king's sign manual, recalling Sir G. Barlow. The Court was compelled to agree to a compromise, by which the Earl of Lauderdale,¹ ostensibly declined the acceptance of the office, and Lord Minto was nominated governor-general. Lord Minto arrived in Calcutta on the 3rd July, 1807, and Sir G. Barlow was appointed Governor of Madras, in the room of Lord W. Bentinck, who had been recalled.

The sentiments which had been expressed both by the ministry and the Court of Directors,² adverse to the system of policy followed by Lord Wellesley, imposed upon Lord Minto the obligation of adopting principles of a less ambitious tenor, and of pursuing the measures which had been instituted by Lord Cornwallis and Sir G. Barlow, for the retrenchment of public expenditure, and the preservation of external tranquility. The new administration was therefore pacific. His early attention was given to the

¹ Lord Lauderdale was a zealous supporter of Mr. Fox's India bill, and an opposer of the Company's privileges. Mill quotes from the *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1839.

² Mill, vol. vii. p. 171.

province of Bundeleund, which we obtained from the peishwa, and had only been in our possession a little more than three years. The province was in an unsettled state. It was not found possible,¹ however, to exterminate the banditti who roamed through the country, as long as they found shelter and support in its principal fortresses; and it was rendered necessary to employ military force for their humiliation. Ajayguh was surrendered to us on the 13th Feb. 1809.² In 1809, and afterwards, the famous Gopal Sing gave great trouble to our troops, while Colonel Martindell's force was concentrated in a different quarter of the province.³

Kalinjar,⁴ a fortified hill, twenty miles south-east of Banda, in Bundeleund, gave more trouble. Imperfect and weak batteries made an impracticable breach, which was reported practicable on the 2nd February, 1812, and stormed. The storming party were assailed by volleys of large stones and a brisk fire of matchlocks. They reached the foot of the parapet. Ladders were

¹ Mill, vol. vii. p. 173.

² Mill, vol. vii. p. 175.

³ Lieutenant-General Archibald Watson was employed against Gopal Sing.

⁴ Mill, vol. vi. p. 185.

applied, but it was difficult to fix them, and as fast as the men ascended they were knocked down by heavy stones, or shot by matchlocks. At length the storming party was recalled.¹ Two officers were killed, one wounded, and about one hundred and sixty men killed and wounded. Wilson says, "this stronghold, which had baffled Mahomed of Ghaznee, had seen Shir Shah perish before its walls, and had sustained a ten years' siege by Ali Bahadur, was thus added to the British conquests. The siege train, six eighteen pounders, two twelve-pounders, and two mortars, could not make a breach. Like the Droogs in the south of India, the upper forts were usually gained by bribing the garrison, or by a system of starvation. Treaties were made with the different petty rajas in Bundelcund, who engaged to keep up a certain quota of troops, and to prevent any banditti passing through their country. It was well observed² that the best plan for preserving the peace of the province, was to compel these rajas to act up to the strict letter of their treaty; which would have saved the expense and exposure of troops in running

¹ Mill, vol. vi. p. 188.

² By Sir T. H. Maddock.

(making dours) after these plunderers or banditti.

Macao¹ 1808.—“ An attempt was made by the government of Bengal to secure the possession of the Portuguese settlement of Macao for the Prince Regent, and place it under British protection, in the same manner, or by similar arrangements, as Madeira had been. But the Emperor of China sent orders to the governor of the district, within which Macao is situated, not to allow the English Company's ships to trade, until such concessions and apologies should be made, for the attempt to station a military force in that island, as might be amply sufficient for the purpose of inducing him to pardon them :—concessions were made to the *celestial empire*, and harmony was re-established.” Major Weguelin with a detachment of the Bengal European regiment was sent to Macao. The Chinese were very insolent, and the major was praised for his firmness and command of temper. There were thirteen or fourteen China ships waiting for cargoes ; so that a stoppage of trade would have been of great importance. Our object was to secure Macao against an attack by the French. From Madras two

¹ “Annual Register,” 1808, p. 240, History of Europe.

companies of his Majesty's 30th regiment and two companies of the European regiment from Bengal, and six hundred sepoy, and six vessels of war, under Rear-admiral Drury,¹ were sent. The troops were landed, but re-embarked on the 23rd of December, 1808.

¹ Wilson, vol. vii. p. 319 (*Note 1.*)

CHAPTER XII.

THE SIKHS,¹ 1809.

RUNJEET SING, the Sikh chief, had succeeded his father who was one of the chiefs of the Punjab. Runjeet by his own talent had made his authority paramount to the west of the Sutlej, and now desired to extend his influence and power across it to the Jumna. In 1806 the rajas of Patiala and Naba having quarrelled, the latter called in Runjeet Sing. He crossed the Sutlej with a strong party of horse and dictated terms of reconciliation. In 1807 he again interfered in the case of the wife of the Patiala raja. The Sikh chiefs in that quarter became alarmed, and applied to the resident at Delhi to defend them against the ambition of their countryman. Lord Minto resolved to resist the pretensions of Runjeet Sing to the exercise of any authority on the right bank of the Jumna, yet he still desired to secure his concurrence in the scheme of defensive

¹ Wilson, vol. vii. p. 195.

alliance, against the hostile designs of France against India. Runjeet had written to Lord Minto; his lordship referred him for a reply to the resident at Delhi, who was sent on a mission to Lahore. Sir C. Metcalfe crossed on the 1st of September, 1808, and had an audience of Runjeet at Umritsir. Runjeet had even seized upon Umballa, and had exacted tribute from the petty rajas of Shahabad and Thanesur (between the Jumna and Umballa). He remonstrated and appeared resolved to maintain his pretensions by arms; the British government having decided that the Sutlej should be Runjeet's boundary, a detachment crossed the Jumna in the middle of January, 1809, and proceeded to Loodianah, whilst an army of reserve under the command of Major-general St. Leger was prepared to support the advance; this force consisted of several thousand men. The troops of Runjeet fell back as Colonel Ochterlony's¹ detachment approached.

During the stay of the British embassy near Umritsir the anniversary of the Mohurram occurred, and the deaths of Ali and his sons, Hasan and Hosain, were commemorated² by the Shia

¹ He had been resident at Delhi in 1803; and defended it in 1804.

² Wilson, vol. vii. p. 199.

Mahommedans of the envoy's escort. The celebration gave great offence to the Sikh population¹ of Umritsir, which is the site of their most sacred temple; and especially to the Akális, a set of Sikh fanatics who combine a religious and martial character. Headed by the Akális, a mob attacked the envoy's camp; they were repulsed by the escort, consisting of two companies and sixteen troopers. Several of the assailants were killed, and many of the sepoys were wounded. Runjeet came up at the close of the affray, and assisted in quelling the tumult, which it was suspected he had fomented. It gave him a favourable opinion of our sepoys. On the 25th April, 1809, a treaty was concluded, which stipulated perpetual friendship between the British government and the state of Lahore; and article first, "that the British government, should have no concern with the territories and subjects of the rajas to the northward of the river Sutlej; that the Sikhs should never maintain on the left bank of the river, more troops than were necessary for the internal duties of the territory belonging to them, nor commit nor suffer any encroachment

¹ The Sikhs will receive proselytes from Mahommedans as well as Hindoos.

on the possession or rights of the chiefs in its vicinity." Thus terminated all our friendly discussions. The rajas between the Sutlej and the Jumna and their territories were placed under the protection of the British government—these were styled the "Protected Sikh states." Thorn says, Lord Lake proposed that the Sutlej should be our frontier.

Mr. Wilson¹ thinks there is no satisfactory proof that the Emperor Napoleon ever seriously contemplated the invasion of India. That the conquest of Egypt, in addition to the purpose of establishing a French colony in that country, to divert the stream of commerce between India and Europe, from the Cape of Good Hope to the Straits of Bab-al-Mandal, was his object, and thus to annihilate one of the sources of British prosperity. But² he had said, that whatever nation obtained possession of Egypt, would gain India. The object was to be prepared, against an attack, *via* Egypt, to conquer India.

Cabool.—1809. The Hon. Mr. Elphinstone³ was sent on an embassy to Cabool. He left

¹ Wilson, vol. vii. p. 203

² Dr. O'Mera's "Voice from St. Helena."

³ Wilson, vol. vii. p. 208.

Delhi on the 13th October, 1808, and reached Peshawur on the 5th March, 1809; having taken a circuitous route, *via* Bikaner and Jesselmer, to the frontiers of Bahawalpoor, and, through Mooltan, to the Indus. The object was to form a treaty with Shah Shuja, to protect India from an invasion by the French or Persians. The Shah marched towards Cabool in June 1809. Taking leave of the king, the mission marched from Peshawur on the 14th June. The king was defeated on his march, and the Governor-general recalled the mission. A treaty had been signed.

Persia, in relation to India. According to Sir J. M'Neill,¹ who was long ambassador to the Persian court, the king of Persia, being unable to cope with Russia, addressed a letter to Napoleon, desiring to form an alliance with France. M. Jaubert was sent to Tehren. Mirza Reza, in return, went on a mission to Napoleon; accompanied him to Tilsit, and concluded a treaty, which was ratified at Fénkenstein in May 1807. At the same time, Mahommed Nebbee Khan was

¹ M'Neill's "Progress and Present Position of Russia," 1838, p. 55. He also states, that a plan was given to Catharine of Russia in 1787 for the march of an army *via* Bokhara and Cashmere. P. 46.

sent as envoy to the British government of India, to claim its assistance against Russia; but his mission was unsuccessful; and Persia, losing all hope of support from her old ally, had no alternative but to throw herself into the arms of France. At Tilsit, a secret treaty was signed in 1807 between Napoleon and the Emperor Alexander; having for its object the invasion of India, each agreeing to furnish thirty thousand men. Napoleon seems to have given up that design. The next step which he took, was to send General Gardanne as ambassador to the court of Persia. French officers were sent, who first introduced European discipline into the Persian army. French engineers built the first regular fortifications.

In 1809, Sir J. Malcolm was sent on a second mission¹ to Persia from India. French influence prevented Malcolm's reception, as not being an ambassador from the king of Great Britain. General Gardanne, the French ambassador, had persuaded the Shah of Persia to take a French

¹ The first in 1799. Sir H. Jones was also sent in 1809 from England. Wilson says, vol. vii. p. 224, the government of India issued orders to fit out a military expedition to occupy the island of Kharak, and hold command of the Persian gulf. (Malcolm, vol. i. p. 415, Political History of India.)

subsidiary force ; but Napoleon disapproved of the measure, and the shah gave a favourable reception to the British mission, and obliged the French embassy to retire ; and procured a Persian ambassador to be sent to England. Sir H. Jones settled a preliminary treaty on the 12th of March, 1809, to the following effect, as regarded the invasion of India. Article IV.¹—"In case any *European* forces shall invade the territories of Persia, his Britannic Majesty will afford a force, or, in lieu of it, a subsidy. That, in case the dominions of his Britannic Majesty in India are attacked or invaded by the *Affghans*, or any *other power*, his majesty the King of Persia shall afford a force for the protection of the said dominions."² The definitive treaty concluded at Tehran by Messrs. Morrier and Ellis, on the 25th November, 1814, fixed the subsidy to Persia, if troops were not furnished at two hundred thousand tomauns (£125,000) ;³ but the late Abbas Merza, prince

¹ Parliamentary Papers.

² Sir H. Jones returned to England in 1811. A treaty founded on this was settled by Sir Gore Ousley, who was sent to Persia from England. A commercial and political treaty in 1801, was settled by Sir J. Malcolm.

³ At 12s. 6d. They are of different values.

royal of Persia, in March 1828, gave his bond, cancelling the subsidy, provided two hundred thousand tomauns (£125,000) were given by the British government to Persia, towards liquidating the indemnity due by Persia to Russia: this the king of Persia confirmed. In 1814, a treaty was concluded between Russia and Persia, by which the latter ceded to Russia all her acquisitions south of the Caucasus, and engaged to maintain no navy on the Caspian Sea, which now belongs to Russia. By the treaty of 1828 with Persia, Russia established the line of the Arras (Araxes) as her frontier towards Persia.

Madras mutiny. In 1809, a mutiny occurred among the officers of the Madras army regarding an order which had been issued, abolishing the tent contract, a monthly allowance in peace or for war, enjoyed by commanding officers of regiments for supplying the men with suitable camp equipage when required. "The retrenchment was originally suggested by Sir John Craddock; and he called upon Colonel John Munro, the quartermaster-general of the army, to report whether it was not practicable without detriment to the efficiency of the troops, and how it might be best accomplished. The report advocated the change,

and submitted a mode of effecting it. The plan was approved of by Sir J. Cradoek, by Lord W. Bentinck, and by the government of Bengal. It merely fell to Sir George Barlow to carry it into execution." There were some words in the report "capable of individual application, and might be construed into an accusation that the officers in command of corps had consulted their own profit at the expense of the public service, and had appropriated the tent allowance, without keeping up an adequate tent establishment." The officers resented the imputation, and though Colonel Munro disclaimed any intention of reflecting upon the honour and integrity of any portion of the officers, they called upon the commander-in-chief (Lieutenant-general Hay Macdowall) to bring Colonel Munro to a court-martial, and sent in charges. The judge-advocate-general considered that the accusers had no right to prefer charges. The officers then proposed to send a memorial to the Court of Directors. In the meanwhile, the commander-in-chief determined that the charge should be entertained. On the eve of quitting Madras, he placed Colonel Munro in arrest, to be brought to trial by the

¹ Wilson, vol. vii. pp. 264—301.

succeeding commander-in chief. Colonel Munro appealed to the government, under whose orders he had acted, and sent his appeal through the commander-in-chief, who declining to submit the appeal to government, Colonel Munro sent it direct; which he had then a right to do. The government at first requested, and then commanded, the commander-in-chief to release Colonel Munro. General Macdowall was obliged to obey; but, on the eve of departure, he issued an order, stating that, but for his departure, he would have brought the colonel to trial for disrespect in resorting to the civil power, and issued a reprimand.

The government of Madras removed General Macdowall from the command of the army (though on the eve of departure), and cancelled his resignation, and suspended the adjutant-general (Colonel Capper) and Major Bowles (the deputy adjutant-general) for publishing the order of the commander-in-chief. The judge advocate general said, that "even in the case of military men, the illegal commands of a superior are invalid."¹ On the 1st of May, 1809, by the order

¹ Quite correct. It was known to be in opposition to government, who had ordered Colonel Munro's release from arrest.

of government, four officers of rank were suspended the service, and an equal number removed from their commands, and four suspended in the command of their corps. They were accused of having signed an address to Major Bowles, and having signed, and influenced others to sign, a memorial to the Governor-general, in which the supposed grievances of the Madras army were detailed. The governor had been advised to restore the suspended officers. Matters became worse, and Lord Minto (governor-general) sailed for Madras on the 11th of September. Several officers were tried for mutinous conduct while in the command of the forces of government; some were cashiered, and others acquitted, but suspended till the pleasure of the Court of Directors should be known.¹ Lord Minto staid at Madras till the beginning of 1810, when General Hewett, the commander-in-chief of the Bengal army, assumed the command of the Madras army. At the end of 1810, General Sir S. Auchmuty became commander-in-chief of the Madras army. The Court of Directors at first approved of the con-

¹ Major-general Gowdie was made commander-in-chief for the time.

duct of the governor of Madras, but when the alarm had subsided, the court were divided in opinion on the subject, though they cordially approved of the conduct of the Governor-general of India.

CHAPTER XIII.

EXPEDITION TO THE MAURITIUS, 1810.

It is stated¹ that, in 1807, Admiral Pellew had under his orders, in different parts of the Indian seas, six ships of the line, sixteen frigates, and six sloops. Notwithstanding the presence in the Indian seas of so many ships of war, armed vessels issued from the French islands of Mauritius and Bourbon, and preyed upon the maritime trade of India almost with impunity. The Marquis Wellesley had proposed to capture those islands. Again, the Company's government had, at the beginning of the war, been interdicted² from engaging in any expedition against the islands, as involving a certain expense. It was latterly at first proposed to attempt a rigorous blockade by the squadron at the Cape of Good Hope, under Admiral Bertie; but this was impracticable, as the ships would have so far to go for supplies; to the Cape or to Bombay. It was

¹ Wilson, vol. vii. p. 322. ² Wilson, vol. vii. p. 325.

determined, in 1809, to occupy the small island of Rodriguez, about one hundred leagues east of the Isle of France, for establishing magazines, &c. A small force of two hundred Europeans and two hundred sepoys, under Lieut.-Colonel Keating, were sent from Bombay, and landed on the 4th of August. The captures made in 1809 and 1810 proved that the system of blockade would not answer. Further measures being necessary, the forces, both military and naval, were strengthened, and in September 1809, an expedition proceeded from Rodriguez to the Isle de Bourbon. Arrived off the island on the morning of the 20th of September, a force of six hundred men was disembarked about seven miles from St. Pauls. By the evening, the town was in our possession. A French frigate was captured, and two East India Company's India-men were recaptured. The English squadron, with the captured vessels, returned to Rodriguez. This success induced the Bengal government to attempt, without waiting for instructions from home, the complete destruction of the French islands.

In the beginning of 1810, a reinforcement¹

¹ Wilson, vol. vii. p. 328.

of one thousand six hundred Europeans, and as many native troops, was despatched to Colonel Keating, to enable him to complete the subjugation of the Isle de Bourbon. A strong squadron of five frigates,¹ under Commodore Rowley, arrived off the point of debarkation on the 6th of July, 1810. The troops landed on the 7th of July; one brigade landed towards the west, and the other three brigades to the east of St. Dennis, and were in possession of the island by the evening of the 8th July. Our loss was one officer and seventeen men killed, and fifty-nine wounded. No effort was made from the Isle of France to interrupt these operations, in consequence of the absence of the principal strength of the French naval force.

On the 20th of August, the French frigates *Bellone*, *Minerve*, and *Victor*, returned to the Isle of France, with the *Wyndham* and *Ceylon*, captured *Indiamen*. The Isle de la Passe had been taken possession of on the 14th of August by the boats of the *Sirius* and one hundred and thirty men from Bourbon. The French found Port St. Louis blockaded, and made for Grand Port (Port Impérial). On nearing the Isle de

¹ *Sirius*, *Iphigenia*, *Magicienne*, *Nereide* and *Boadicea*.

la Passe, a small islet, with a fort, lying off the mouth of the harbour, about three miles from the land, the enemy were surprised by a hostile fire from the guns of the fort, and of the *Nereide* frigate, which had been stationed off the island. The French made their way into the harbour, but the *Wyndham* was recaptured by the boats of the *Sirius*. Sending off his prize to Bourbon, Captain Pym, in communication with Captain Willoughby of the *Nereide*, determined to attack the French ships in the harbour, and on the 22nd August, stood in for that purpose. The *Sirius* grounded, and could not be got off till next day, when the *Iphigenia* and *Magicienne*, under Captains Lambert and Curtis, arrived to take part in the engagement. General Decaen, the governor of the Mauritius, reinforced the crews of the French ships with seamen and soldiers, and strengthened the batteries on that part of the coast, which mounted sixty guns.

The result was most unfortunate to the British frigates. The *Magicienne* on the 23rd in following in at five p. m. grounded; the *Sirius* again grounded. The *Nereide* which had previously grounded, having most of her guns disabled, the greater part of her crew killed or wounded, and

being exposed to the fire of the land-batteries, struck her colours. On the 24th, the *Magicienne* being unmanageable and on the point of sinking, was deserted and set on fire. On the 25th, the *Iphigenia* warped out of the action, and attempted to extricate the *Sirius*; but, finding it impracticable, she was set on fire and exploded. The *Iphigenia*, the sole remaining ship, contrived to get back to the *Isle de la Passe*, where she landed the surviving crews of the other vessels. In this situation and surrounded without provisions, Captain Lambert found himself under the necessity of capitulating to the French commodore. The only British ship of war of the blockading squadron now left was the *Boadicea*, and Commodore Rowley was unable to prevent the blockade of the *Isle of Bourbon*, which was established by the French frigates, *Astrea* and *Iphigenia*.¹

Capture of the *Isle of France*,² 1810.—Rear-admiral Drury reached Rodriguez on the 3rd of November, 1810. The division from Bombay was already present. The Madras division arrived on the 6th of November; the armament from Bengal did not arrive till the 21st. The whole fleet

¹ The latter just surrendered by the English.

² Wilson, vol. vii. p. 338.

weighed on the 29th of November, and came to anchor off the point selected for debarkation in Grande Baye, near the N. E. extremity of the island, about fifteen miles north from the capital. No opposition was experienced, and the whole force was landed by three o'clock in the afternoon. There were five brigades:—

First brigade, Colonel Picton; his Majesty's 12th and 22nd regiments, and right wing Madras volunteer battalion.

Second brigade, Colonel Gibbs; three hundred of the 89th, a company of the 87th, and left wing Madras volunteers.

Third brigade, Lieutenant-colonel Kelso; 14th regiment 2nd Bengal volunteers.

Fourth brigade, Colonel Macleod; Madras native flank battalion, and three hundred marines.

Fifth brigade, 65th foot, a troop 26th Dragoons, and 1st Bengal volunteers.

Reserve division, Lieutenant-colonel Keating; 84th regiment, flank companies of some other corps, and the Bombay native troops.

These with the artillery, and a large body of seamen, formed a force of about eleven thousand

three hundred men.¹ General Decaen had not more than two thousand Europeans, including the crews of the ships of war, a considerable number of colonists, and a body of African slaves, without discipline and badly armed. The English squadron consisted of the *Illustrious*, seventy-four, and the thirteen frigates, *Cornwallis*, *Africane*, *Boadicea*, *Nisus*, *Clorinde*, *Cornelia*, *Mene-laüs*, *Psyche*, *Ceylon*, *Nereide*,² *Phoebe*, *Doris*, and *Vesper*, besides sloops and gun-brigs.

On landing, the troops were formed and moved towards Port Louis, for the first five miles along the coast, passing through a thick wood. On clearing the wood, the heads of the columns were fired upon by a small picquet. The troops chiefly suffered from the excessive heat of the weather and want of water. After clearing the wood, the army bivouacked for the night. The next morning the march was resumed; but excessive heat and scanty supply of water compelled General Abercrombie to halt, about five miles short of Port Louis upon the bed of the Pamplémousse river.

¹ Wilson, vol. vii. p. 340. European troops, six thousand three hundred; two thousand seamen and marines; the 4th Bengal and Madras volunteers, and Madras pioneers, three thousand.—Total, eleven thousand three hundred.

² The French *Venus*, now *Nereide*.

On the 31st the force again advanced, and came soon upon the enemy, who had taken up an advantageous position in front with several field-pieces; these were charged and taken. The army then moved on, and drew up in front of the lines defending Port Louis, preparatory to an assault next morning, whilst the ships of war should cannonade the town from the sea. General Decaen offered to capitulate. The terms of his surrender were agreed upon; and the Isle of France became subject to the British crown. The troops of the garrison and crews of the ships of war were to be conveyed in English ships to European France, instead of becoming prisoners of war; taking with them all property declared to be private. The ships in the harbour, with all stores and public property, fell to the captors. The inhabitants were secured in the continuance of their religion, laws, and customs.¹ The Isle of Bourbon was restored to France at the peace (1814). It does not, like the Isle of France, contain any good harbour.

¹ See also "Asiatic Annual Register," vol. xii.; History, p. 15; London Gazette Extraordinary, February 13th, 1811.

CHAPTER XIV.

EXPEDITION TO JAVA, 1811.

THOUGH French privateers only occasionally haunted the roads of Batavia, or cruised amongst the islands of the Indian Archipelago,¹ still Batavia and these islands were so many rallying points. Blockades in distant seas still render the having other ships to cruise about to defend the trade, necessary. The first measures sanctioned contemplated a vigorous blockade of Java and the Spice Islands. Each island would require a separate blockade, so that it would have rendered necessary a system of blockades expensive, and requiring a great many ships of war. It was therefore, judged by Lord Minto and Admiral Drury, proper to attempt the conquest of Java and the Dutch islands. Reinforcements had been received at Java, but none at the Moluccas as yet. In the middle of February

¹ Wilson, vol. vii. p. 343.

1810,¹ Captain Tucker, with his Majesty's ship *Dover*, Cornwall, and Samarang, and part of the Madras European regiment, Captain Court arrived off the island of Amboyna. While the squadron occupied the attention of the enemy by a vigorous cannonade, four hundred troops were landed, and divided into two bodies, one led by Capt. Phillips, the other by Captain Court. The first stormed a battery and carried it. Captain Court made a detour to the south of the town, reached a height above Fort Victoria, surmounted by a redoubt, which was abandoned as they entered it from the rear. The ships kept up a brisk cannonade on the sea face of the town.

On the following morning, the batteries in possession of the British opened on the town and fort, and soon silenced their fire. A summons to surrender was sent to the Dutch governor, and was promptly obeyed. A capitulation was entered into, and a garrison of more than one thousand three hundred Europeans and Malays laid down their arms. The Dutch troops were sent to Java; the Malays were taken into the British service. The whole of the Moluccas were subsequently reduced, and Java and its

¹ Wilson, vol. vii. p. 344.

dependencies alone remained in the possession of the Dutch.

1811.—The expedition against Java¹ having completed its preparations, the first division, under the command of Colonel Robert Rollo Gillespie, sailed on the 18th of April, 1811, from the Madras Roads, under the convoy of his Majesty's ship *Caroline*, Captain Cole. The remainder of the troops followed in about a week, under Major-general Wetherall. A tremendous hurricane, which came on the day after their departure, threatened to involve the whole in a general wreck. His Majesty's ship *Dover*, and all the other vessels remaining in the roads were driven on shore by the violence of the tempest, and were lost. All the transports, having left in time, escaped. On the 18th of May the first division anchored in Penang harbour, the first rendezvous of the expedition. The *Akbar* frigate, with his excellency the Commander-in-chief, arrived on the 13th, and departed again on the 20th for Malacca. The *Modeste* frigate, with Lord Minto, had touched at this place, and proceeded to Malacca. Mr. Seton, governor of

¹ Thorn's Memoir (1815) of Conquest of Java (late deputy quarter-master-general at Java), p. 2.

Prince of Wales's Island, had proceeded with his lordship. On the 21st of May, the second division, under Major-general Wetherall, arrived under convoy of his Majesty's ship *Phaeton*, Captain Pellew. On the 24th May they sailed for Malacca which they reached on the 1st of June. The Bengal troops, under convoy of his Majesty's ship *Cornelia*, Captain Edgell, had arrived five or six weeks before and were encamped along the shore; Lord Minto, Sir Samuel Auchmuty, and Commodore Broughton, had also arrived.

Lord Minto heard at Malacca that General Daendels¹ had been recalled, and was succeeded by General Jansens, who, it was reported, had arrived at Batavia with a numerous body of troops from France. It was determined to proceed in squadrons to Point Sambar, and from thence to stretch across the Java sea towards Cheribon. The troops were brigaded at Malacca. The ships got under weigh on the 11th of June. The Bengal division sailed first, followed by the first division from Madras, and so on in succession, and in a few days the fleet entered the straits of Singapore. Here they experienced occasional

¹ Thorn, p. 10.

squalls, and the tide drifting forcibly over to the Malay coast, obliged them frequently to come to anchor. After passing through the straits, the fleet stood direct for Borneo, to profit by the land breezes which blow over that vast line of coast. They anchored at High Islands. On the morning of the 10th of July, while preparing to get under weigh, a stiff squall with rain came on, and brought a great portion of the fleet into imminent danger. It lasted a considerable time. On the 20th July they reached Point Sambar, which was the fourth rendezvous of the expedition, at the extremity of the south-west coast of Borneo. From information received at Madras, and confirmed both at Penang and Malacca, Sir Samuel Auchmuty, had finally determined to attack Batavia, near which it was expected that the grand stand would be made. That their greatest force was collecting there; and strong positions were taken up at Cornelis and Buitenzorg. The Commander-in-chief had resolved to land at Chillingching. On the evening of the 3rd August, 1811, the squadron made Cape Carawang, and early next morning ran in for the mouth of Marandi river. The ships anchored during the intervals between the land and sea

breezes. The troops landed in the afternoon, by signal, when the sea breeze set in at 2 P.M. on Sunday, 4th August, 1811. The fleet consisted of four sail of the line, fourteen frigates, seven sloops, eight Honourable Company's cruisers, fifty-seven transports and several gun-boats, amounting in all to one hundred sail of ships, under Rear-admiral Stopford, who joined at Batavia.

The army brigaded:—

The advance, under Colonel R. R. Gillespie.

Major of brigade, Captain Thorn, 25th Dragoons.

Attached to the advance, Captain Taylor, 24th Light Dragoons.

Right flank battalion, Major Miller.

Left flank battalion, Major Fraser.

Detachment 89th regiment, Major Butler.

Royal Marines, Captain Liardet.

Bengal light infantry volunteer battalion, Major Dalton.

Dismounted 22nd Light Dragoons, Lieutenant Dudley.

Governor-general's body guard, Captain Gall.

Pioneers, Captain Smithwaite.¹

¹ Madras, the rest king's or Bengal officers.

Horse Artillery, Captain Noble.¹

Detachment 22nd Light Dragoons, Major Travers.

The line, commanded by Major-General Weatherall.

Right brigade, commanded by Colonel Gibbs.²

Major of brigade, Captain Douglas.

His Majesty's 14th regiment, Lieut.-Colonel Watson.³

Fifth battalion Bengal volunteers, Captain Griffiths.

His Majesty's 59th regiment, Lieut.-Colonel M'Leod.

Left brigade, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Adams.

Major of brigade, Captain Bethune.

His Majesty's 69th regiment, Lieut.-Colonel M'Leod.

Sixth battalion Bengal volunteers, Major Raban.

His Majesty's 78th regiment, Major Lindsay.

The reserve, commanded by Colonel Wood.⁴

Major of brigade, Lieutenant Williamson.⁴

¹ Madras ; the rest king's or Bengal officers.

² Killed at New Orleans.

³ General Sir James Watson, K.C.B.

⁴ Bengal officers.

Flank battalion, Major Yule.¹

3rd battalion Bengal volunteers, Lieut.-Colonel Dewar.¹

1st battalion 20th or marine regiment, Lieut.-Colonel Loveday.¹

4th battalion Bengal volunteers, Major Grant.¹

Royal Artillery and Bengal Artillery, Major Caldwell.¹

Madras Engineers, Lieut.-Colonel Mackenzie.²

Lieut.-General Sir Samuel Auchmuty, Commander-in-Chief.

Adjutant-General, Colonel Agnew.²

Deputy Adjutant-General, Colonel Agnew.²

Assistant Adjutant-General, Captain Carroll.

Quarter-Master General, Colonel Eden.

Deputy Quarter-Master General, Major Burslem.

Assistant Quarter-Master General, Lieutenant Hanson.

Assistant Quarter-Master General, Lieutenant Wetherall.³

Attached to Quarter-Master General's Department, Lieutenant Bayley.

¹ Bengal officers.

² Madras officers.

³ Major-general C. A. Wetherall, C.B.K.H., deputy adjutant-general of the army.

Attached to Quarter-Master General's Department, Lieutenant Dalcairns.

Major Farquhar,¹ in charge of guides and Intelligence department.

Aide-de-camp, Captain Dickson.

Aide-de-camp, Captain Knatchbull.

Aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Blakiston.¹

Aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Wetherall,² to the Major-General.

Major Campbell,³ Commissary General.

Captain Limond,¹ Commissary of Stores.

Deputy Paymaster-General, Major Johnson.³

Dr. W. Hunter, Superintending-Surgeon.³

The landing was at Chillingching, a village about ten miles to the eastward of Batavia.

General Abstract⁴ of the Army, Malacca, 4th June, 1811.

	OFFICERS.	NATIVE OFFICERS.	N. C. O. & PRIVATES.	TOTAL.
European forces	200	—	5144	5344
Native forces	124	128	5580	5777
	<hr/> 324	<hr/> 128	<hr/> 10,674	<hr/> 11,121
Pioneers, Lascars, &c.				839
			Grand total	<hr/> 11,960 <hr/>

¹ Madras officer.

² Major-general C. A. Wetherall, C. B. K. H., deputy adjutant-general of the army.

³ Bengal officers.

⁴ *Thorn*, p. 18.

Of the number before-mentioned about twelve hundred were sick at Malacca and about one thousand five hundred on landing at Java.

The advance under Colonel Gillespie first landed, followed by his Excellency the Commander-in-chief, moved forward, and took up a position beyond the village, to gain possession of the road to Cornelis, and protect the landing of the rest of the troops.

On the 7th of August¹ the advance under Colonel Gillespie crossed the Anjole river by a bridge of boats, and by dawn were huddled near the suburbs. On the 8th August the town of Batavia was summoned. Many of the principal inhabitants had been compelled by General Jansens to quit Batavia; and those who remained readily submitted. Our troops occupied the town. On the morning of the 10th of August the advance division marched out of Batavia towards the cantonments of Weltevreden, which they reached by day-break. The cantonments were abandoned; but a division of the Dutch army, under General Jumel, the second in command, had taken up a strong position about a mile from Weltevreden, on the road to Cornelis.

¹ Wilson, vol. vii. p. 354.

The enemy opened a fire of grape from four horse artillery guns; whilst the infantry, posted in two villages, kept up a brisk fire of musketry on the advancing column. The enemy's guns were answered by the British artillery with effect, and the skirmishers replied to their musketry. The enemy's left flank was turned. The villages were set in flames, and the British troops charged. The enemy broke, and were pursued till they took shelter under the guns of Cornelis. Our loss was inconsiderable, but several officers were wounded: Lieutenant Duffield, horse artillery, died of his wounds; Lieutenant Munro, his Majesty's 78th, was killed. The enemy's loss was severe. The main body of the army came up towards the close of the engagement, and took post at Weltevreedon; having secured a free communication with the town and shipping, a healthy and commodious station for the troops, and the command of the resources of the country. In the arsenal at Weltevreedon three hundred guns were found, besides great quantities of ammunition and military stores.

“Preparations were immediately made for an attack upon Cornelis,¹ which General Jansens

¹ Wilson, vol. vii. p. 356.

expected to be able to maintain against all assaults, until the rainy season should set in, and sickness should compel the English to retire. His post was an entrenched camp between two rivers, the Slokan on the east, and the river of Batavia on the west. The latter was unfordable, and the banks were steep and overrun with jungle; the former was more practicable, but it was defended by powerful batteries and redoubts, one of which was on the near side of the river, for the protection of the only bridge that had been left standing. The space between the rivers in front, about six hundred yards, was guarded by strong entrenchments and redoubts, and was difficult of access from the ruggedness of the ground. A like space in the rear of the works was still more strongly fortified. The whole circumference of the lines extended nearly five miles, and was defended by two hundred and eighty pieces of cannon."

The battering train having been landed, and batteries constructed, the army broke ground on the night of the 20th of August. The place was now to be carried by storm. The principal attack was to be made on the redoubt on this side of the Slokan, and the bridge by which the river

was crossed. Colonel Gillespie¹ commanded the assault, having the infantry of the advance, and a part of the right brigade of the line commanded by Colonel Gibbs. Two other attacks were to be made upon the enemy's lines; one, under Lieut.-Colonel Macleod, against the principal redoubt in the angle of the enemy's front and left; and the other, under Major Yule,² upon the bridge leading to the rear. Whilst the main body of the army threatened the front.

The assault took place on the *night* of the 26th of August, when the Colonel Gillespie's column marched. The head of the column approached near the works towards morning. The rear division had fallen behind, and the colonel made a short halt; but as it was impossible to remain unobserved after *day-break*, he determined to make the assault at once. The morning

¹ Major-general Sir R. R. Gillespie, killed on the 31st of October, 1814, at Kalunga, in Nepaul. He had some dismounted dragoons, the body guard, and a body of marines; besides the grenadier, and light and rifle companies, of the 14th, 59th, 69th, and 78th regiments, and grenadiers of 5th and 6th volunteers, Madras pioneers.

² Grenadiers of the 20th native infantry, two companies 69th foot; flank battalion of reserve, and a troop of 22nd dragoons.

dawn showed the enemy's *videttes* at hand, and the column was challenged. The men, as commanded, reserving their fire, rushed forward with the bayonet; and the picquets were destroyed, and the advance redoubt was carried almost as soon as the alarm was given. The 78th carried the bridge over the Slokan. The passage effected, Colonel Gillespie turned to the left, stormed a second redoubt within the lines; and carried it at the point of the bayonet. Each of these redoubts mounted twenty eighteen-pounders, besides several twenty-four and thirty-two-pounders.

Colonel Gibbs was guided to the scene of action by the cannonade, and having crossed the Slokan, the grenadiers of the 14th, 59th, and 69th regiments moved against a redoubt on the right, which they carried with the bayonet in the most gallant style. Just when in possession of the redoubt, a powder magazine attached to it exploded and destroyed many, both defenders and assailants.¹ The remaining redoubts to the right and left were stormed. An active cannonade had been maintained on the front, where the enemy

¹ Blew up the grenadier companies of his majesty's 14th foot. It was fired by one of the enemy's officers, who perished in the explosion.

had erroneously expected the main attack, and hence had refrained from reinforcing their troops on the right. The detachment under Licut.-colonel Macleod, who led the 69th, carried the redoubt it attacked, but he was unfortunately killed. The success of the assault on the right soon opened a free access to the entrenchment, and the British entered Cornelis in every direction.

When most of the redoubts had been stormed, and daylight rendered objects distinct, the enemy's reserve, composed of several battalions, with twenty pieces of horse artillery, besides heavy guns, and a large body of cavalry, was seen drawn up on the plain in front of the barracks, and lesser fort of Cornelis, the guns of which commanded the approach. His majesty's 59th gallantly dispersed the enemy's troops, and captured the fort. The dragoons and horse artillery coming up, Colonel Gillespie placed himself at their head, and pursued the fugitives for ten miles, cutting off great numbers, and completing the disorganization of their army. Six thousand prisoners were taken, mostly European troops, including a regiment of Voltigeurs recently arrived from France. The loss of the enemy was very considerable. In the previous operations, and in the

assault of Cornelis, the killed and wounded amounted to nearly nine hundred,¹ of whom eighty-five were officers.

After² the annihilation of his army, General Jansens, with a small body of horse, retired to the eastern districts of Java. A squadron of frigates, with the marines, and a Bengal battalion under Colonel Wood, was immediately dispatched to Cheribon, and arrived there two days after General Jansens had passed. The place was immediately surrendered. Another expedition occupied the island of Madura, off the north-east extremity of Java. On the 5th September, Sir S. Auchmuty proceeded against General Jansens, who had assembled a native force, chiefly of horse, at Jatu, about six miles from Samarang. He landed at Samarang on the 13th : the town was abandoned. On the 16th, he came in sight of the enemy, about eight thousand strong, principally natives, with twenty guns drawn up on some high and rugged hills. Sir S. Auchmuty had about one thousand men, con-

¹ Thorn, p. 69, gives seven hundred and thirty-six Europeans, and one hundred and fifty-three natives (eight hundred and eighty-nine); besides seventy-three seamen and marines.

² Wilson, vol. vii. p. 362.

sisting of his majesty's 14th and 78th regiments, and grenadier company third volunteer battalion, and details of artillery and pioneers, with six field pieces. Our troops advanced, and ascended the heights; when the enemy retreated in confusion, and being chiefly cavalry, easily outstripped pursuit. This was the last effort made by General Jansens. He proposed to treat for a capitulation. A cessation of arms for twenty-four hours was allowed him; and, after some hesitation on the part of General Jansens, a treaty was signed. By this, it was stipulated that Java and its dependencies should be surrendered to Great Britain; that all the military should be prisoners of war; and that the British governor should be left unfettered in regard to the future administration of the island, the guarantee of the public debt, and the liquidation of the paper money. Jansens was governor of the Cape of Good Hope in 1806, when taken by Sir D. Baird. Napoleon said, when he took leave to go to Java (1811),—"Souvenez-vous, monsieur, qu'un général François ne se laisse pas prendre une seconde fois." He had little reason to look for much favourable consideration on his return to France.¹

¹ Wilson, p. 364.

The reduction of Java left the eastern seas without an enemy, and the merchant vessels of Great Britain and British India were at liberty to trade in those seas without the fear of plunder. It is said that Sir Edward Pellew¹ had, in 1807, urgently pressed Sir George Barlow to sanction an expedition against the island, for the reduction of which he required no more than one thousand Europeans, and as many native troops, in addition to the resources of the vessels under his command. The government adopted the economical policy, which was the order of the day. Sir E. Pellew, with a squadron of two line-of-battle ships, two frigates, and four sloops, sailed in October, 1807, for Gresik, a harbour on the east coast of Java, where it was known that several Dutch vessels of war were laid up. He there burnt three line-of-battle ships and an Indiaman, and destroyed the fort and batteries. The route which the fleet took in 1811 was recommended by Mr. Raffles, upon the authority of Captain Greigh, who had surveyed it. "Had not the presence of the Governor-general decided

¹ Wilson, p 352.—"The island of Java had for some time been almost lost sight of amid the convulsive revolutions which had shaken the parent country."

the question," (Mr. Wilson observes,) "we have his own testimony that the enterprise must have been suspended until the following year."¹ Then the Dutch would have rendered their works much stronger.

Medals² were bestowed upon the king's and Company's officers who had distinguished themselves in the expedition, and Lord Minto was raised to the dignity of Earl of Minto. After the reduction of Java, the government of the island was conferred upon Mr. Raffles, with the rank of lieutenant-governor of Java and its dependencies; and the command of the troops left on the island was given to Colonel Gillespie. Some of the native chiefs manifested a hostile disposition. Among these chiefs, one of the most powerful was the sultan of Yodtryakaita,³ who declared open war against the British, and called upon his countrymen to join him for their expulsion. Colonel Gillespie conducted a force against his capital, and carried it by storm. The sultan was taken prisoner and exiled to Penang,

¹ Parliamentary Debates, 10th January, 1812.

² Wilson, p. 364.

³ Usually pronounced Jockjokarta. Stormed on the 20th June, 1812.

and his son placed on the throne. The capture of Yodtryakaita, a place of great extent and some strength, defended by one hundred thousand troops, who, although defective in arms and discipline, were not wanting in intrepidity and fierceness. An expedition had before been sent against the sultan of Palembang, a state on the north-east coast of Sumatra. The sultan refused to enter into any engagements with the British, as he had done to the Dutch, and denied that such engagements had ever existed, and that the Dutch factory had been abandoned before the reduction of Java. The sultan had razed the Dutch fort and factory, and caused the members of the factory to be murdered. A force was sent, in March 1812, against the sultan, under Colonel Gillespie. The sultan fled. The colonel, on the 25th of April, landed a small party, and proceeded to the town, ascertained the truth of the above statement, and placed the sultan's brother on the throne. On the 18th of May, Colonel Gillespie, leaving the prince one hundred men for his defence, returned to Java, taking possession of Banca on his way.

The two French frigates,¹ *La Nymphe* and *La*

¹ Thorn, p. 90.

Medusa, which were blockaded in Sourabaya harbour, effected their escape the moment they received the news of the destruction of their army. Until the capitulation of the island, the navy were engaged in various operations, and were not able to detach ships to a distance along the coast.

The prize-money collected on account of the sale of prize-property captured on the island of Java, was distributed according to the rules which regulated prize-money in the navy in those days, it being a joint naval and military expedition.

Mutiny at Java in 1815.—In the end of 1815, several native officers, non-commissioned officers and sepoys, of the Bungal light infantry battalion, were tried for mutiny, in having, at Djoc-jocarta (Java), in October 1815, conspired with other native officers, &c., and for having been present at mutinous meetings, whereat it was determined to murder their European officers, and subvert the legal authorities of the state, and not reporting the existence of such meeting or meetings during the month of October 1815, to their immediate commanding officer. Some were sentenced to suffer death.¹ It ap-

¹ G. O. C. C., Bengal, 13th and 18th May, 13th June, and 21st September, 1816.—Hough's "Practice of Court Martial" (1825), p 77.

pears that in the Bengal G. O. C. C., 12th of December, 1810, it is stated, that "After the service shall be over, they (the volunteers) will be permitted to return to the battalions from which they were received, or to join any other corps to which they may give the preference."¹ These men had been volunteers since December 1810, and had been absent from India on foreign service above four and a-half years, while the usual period of absence is about three years. No intimation was given to these men that their services would be required beyond three years, whereas intimation ought to have been given to them before the expiration of the three years.

Java given up in 1816.—By a convention² with the United Netherlands, dated 13th of August, 1814; the British government, engaged to restore all the colonies, with exception of the Cape of Good Hope and some places in the West Indies. Java was among the cessions. Wilson says, "The more pressing calls at home upon the attention of the Batavian government, delayed its availing itself immediately of the generosity of its ally;"³

¹ Henley's "Bengal Military Regulations," p. 243.

² Wilson, vol. vii. p. 370.

³ It has been stated, that Great Britain was called upon

and Java did not re-assume the character of a Dutch colony until the end of 1816, five years after it had been conquered by the armament from Bengal."

It has been stated that the minister of the day did not, even open the despatches of Sir T. S. Raffles, nor those of Sir Samuel Auchmuty, giving glowing accounts of the Island of Java. In 1814, Wilson¹ states the revenue to have amounted to rupees 5,368,065 (£536,806). Java now yields about 60,000 tons of sugar, and the same amount of coffee, besides a considerable quantity of indigo. These articles are a government monopoly and sold to a Dutch company. The produce chiefly goes to Holland.

Debt of India in 1813-14.—The amount of the debt of India was £27,000,000.² The interest £1,636,000, a permanent diminution of £592,000 annual interest. But taking the sicca rupee at two shillings, the debt would be only £23,183,000, and the interest only £1,402,287.

Recall of Lord Minto.—Wilson states, that on to make the sacrifice, having gained so much by the war.—1st November, 1814, Congress at Vienna.

¹ Wilson, p. 369.—(Note 1.)

² Mill, vol. vii. p. 486.—According to parliamentary accounts, of two shillings and sixpence the sicca rupees.

the change of ministry in November, 1811, circumstances¹ had imposed upon the ministers the duty of conferring the office of government on the Earl of Moira. Lord Moira had been engaged in the endeavour to form a ministry. This was to be his reward. "A resolution was accordingly moved by the chairman (of the Court of Directors), under the dictation, no doubt, of the Board of Control, that Lord Minto should be recalled. No reason for the measure was assigned; but it was adopted in opposition to the tenor of a letter received from Lord Minto's friends, expressing his wish to be relieved in January, 1814. This letter was assigned as the reason for the immediate appointment of Earl Moira; but, as objected by one of the opponents of the arrangement, Mr. Charles Grant, the plea was delusive, as no one could pretend to assign it as a sufficient reason for proceeding to the choice of a governor-general in November, 1811, whose presence at Fort William could only be necessary in January, 1814." Lord Minto arrived in Calcutta as governor-general in July, 1807, so that in January, 1814, he would have been in office about the usual period.² "On

¹ Mill, vol. vii. p. 490, the assassination of Mr. Perceval.

² Warren Hastings, was from 1772 to 1785 (February);

the same occasion it was determined to supersede Sir George Nugent, as commander-in-chief, Lord Moira uniting both the civil and supreme authority; and not only to re-seind the conditional appointment of Sir G. Barlow as governor-general, but to remove him from the government of Fort St. George. These several measures were made the subject of strong protests by several leading members of the Direction; but the objections were over-ruled by the predominating spirit of ministerial obligations, and the change took place. Earl Moira was appointed governor-general of India and commander-in-chief;¹ and General Abercrombie, the commander of the forces at Fort St. George, was nominated for a time go- Lord Cornwallis, 1786 to 1793; Marquis Wellesley, 1798 to 1805.

¹ Sir G. Nugent assumed the command as commander-in-chief, 14th January, 1812, and quitted command 4th October, 1813, the day the Earl of Moira assumed command. On the arrival of Lord Moira, Sir G. Nugent assumed the provincial command, agreeably to the court's resolution of November 18th, 1812. In the case of Marquis Cornwallis, who assumed the command July 30th, 1805 (died 5th October, 1805), Lord Lake had held the command from the death of Lord Cornwallis, in his capacity of provincial commander-in-chief.—(Dodwell and Mill's Army List, 1760 to 1837.) Lord Lake sent in his resignation, which does not appear to have been accepted.

vernor of Madras. Lord Minto survived but a short time his return to his native country; he died in the course of the same year. Lord Moira arrived in Calcutta, and assumed his offices of governor-general and commander-in-chief on the 4th of October, 1813.

The renewal of the charter in 1814. The charter of 1793 expired¹ on the 10th April, 1814. Notice was given on the 4th March, 1811, by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who moved, that the Speaker of the House of Commons should signify the same in writing to the Court of Directors of the East India Company, that the Company's commercial privileges would cease and determine on the date above specified. On the 22nd February, 1813, a petition was presented to the House of Commons,² in which the Company prayed for the renewal of the privileges granted in 1793.

¹ Wilson, vol. vii. p. 497. ² Wilson, vol. vii. p. 509.

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